Against Cognitivism About Supposition

Philosophia (United States)

Volumn 42, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 607-624

  Arcangeli, Margherita ^a  

^a INSTITUT JEAN NICOD   (France)

Author keywords

Belief; Belief like imagination; Imagination; Supposition

Indexed keywords

EID: 84911004409     PISSN: 00483893     EISSN: 15749274     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-014-9535-9     Document Type: Article

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