Paradoxes from A to Z: Second edition

Paradoxes from A to Z: Second Edition

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-253

  Clark, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84911215767     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203962367     Document Type: Book

References (157)

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2. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, chapter 1.
3. Wesley C. Salmon, Space, Time and Motion, Enrico, California and Belmont, California, Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, chapter 2.
4. M. Allais, 'Le comportment de l'homme rationnel devant le risque', Econometrica, 1953, vol. 21. (Has English summary at the beginning.)
5. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk.' Econometrica, 1979, vol. 47.
6. Thomas Baldwin, G. E. Moore, London and New York, Routledge, 1990, chapter 7.
7. G. E. Moore, 'A reply to my critics', in P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, Northwestern University Press, Chicago and Evanston, 1942.
8. Wesley C. Salmon, Space, Time and Motion, Enrico, California and Belmont, California, Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, chapter 2.
9. C. L. Dodgson, Lewis Carroll's Symbolic Logic, ed. W. W. Bartley III, New York, Clarkson Potter, 1977.
10. Stephen Read, Relevant Logic, Oxford, Blackwell, 1988, section 2.3.
11. Frank Jackson, Conditionals, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1987.
12. James D. French, 'The false assumption underlying Berry's paradox', Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1988, vol. 53, offers the resolution given above.
13. Michael Clark, 'There is no paradox of blackmail', Analysis, 1994, vol. 54.
14. Joel Feinberg, Harmless Wrongdoing, vol. 4 of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 238-76.
15. Jean Buridan, Sophismata, 14th century (undated), translation in John Buridan on Self-Reference, ed. and trans. G. E. Hughes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982.
16. B. Spinoza, Appendix to Ethics 2, in The Collected Works of Spinoza, ed. and trans. Edwin Curley, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1985.
17. Alan Hájek, 'The Cable Guy paradox', Analysis, 2005, vol. 65, from which this entry is almost exclusively drawn.
18. A. W. Moore, The Infinite, London and New York, Routledge, 2nd edn, 2001, chapter 8.
19. Paul Halmos, Naïve Set Theory, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1960.
20. Thomas Forster, Set Theory with a Universal Set, Oxford, Clarendon Press, revised edn, 1995, for set theories which admit the set of all sets by restricting the axiom of subsets.
21. Michael Byron, 1995. 'Simon's revenge: or, incommensurability and satisficing', Analysis, 1995, vol. 55.
22. Cliff Landesman, 'When to terminate a charitable trust?', Analysis, 1995, vol. 55.
23. Dan Moller, 'Should we let people starve - for now?', Analysis, 2006, vol. 66.
24. Roy Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox, Oxford, OUP, 2003, p. 11. (A fascinating history.)
25. David Waller, 'The chicken and her egg', Mind, 1998, vol. 107.
26. G. Boolos and R. Jeffrey, Computability and Logic, 4th edn, 2002, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 236-38.
27. Ross Harrison, Democracy, London, Routledge, 1993. He makes the point about conflicting normative beliefs.
28. Ted Honderich, 'A difficulty with democracy', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1974, vol. 3, which inspired the treatment above.
29. Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, vol. I, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1945, chapter 7, note 4.
30. Roy Sorensen, Blindspots, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 317-20.
31. Gregory Kavka, 'Some paradoxes of deterrence', Journal of Philosophy, 1978, vol. 75. Kavka also considers some related paradoxes of deterrence.
32. Roy Sorensen, 'Seeing intersecting eclipses', Journal of Philosophy, 1999, vol. 96.
33. Stephen Read, Thinking about Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, chapter 2.
34. Neil Tennant, Anti-realism and Logic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987, chapter 17.
35. M. Hjort and S. Laver, eds, Emotion and the Arts, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997.
36. Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-believe, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990.
37. A. N. Prior, 'The formalities of omniscience', Philosophy, 1962, vol. 37.
38. A. W. Moore, The Infinite, London and New York, Routledge, 2nd edn, 2001, chapters 1 and 8.
39. J. W. Forrester, 'Gentle murder and the adverbial Samaritan', Journal of Philosophy, 1984, vol. 81. For the original Good Samaritan version
40. see P. H. Nowell-Smith and E. J. Lemmon, 'Escapism: the logical basis of ethics', Mind, 1960, vol. 69.
41. Stephen Yablo, 'A reply to new Zeno', Analysis, 2000, vol. 60.
42. Nelson Goodman, Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1955; 4th edn, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1983.
43. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, pp. 81-91.
44. Douglas Stalker, ed., Grue! the New Riddle of Induction, Chicago, Open Court, 1994. Fifteen papers with an extensive annotated bibliography covering 316 publications. According to the introduction there are now about twenty different approaches to the problem.
45. Alan Weir, 'Gruesome perceptual spaces', Analysis, 1995, vol. 55, for a stronger version of the paradox, which he argues cannot be dealt with so easily.
46. Oswald Hanfling, 'What is wrong with sorites arguments?', Analysis, 2000, vol. 61.
47. Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith, eds, Vagueness: A Reader, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: MIT Press, 1987, contains an excellent introductory survey and a range of important papers.
48. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, chapter 2.
49. R. M. Sainsbury and Timothy Williamson, 'Sorites', chapter 18 in R. Hale and C. Wright, eds, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford, Blackwell, 1997.
50. David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, chapter 1.
51. Robert L. Martin, 'On Grelling's paradox', Philosophical Review, 1968, vol. 77.
52. A. W. Moore, The Infinite, London and New York, Routledge, 2nd edn, 2001, chapter 1.
53. Roy Sorensen, Blindspots, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, chapter 7.
54. C. L. Dodgson, Lewis Carroll's Symbolic Logic, ed. W. W. Bartley III, New York, Clarkson Potter, 1977, reprints the article referred to above. Carroll's letter to the editor, reproduced in facsimile in the volume (pp. 471-74), throws some light on it.
55. Timothy Smiley, 'A tale of two tortoises', Mind, 1995, vol. 104.
56. Barry Stroud, 'Inference, belief, and understanding', Mind, 1979, vol. 88.
57. J. F. Thomson, 'What Achilles should have said to the tortoise', Ratio, 1960, vol. 3. For a different approach
58. see David Miller, Out of Error: Further Essays on Critical Rationalism, Ashgate, 2006, chapter 3.
59. G. H. Hardy, A Mathematician's Apology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. See the foreword by C. P. Snow added in this edition.
60. François Le Lionnais, Nombres Remarkables, Paris, Herman. 1983.
61. Roy Sorensen, A Brief History of the Paradox, Oxford, OUP, 2003, pp. 362-63.
62. Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 2001.
63. Ruth Weintraub, 'The time of a killing', Analysis, 2003, vol. 63.
64. Alan R. White, 'Shooting, killing and fatally wounding', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1979-80, vol. 80.
65. Roy Sorensen's Blindspots, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 121-30.
66. Michael Dummett, 'Victor's error', Analysis, 2001, vol. 61.
67. Neil Tennant, 'Victor vanquished', Analysis, 2002, vol. 62.
68. Tyler Burge, 'Buridan and epistemic paradox', Philosophical Studies, 1978, vol. 34. As Burge notes, Buridan's thirteenth sophism has some similarity to the belief paradox (Jean Buridan, Sophismata, fourteenth century (undated), translation in John Buridan on Self-Reference, ed. and trans. G. E. Hughes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982). In this version B is a proposition written on a wall which Socrates reads and doubts: 'Socrates knows that he doubts the proposition written on the wall'. Replace 'doubts' by 'doesn't believe', and you have the belief paradox.
69. Tyler Burge, 'Epistemic paradox', Journal of Philosophy, 1984, vol. 81, for an alternative approach.
70. Richard Montague and David Kaplan, 'A paradox regained', Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 1960, vol. 1. Reprinted in Formal Philosophy, ed. Richmond Thomason, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1974.
71. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, pp. 98-103.
72. Peter Suber, The Paradox of Self-Amendment, Section 20, B, at http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/writing/psa/sec20.htm, for the Ohio case.
73. Patrick Grim, The Incomplete Universe, Cambridge, Mass., and London, MIT Press, 1991, chapter 1. Pages 25-28 contain a critique of dialetheism.
74. Susan Haack, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, chapter 8.
75. Stephen Read, Thinking about Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, chapter 6.
76. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 6 is a good brief discussion of dialetheism (more sympathetic than Grim's).
77. John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2004.
78. David Lewis, 'Elusive knowledge', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1996, vol. 74. Reprinted in his Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999. For the relevant alternatives view.
79. Dana K. Nelkin, 'The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality', Philosophical Review, 2000, vol. 109.
