Thick concepts and emotion

Reading Bernard Williams

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 94-109

  Goldie, Peter ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84919509228     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203882597     Document Type: Chapter

References (12)

1. Alan Gibbard, "Morality and thick ethical concepts", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 66 (1992), 267-83
2. Kevin Mulligan, "From appropriate emotions to values", The Monist 81 (1998), 161-88
3. Samuel Scheffler, "Morality through thick and thin: A critical notice of Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy", The Philosophical Review 46 (1987), 411-34
4. Christine Tappolet, "Through thick and thin: good and its determinables", dialectica 58 (2004), 207-21.
5. "Maxims and thick ethical concepts", Ratio (new series) 19 (2006), 129-47, at p. 137.
6. Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)
7. Gibbard's Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Normative Theory of Judgment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
8. "Sentiment and value", Ethics 110 (2000), 722-48, at p. 729.
9. Simon Blackburn, "Circles, Finks, Smells and Biconditionals", Philosophical Perspectives 7, Language and Logic (1993), 259-79
10. Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotion", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2000), 65-90
11. R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Methods, and Point (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 74.
12. Bennett Helm's Emotional Reason:Deliberation, Motivation, and the Nature of Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).