Mental Representation and Consciousness

Encyclopedia of Consciousness

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 19-32

  Hutto, D D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HERTFORDSHIRE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Enactivism; Externalism; Intentionality; Internalism; Methodological solipsism; Misrepresentation; Mode of presentation; Narrow content; Phenomenal character; Psychosemantics; Qualia; Representational content; Subjectivity; Supervenience; Teleofunctions

Indexed keywords

EID: 84880670223     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1016/B978-012373873-8.00050-5     Document Type: Chapter

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