Beware of black swans: Taking stock of the description-experience gap in decision under uncertainty

Marketing Letters

Volumn 25, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 269-280

  de Palma, André ^a   Abdellaoui, Mohammed ^b   Attanasi, Giuseppe ^c   Ben Akiva, Moshe ^d   Erev, Ido ^e   Fehr Duda, Helga ^f   Fok, Dennis ^g   Fox, Craig R ^h   Hertwig, Ralph ⁱ   Picard, Nathalie ^j   Wakker, Peter P ^g   Walker, Joan L ^k   Weber, Martin ^l  

^a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS SACLAY   (France)

^b Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique   (France)

^c UNIVERSITÉ DE STRASBOURG   (France)

^d Massachusetts Institute of Technology Cambridge   (United States)

^e TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^f ETH ZURICH   (Switzerland)

^g ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^h UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

ⁱ MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT   (Germany)

^j UNIVERSITÉ DE CERGY PONTOISE   (France)

^k 109 McLaughlin Hall   (United States)

^l UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

more..

Author keywords

(Non) expected utility; Ambiguity; Black swans; Description based decision making; Experience based decision making; Fourfold pattern; Probabilistic choices; Risk

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905695681     PISSN: 09230645     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11002-014-9316-z     Document Type: Article

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