From stability to stagnation: Germany at the beginning of the twenty-first century

Germany: Beyond the Stable State

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-32

  Kitschelt, Herbert ^a   Streeck, Wolfgang ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIETIES   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905546416     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203489154     Document Type: Chapter

References (21)

1. Deutsche Presse Agentur, 'Politbarometer: Wähler mit Rot-Grün so unzufrieden wie nie', DPA reportof Friday, 15 December, 15:35 hrs:de.news.yahoo.com/021213/3/349g9.html.
2. For a detailed review of the institutional configuration characterising 'Model Germany', see Peter Katzenstein Policy and Politics in West Germany. The Growth of a Semisovereign State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1987), which is still the most incisive and comprehensive summary we know.
3. For a later account see Wolfgang Streeck, 'German Capitalism: Does it Exist? Can it Survive?' New Political Economy 2/2 (1997), pp. 237-56.
4. See W.Streeck, 'On the Institutional Conditions of Diversified Quality Production', in E. Matzner and W.Streeck (eds.), Beyond Keynesianism: The Socio-Economics of Production and Employment (London: Edward Elgar 1991), pp. 21-61.
5. G.Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990), and Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999).
6. For Germany's relative comparative advantage in different manufacturing sectors from 1961 to 1997, see H.Siebert and M.Stolpe, 'Germany', in B.Steil, D.G.Victor and R.R.Nelson (eds.), Technological Innovation and Economic Performance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2002), pp. 112-47, Table, p. 120.
7. For the link between market and technological challenges and the institutional advantages of different varieties of capitalism, see S.Casper, M.Lehrer and D.Soskice, 'Can High-Technology Industries Prosper in Germany? Institutional Frameworks and the Evolution of the German Software and Biotechnology Industries', Industry and Innovation 6/1 (1999), pp. 5-20;
8. P.A. Hall and D.Soskice, 'An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism', in P.A.Hall and D.Soskice (eds.), Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), pp. 21-7;
9. H.Kitschelt, 'Industrial Governance, Innovation Strategies, and the Case of Japan', International Organization 45/4 (1991), pp. 453-93;
10. D.Soskice, 'German Technology Policy, Innovation, and National Institutional Frameworks', Industry and Innovation 4/1 (1997), pp. 75-96;
11. and W.Streeck, Social Institutions and Economic Performance. Studies on Industrial Relations in Advanced European Capitalist Countries (London: Sage 1992).
12. For the current predicament of the conservative German welfare state, discussed in acomparative context, see F.W.Scharpf, 'Economic Changes, Vulnerabilities, and Institutional Capabilities', and A.C.Hemerijck and M.Schludi, 'Sequences of Policy Failures and Effective Policy Responses', both in F. Scharpf and V.A.Schmidt (eds), Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000)
13. as well as E.Huber and J.D.Stephens, Development and Crisis of the Welfare State (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2001), especially pp. 144-68 and 223-40.
14. See T.Iversen, Contested Economic Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999)
15. and R.J.Franzese, Explaining Macroeconomic Policies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002).
16. P.A.Hall and R.J.Franzese, 'Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union', International Organization 52/3 (1999), pp. 502-36.
17. F.W.Scharpf, B.Reissert and F.Schnabel, Politikverflechtung. Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in der BRD (Kronberg, Taunus: Scriptor 1976).
18. See also F.W. Scharpf, 'The Joint Decision Trap. Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration', Public Administration 66 (1988), pp. 239-78.
19. B.R.Weingast, 'The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development', Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11/1 (1995), pp. 1-31.
20. For a fascinating empirical confirmation of the democratic logic of intertemporal accountability and responsiveness in the US case, see R.S.Erikson, M.B.MacKuen and J.A. Stimson, The Macro Polity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002), especially chapters 7 to 9.
21. H.Kitschelt, 'Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies?' in P.Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001), pp. 265-302.