Why do members of congress support agricultural protection?

Food Policy

Volumn 50, Issue , 2015, Pages 20-34

  Bellemare, Marc F ^a   Carnes, Nicholas ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

^b DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Agricultural policy; Agricultural protection; Congress; Farm bill; Lobbying; Voting

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL POLICY; ELECTORAL SYSTEM; LOBBYING; SUBSIDY SYSTEM; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 84909619819     PISSN: 03069192     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.10.010     Document Type: Article

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