Wars of disruption: International competition and information technology-driven military organizations

National Security in the Information Age

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 75-112

  Demchak, Chris C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905951106     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203005859     Document Type: Chapter

References (51)

1. Colin S. Gray, Weapons Don't Make War: Policy, Strategy and Military Technology (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas), p.85 and O'Connell, Ride of the Second Horseman, p.237.
2. For a discussion of the implications of these changes for the international system, see Barry R. Posen, 'Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power', International Security, Vol.18, No.2 (Fall1993), pp.80-124.
3. See O'Connell, Ride of the Second Horseman, p.233.
4. Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos and Mark R. Shulman (eds) The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).
5. See Roger Allen, Leslie Lewis, Carl Dahlman and John Schank, Assessing the Potential for Using Reserves in Operations Other Than War (MR-796-0SD) (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Publications, 1997).
6. See Michael J. Mazarr, Don M. Snider and James A. Blackwell, Desert Storm: The Gulf War and What We Learned (San Francisco, CA: West View Press, 1993).
7. See also Gene I. Rochlin and Chris C. Demchak, 'The Gulf War: Technological and Organizational Implications', Survival Journal of the International Institute of Strategic Studies, Vol.33 No.3 (1991), pp.260-73.
8. See also Bruce W. Watson and Peter G. Tsouras (eds) Military Lessons of the Gulf War (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993).
9. For the development of this term as a shorthand to describe the attributes of this new military, see Chris C. Demchak, 'Tailored Precision Armies in Fully Networked Battlespace: High Reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the " Information Age'" ,Journal of Contingency and Crisis Management, Vol.4 No.2 June 1996).
10. See Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense Statement: 'The Bottom-Up Review: Forces for a New Era' US Department of Defense. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office (I Sept. 1993), pp.10-13.
11. James Joyner, 'Back to the Future: The Rumsfeld Defense Strategy Review in Historical Perspective', paper presented at the annual International Security Studies Section conference of the International Studies Association, Whittier, California, October 2001.
12. See Frances Cairncross, The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change Our Lives (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1996).
13. For a detailed discussion of how this sort of leadership vacuum produces traditional outcomes, see Thomas L. McNaugher, New Weapons, Old Politics: America's Military Procurement Muddle (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution 1989).
14. See Paul E. Blackwell, 'Winning the Wars of the 21st Century' in A USA, Association of the United States Army (AUSA Press, Washington DC, 1994), pp.121-34, 123.
15. See Leon E. Salomon, 'At AMC, the future begins today', in Association of the United States Army Greenbook (Washington DC: AUSA Press, 1994), pp.69-76.
16. See Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes and Trevor J. Pinch (eds), The Social Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987)
17. For the seminal work on this topic, see Jay R. Galbraith, Organizational Design, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1977).
18. See David Freedman, 'Killed At Their Keyboards', Business 2.0 Magazine, Feb. 2002.
19. See Demchak, Military Organizations, LaPorte, Organized Social Complexity, Gareth Morgan, Images of Organization (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1996);
20. Michael Harrison, Organizations: Methods, Models and Processes (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1997);
21. Gareth Jones, Organizational Theory (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1995), for discussions of these rules of thumb in organizational literatures.
22. See Vernon Loeb, " 'Friendly Fire" Deaths Traced to Dead Battery', Washington Post, 24 March 2002, p.A21.
23. See Phillip S. Meilinger, 'Preparing For The Next Little War', Armed Forces Journal International (April 2002). Downloaded.
24. See LaPorte, Organized Social Complexity. See also Dan S. Felsenthal, 'Applying the Redundancy Concept to Administrative Organizations', Public Administration Review, 40 (May-June, 1980), pp.247-52.
25. See David Windle and Damian Carrington 'Silent Sensors Wait for bin Laden', New Scientist (21 Nov. 2001). Downloaded.
26. See Linda D. Kozaryn Stopping Escaping AI Qaeda, Taliban Like 'Catching Fleas', American Forces Press Service (17 Dec. 2001). Downloaded.
27. See Jim Garamone, Gunning for AI Qaeda, Taliban Leaders, American Forces Press Service (10 Dec. 2001). Downloaded.
28. See Dennis J. Reimer, Address of the Army Chief of Staff at the Acquisition Reform Conference, Atlanta (23 April 1996).
29. See, William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains: Lessons in Leadership (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), p.210.
30. See Gordon Sullivan, 'America's Army-Focusing on the Future', in Association of the United States Army, Army Greenbook (Washington DC: AUSA Press, 1994), pp.19-29.
31. See also AMDP, Army Digitization Master Plan, US Government Department of the Army, HQPA, Army Digitization Office (30 Jan. 1995).
32. See William Seymour, Decisive Factors in Twenty Great Battles of the World (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1988).
33. For a modern discussion of the causes of war, see Byman, Daniel and Stephen Van Evera, 'Why They Fight: Hypotheses on the Causes of Contemporary Deadly Conflict', Security Studies Journal, Vol.7, No.3 (spring 1998).
34. See Dan Reiter, 'Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen', International Security, Vol.20, No.2 (Fall, 1995), pp.3-34.
35. See Rohan Gunaratna, 'Al-Qleda's Operational Ties with Allied Groups',Jane's Intelligence Review (1 Feb. 2003) online service.
36. For an interesting case of how long this takes, see Peter Hermann, 'Recruited To Die: An Arab's Story,' Baltimore Sun, (20 Feb., 2003) online.
37. See Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
38. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
39. See also Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (Fifth Edition, Revised) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pp.4-15.
40. See A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, 'The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice', Science, 211 (1981), pp.453-8.
41. For an application of complexity theory to international relations, see Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1997).
42. See also David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski (eds) Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997).
43. See Vaiclia Krebs, 'Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells', Connections, Vol.24, No.3 (2002), pp.43-52.
44. See also Richard Rothenberg, 'From Whole Cloth-Making up the terrorist network', Connections, Vol.24, No.3 (2002), pp.36-42.
45. See Anthony H. Cordesman and A. R. Wagner, Lessons of Modern War, Vol.III (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989).
46. See Thomas L. Friedman, 'U.S. hasn't won hearts and minds of Arab-Muslim world', New York Times, 25 Jan. 2002.
47. See Eric Schmitt, 'Rumsfeld Formally Disbands Office of Strategic Influence', New York Times, 26 Feb. 2002.
48. See Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Globalization and Governance', PS Online (Dec. 1999).
49. See John Lewis Gaddis, 'Living in Candlestick Park', Atlantic Monthly Online, April1999.
50. See Martin Van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
51. See Toeffler and Toeffler, War and Anti-War, p.l39.