Institutional reform and decision-making in the European Union

Institutional Challenges in the European Union

Volumn , Issue , 2012, Pages 134-154

  Golub, Jonathan ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF READING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84917238738     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203164952     Document Type: Chapter

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