Pure intentionalism about moods and emotions

Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 135-158

  Mendelovici, Angela ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN ONTARIO   (Canada)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84906017206     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203116623     Document Type: Chapter

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