The role of modeling and consequence evaluation in improving safety level of industrial hazardous installations: A case study: Hydrogen production unit

Iran Occupational Health

Volumn 10, Issue 6, 2014, Pages 29-41

  Zarei, E ^a   Jafari, M J ^b   Dormohammadi, A ^c   Sarsangi, V ^d  

^a NEYSHABUR UNIVERSITY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES   (Iran)

^b SHAHID BEHESHTI UNIVERSITY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES   (Iran)

^c Occupational Health Eng Health Safety and Environment Management Mashhad subway Line 2 project   (Iran)

^d KASHAN UNIVERSITY OF MEDICAL SCIENCES   (Iran)

Author keywords

Consequence evaluation; Consequence modeling; Hazardous industries; Hydrogen production

Indexed keywords

EID: 84906699972     PISSN: 17355133     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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