Inherited obligations and generational continuity

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 29, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 493-515

  Thompson, Janna ^a  

^a LA TROBE UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84911152780     PISSN: 00455091     EISSN: 19110820     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00455091.1999.10715989     Document Type: Note

References (22)

1. Canadian Journal of Philosophy I want to thank the referees and editors of the for their helpful comments and suggestions.
2. Miller, David. 1995. On Nationality 23Oxford: Clarendon Press. See also Miller, ‘In Defence of Nationality,’ Journal of Applied Philosophy10 (1993), 7.
3. Tamir, Yael. 1993. Liberal Nationalism 29Princeton: Princeton University Press.
4. Baier, Annette. 1980. “The Rights of Past and Future Persons,” in ”. In Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental Ethics Edited by: Partridge, Ernest. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books. (
5. Burke, Edmund. 1961. “ ‘Reflections,’ in ”. In Philosophy of Edmund Burke Edited by: Bredvold, L. I., and Ross, R. G., 43–4. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
6. Freeman, Michael. 1994. ‘Nation-State and Cosmopolis: A Response to David Miller,’. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11: 84
7. Miller, David. 1997. ‘Nationality: Some Replies,’. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 14: 79
8. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1989). See also, Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizen (Oxford: Clarendon Press
9. Danley, John. 1991. ‘Liberalism, Aboriginal Rights and Cultural Minorities,’. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 20: 168–85.
10. Kymlicka. Multicultural Citizenship 35ff.
11. McMahan, Jeff. 1997. “ ‘The Limits of National Partiality,’ in ”. In The Morality of Nationalism Edited by: McMahan, J., and McKim, R., 130New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
12. 1986. Reciprocity London and New York: Routledge. The best defence that I know of the view that we have a duty of gratitude to past generations is in Lawrence C. Becker, Ch. 7.
13. 1989. Liberalism, Community, and Culture This is the idea of liberalism defended by classical authors like Mill. It is also the position of many contemporary social philosophers. Kymlicka, for example, argues in that all cultural communities ought to become more liberal. Susan Moller Okin argues in Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books that principles of justice ought to be applied to the family.
14. 1974. Anarchy, state, and Utopia New York: Basic Books. Not all liberals reject past-referring duties. Robert Nozick's theory of historical entitlement, makes past- referring duties and rights basic to a theory of justice. However, his theory depends upon a view of self ownership that many philosophers regard as implausible. My account can be regarded as an alternative approach compatible with the liberal framework.
15. I am assuming that the individuals engaging in reflection have the properties and values described on 4–5. I do not suppose that they are reasoning from behind Rawls's veil of ignorance. There are a number of reasons why it is not appropriate to use this device. For one thing, I am assuming that individuals know, and are motivated by, their ideas of good, and that they have certain basic moral beliefs. Furthermore, I allow that the conclusions they reach are affected by the nature and values of their particular community. In any case, Rawls's veil of ignorance is a device meant to enable individuals to determine the basic principles of a political society. My purpose is more general. I want individuals to reflect upon their moral responsibilities in relation to the various communities to which they belong.
16. Partridge, Ernest. 1980. “ ‘Why Care About the Future?‘ ”. In Responsibilities to Future Generations Edited by: Partridge, E., Buffalo, NY: Prometheus. (appeals to various psychological theories to argue that individuals need self-transcendent concerns—concerns that he thinks make us care about what happens in the future. Those who do not have these concerns are narcissistic, alienated from others, and fail to live a satisfying life. If this is right, then it supports my contentions about posterity-directed desires. However, I am not claiming anything more here than that it is reasonable for individuals to have posterity-directed desires and to regard some of them as important.
17. I am not denying that individuals can make unreasonable demands about such things—demands that others will rightly judge to be unfair or unrealistic. I am also not assuming that demands that are reasonable ought to be fulfilled. There may be other considerations (as I will suggest below).
18. There clearly are promises that are understood to be valid only during the lifetime of the promiser. The obligation ceases when he or she dies. The promises made in marriage vows are obvious examples. However, people also make promises or sign contracts where there is no presumption that the obligation ceases with death. The latter, ‘person independent promises,’ are the commitments that individuals are predisposed to think that their successors should fulfill.
19. Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice 289Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.
20. Hacker, P. M.S., and Raz, J., eds. 1977. Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honor of H.L.A. Hart 284–308. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Joel Feinberg argues that the dead do have interests. See ‘Harm and Self Interest,’, However, the issue is not merely this, but also whether and to what extent the ‘like cases should be treated alike’ rule applies to them.
21. Ethics, Ernest Partridge argues for a similar position in ‘Posthumous Interests and Posthumous Respect,’ 91 (1981: ‘Because the living have expectations and concern for having their own wills respected, they also have an interest in respecting the wills of the deceased. That is to say, it is in the interests of the living…that they maintain the stable and just institutions that secured the wishes expressed by the deceased during their lifetimes’ (261). However, my argument is that we do not merely have an interest in respecting the wishes of the deceased, but (in some cases) a moral obligation to do so.
22. Political Theory, 179 The claim that inherited obligations are compatible with liberalism does not mean that their acceptance is compatible with attitudes and practices in existing liberal societies. Those who argue for inherited responsibilities are often critical of existing policies and attitudes in liberal societies. See Sheldon S. Wolin, ‘Contract and Birthright,’ 14 (1986, 93