80. William G. Lycan presents the paradox in his short paper 'Most generalizations are false', in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 1984, vol. 65.
81. Michael B. Burke, 'Dion, Theon, and the many-thinkers problem', Analysis, 2004, vol. 64.
82. David Lewis, 'Many, but almost one', in J. Bacon, K. Campbell and L. Reinhardt, eds, Ontology, Causality and Mind, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
83. E. J. Lowe, 'The problem of the many and the vagueness of constitution', Analysis, 1995, vol. 55.
84. Peter Unger, 'The problem of the many', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 1980, vol. 5.
85. Paul Hoffman, The Man Who Loved Only Numbers, London, Fourth Estate, 1998, pp. 233-40.
86. Thomas Baldwin, G. E. Moore, London and New York, Routledge, 1990, chapter VII, section 5. (See also for remarks on the provenance of the paradox in Moore's writings. The paradox is discussed by A. Duncan-Jones and A. M. McIver in Analysis, 1938, and presented to Moore by C. H. Langford in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed. P. A. Schilpp, Evanston:Chicago, Northwestern University, 1942.)
87. Michael Clark, 'Utterer's meaning and implications about belief', Analysis, 1975, vol. 35.
88. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2nd edn, 1958, Section IIx.
89. Thomas Nagel, 'Moral luck', in his Mortal Questions, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, [1976] 1979.
90. Brian Rosebury, 'Moral responsibility and "moral luck"', Philosophical Review, 1995, vol. 104. A critique of the views of Williams and Nagel.
91. Bernard Williams, 'Moral luck', in his Moral Luck, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, [1976] 1981.
92. R. Fagin, J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses and M. Y. Vardi, Reasoning about Knowledge, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995, paperback ed., 2003. For a fuller account of the puzzle, see pp. 4-7.
93. David Lewis, Convention, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1969.
94. Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation, Vancouver, The University of British Columbia Press, 1985. An anthology of papers which shows the complexity and range of this problem and of the related Prisoners' Dilemma.
95. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, chapter 3, section 1.
96. Ruma Falk in Theory and Psychology, 1994, vol. 4, who mentions the puzzle.
97. Robert Black, 'Solution of a small infinite puzzle', Analysis, 2002, vol. 62.
98. Patrick Grim, The Incomplete Universe, Cambridge, Mass. and London, MIT Press, 1991, pp. 91-94. (Chapter 2 for the direct argument and discussion of possible ways out; and chapter 4 for the Cantorian argument and discussion of possible ways out.)
99. See also J. C. Beall in Analysis, 2000, vol. 60.
100. W. V. Quine, 'The ways of paradox', in his Ways of Paradox and Other Essays, New York, Random House, 1966, pp. 3-20.
101. Derek Abbott and Greg Harmer in Nature, vol. 402, 23/30 Dec. 1999, p. 864.
102. Peter Cave, 'Too self-fulfilling', Analysis, 2001, vol. 61.
103. Raymond Smullyan, Forever Undecided, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988, sections 15-17.
104. Wesley C. Salmon, Space, Time and Motion, Enrico, California and Belmont, California, Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, chapter 2, pp. 52-58.
105. Adolf Grünbaum, 'Zeno's metrical paradox of extension', chapter 3 of his Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes, London, Allen & Unwin, 1968, most of which is reprinted in Wesley C. Salmon, Zeno's Paradoxes, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1970.
106. Michael Levin, Metaphysics and the Mind-Body Problem, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979, chapter 7, sections 6-7.
107. J. L. Mackie, Truth, Probability and Paradox, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, chapter 6.
108. A. N. Prior, Objects of Thought, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971, chapter 6.
109. P. Anand, Foundations of Rational Choice under Risk, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993, chapter 4.
110. Richmond Campbell and Lanning Sowden, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation, Vancouver, The University of British Columbia Press, 1985. An anthology of papers which shows the complexity and range of this problem and of the related Newcomb's Problem.
111. D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, chapters 2-4.
112. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, pp. 66-72.
113. Alexander D. Scott and Michael Scott, 'The paradox of the question', Analysis, 1999, vol. 59.
114. Warren S. Quinn, 'The puzzle of the self-torturer', Philosophical Studies, 1990, vol. 59.
115. Wesley C. Salmon, Space, Time and Motion, Enrico, California and Belmont, California, Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, chapter 2.
