Social preferences in the face of regulatory change

Environmental Economics, Experimental Methods

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 293-306

  George, J Gregory ^a   Johnson, Laurie T ^b   Elisabet Rutstrom E ^c  

^a MIDDLE GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF DENVER   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CENTRAL FLORIDA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84917089826     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203935361     Document Type: Chapter

References (17)

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