Interaction and self-correction

Frontiers in Psychology

Volumn 5, Issue JUL, 2014, Pages

  Satne, Glenda L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Conceptual abilities; Evolution; Interaction; Naturalism; Normativity; Self correction

Indexed keywords

EID: 84904872959     PISSN: None     EISSN: 16641078     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00798     Document Type: Article

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