116. Richard Moran, 'Impersonality, character, and moral expressivism', Journal of Philosophy, 1993, vol. 90.
117. Carl Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, New York, The Free Press, [1945] 1965.
118. Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1912] 1959. The chicken example appears in chapter 6, p. 35.
119. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, pp. 73-81.
120. Richard Swinburne, An Introduction to Confirmation Theory, London, Methuen, 1973.
121. Peter Clark, 'Poincaré, Richard's paradox and indefinite extensibility', Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association, 1994, vol. 2.
122. George Boolos, 'The iterative conception of set', in Paul Benacerraf and Hilary Putnam, eds, Philosophy of Mathematics, 2nd edn, 1983, reprinted in his Logic, Logic, and Logic, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1999.
123. Michael Dummett, The Seas of Language, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 440-45.
124. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, pp. 107-11.
125. For a good introductory account of constructivism, see Stephen Read, Thinking about Logic, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, chapter 8.
126. Jeff Jordan, 'The St. Petersburg paradox and Pascal's Wager', Philosophia, 1994, vol. 23.
127. Maurice Kraitchik, Mathematical Recreations, London, Allen & Unwin, 1943, pp. 135-39.
128. For fair multiple games see: William Feller, An Introduction to Probability, New York, John Wiley, 1968, pp. 251-53.
129. H. L. A. Hart, 'Self-referring laws', 1964, repr. in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983.
130. Alf Ross, 'On self-reference and a puzzle in constitutional law', Mind, 1969.
131. Peter Suber, 'The paradox of self-amendment in constitutional law', Stanford Literature Review, 7, 1-2 (Spring-Fall 1990) 53-78.
132. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, ed., Self-deception and Paradoxes of Rationality, Stanford, California, CSLI Publications, 1998.
133. Alfred R. Mele, Self-deception Unmasked, Princeton, NJ, and Oxford, Princeton University Press, 2001.
134. Peter Cave, 'Too self-fulfilling', Analysis, 2001, vol. 61.
135. David Wiggins, Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
136. Maurice H. DeGroot, Probability and Statistics, Reading, Mass., Addison-Wesley, 1989.
137. Gary Malinas, 'Simpson's paradox and the wayward researcher', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1997, vol. 75.
138. Adam Elga, 'Self-locating belief and the Sleeping Beauty problem', Analysis, 2000, vol. 60.
139. David Lewis, 'Sleeping Beauty: reply to Elga', Analysis, 2001, vol. 61.
140. A. W. Moore, The Infinite, London and New York, Routledge, 2nd edn, 2001, chapter 4.
141. David Gauthier, 'Assure and threaten', Ethics, 1994, vol. 104.
142. Gregory Kavka, 'The toxin paradox', Analysis, 1983, vol. 43.
143. Noël Carroll, The Philosophy of Horror, New York and London, Routledge, 1990.
144. Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, London, Allen & Unwin, [1903] 1937, pp. 358-60.
145. Wesley C. Salmon, Space, Time and Motion, Enrico, California and Belmont, California, Dickenson Publishing Co., Inc., 1975, chapter 2.
146. Michael Clark and Nicholas Shackel, 'The two-envelope paradox', Mind, 2000, vol. 109.
147. For a non-probabilistic version of the paradox, see R. Smullyan, Satan, Cantor and Infinity, 1992, pp. 189-92. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
148. R. M. Sainsbury, Paradoxes, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1995, chapter 4, sections 2 and 3.
149. Roy Sorensen, Blindspots, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, chapters 7, 8 and 9, and references there. Sorensen calls it 'the prediction paradox'; this name is used above for quite a different paradox.
150. W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1962, pp. 287-88.
151. Stephen Read, 'Self-reference and validity', Synthese, 1979, vol. 42.
152. G. Brennan and L. Lomasky, 'Toward a democratic morality', and Alvin Goldman, 'A causal responsibility approach to voting', both reprinted in D. Estlund, Democracy, Oxford: Blackwell. 2002.
153. Jonathan Glover, 'It makes no difference whether or not I do it', 1975, reprinted in P. Singer, Applied Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
154. Michael Dummett, 'Wang's paradox', reprinted in Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith, eds, Vagueness: A Reader, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, MIT Press, 1997.
155. Scientific American, March 1990, p. 119.
156. J. C. Beall, 'Is Yablo's paradox non-circular?', Analysis, 2001, vol. 61.
157. Stephen Yablo, 'Paradox without self-reference', Analysis, 1993, vol. 53.