Recency, consistent learning, and Nash equilibrium

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue SUPPL.3, 2014, Pages 10826-10829

  Fudenberg, Drew ^a   Levine, David K ^b,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

^c WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; DECISION MAKING; LEARNING; LEARNING ALGORITHM; MEMORY; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; NEGLECT; OBSERVATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PROBABILITY; STATISTICS;

ALGORITHMS; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; LEARNING; MEMORY; MEMORY, SHORT-TERM; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; RETENTION (PSYCHOLOGY);

EID: 84904661084     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1400987111     Document Type: Article

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