An overview of practical exchange design

Current Science

Volumn 103, Issue 9, 2012, Pages 1056-1063

  McAfee, R Preston ^a   Vassilvitskii, Sergei ^a  

^a GOOGLE INC   (United States)

Author keywords

Exchange design; Goals and key techniques; Online exchange; Selling mechanisms

Indexed keywords

EID: 84918526727     PISSN: 00113891     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (23)

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