The former clerks who nearly killed judicial restraint

Notre Dame Law Review

Volumn 89, Issue 5, 2014, Pages 2129-2154

  Snyder, Brad ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL   (United States)

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EID: 84904189444     PISSN: 07453515     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (151)

1. Richard A. Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519, 553 (2012).
2. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 146 (1893) (quoting In Wellington, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 87, 95 (1834) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
3. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER ET AL., JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, AND FEUX FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 86 (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1967).
4. This group includes not only Supreme Court clerks but also lower court clerks. Dave Trubek, for example, clerked for Second Circuit Judge Charles Clark. Some important legal theorists, such as Roberto Unger, did not clerk at all. For a list of Supreme Court clerks according to their respective Justices, see TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE app. 4 (2006).
5. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 145-52 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
6. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Printiples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959).
7. For a critique of Wechsler's article, see Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 561 (1988).
8. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
9. See Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 463 (1995) (discussing the history and significance of the Harvard Law Review forewords).
10. See Charles L. Barzun, The Forgotten Foundations of Hart and Sacks, 99 VA. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (2013)
11. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historieal and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in HART & SACKS, supra note 17, at cii-ciii.
12. John Henry Schlegel, Those Weren't "The Good Old Days," fust the Old Days: Laura Kaiman on Yale Law School in the Sixties, 32 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 841, 843 (2007)
13. reviewing LAURA KALMAN, YALE LAW SCHOOL AND THE SIXTIES (2005).
14. See Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 38 (1957)
15. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court 1958 Term-Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1959).
16. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 220, 235 (1995)
17. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 21, at civ; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960, at 49-50 (1986)
18. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Commentary, The Making of The Legal Process, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2032-33 (1994)
19. William M. Wiecek, American Jurisprudence After the War: "Reason Called Law," 37 TULSA L. REV. 857, 867-72, 874 (2002).
20. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 44-47 (1997).
21. See Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934, 49 HARV. L. REV. 68 (1935).
22. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, at ix (Ist ed. 1953).
23. Peter B. Edelman, Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence and the Good Society: Shades of Felix Frankfurter and the Harvard Hit Parade of the 1950s, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1799 (1991).
24. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In a democratic society like ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the people's representatives. In any event there is nothing judicially more unseemly nor more self-defeating than for this Court to make in terrorem pronouncements, to indulge in merely empty rhetoric, sounding a word of promise to the ear, sure to be disappointing to the hope.")
25. See Brad Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 346 (2013).
26. See MICHAL R. BELKNAP, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, 1953-1969, at 80 (2005) (discussing the shift occurring in the Warren Court after the replacement of Justice Frankfurter with Justice Goldberg)
27. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 11-12 (1998) (positing a three-part Warren Court)
28. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 497-99 (2000) (characterizing the Warren Court as three different courts)
29. Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 3-4 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE WARREN COURT] (arguing that the Warren Court did not exist "as a cultural phenomenon" until the early 1960s).
30. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 175-98 (1965)
31. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 193-97 (2d ed. 1986)
32. hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH.
33. See BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at 25-26 (arguing that "insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal to men's better natures"); see id. at 29-31, 71-72, 129 (discussing the Court's legitimating function).
34. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS 17 (1957) (quoting Brandeis that the "'most important thing we do is not doing'")
35. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at 111-98; Bickel, supra note 19, at 41.
36. Nonetheless, Brandeis did not always avoid constitutional questions. See, e.g., Erie R.R. V. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
37. Willing v. Chi. Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
38. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at 16-23.
39. See KALMAN, supra note 22, at 52; Robert A. Burt, Alex Bickel's Law School and Ours, 104 YALE L.J. 1853, 1856 (1995) (stating that Bickel's "distinctive vision framed the terms of debate in constitutional jurisprudence in the 1960's and beyond")
40. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Alexander M. Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521, 521 (1976) ("While Alexander Bickel's premature death at the age of forty-nine was a personal tragedy for his family and friends, it was an intellectual loss of almost equal proportion for his wide and varied audience.").
41. KALMAN, supra note 22, at 52-54, 208-09, 214-15. For Bickel's decision to represent The New York Times and initial views on the case, see DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED 101-04 (1996).
42. For Bickel's criticism of the Warren Court, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975)
43. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
44. For the best chapter on Hart, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION 258-85 (2000); see also id. at 390 n.195 (discussing Hart's declining health).
45. LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2 (1996) ("[Legal liberalism refers to] trust in the potential of courts, particularly the Supreme Court, to bring about 'diose specific social reforms that affect large groups of people such as blacks, or workers, or women, or partisans of a particular persuasion; in other words, policy change with nationwide impact' Because of the nation's experience with the Warren Court, legal liberalism has been linked to political liberalism since midcentury."
46. quoting GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 4 (1991).
47. Robert C. Post, William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT, supra note 34, at 123 (quoting Hutchinson that Brennan was "responsible" for the Warren Court's "intellectual legacy"); POWE, supra note 34, at 499 (noting that Dennis Hutchinson, Sanford Levinson, and Robert Post credited Brennan with the Warren Court's leadership).
48. OWEN FISS, A Life Lived Twice, 100 YALE L.J. 1117, 1118 (1991).
49. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 6 (1978).
50. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 14-15 (1969) (building on Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness" and the identification of "just wants").
51. See generally Frank I. Michelman, The Priority of Liberty: Rawb and "Tim of Scrutiny" (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 11-22, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1927292 (discussing "Rawlsian political liberalism").
52. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
53. See Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962, 1016 (1973) (discussing Rawls's "comprehensive, coherent theory of social justice").
54. Id. at 262 n.8 (quoting Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1255 (1965)
55. citing Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964)
56. see also OWEN M. FISS, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 789 (1990) (describing Goldberg's outcome as "singular" and "remarkable" and attributing it to Brennan's jurisprudential triumphs during the 1960s)
57. Charles A. Reich, Beyond the New Property: An Ecological View of Due Process, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 731, 731 (1990) (describing Goldberg as "a landmark in the evolution of social justice").
58. See OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 54-130 (2003).
59. Fiss's retirement speech in his last civil procedure class made students cry. See M.L., A Professor's Reach, YALE L. SCH. (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.law.yale.edu/admissions/12827.htm.
60. As of 2000, Ely was the fourth most-cited legal scholar behind Posner, Dworkin, and Holmes. Fred R. Shapiro, The MostrCited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 tbl.6 (2000).
61. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 122-26 (1964).
62. John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 11 (1974) ("He was a leader because he was a man with a mission, and because the mission was good."); see id. (describing Warren as "one of the greatest single forces for right the nation has ever known").
63. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, at v (1980).
64. Id. at 69-72 (discussing Bickel's later work and Warren Court criticism); see also Harry H. Wellington, Foreword to BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at x (arguing Ely "in one way or another is a student of Bickel" and that his scholarship would not have been possible without The Least Dangerous Branch).
65. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 41, at 18. For Bickel's discussion of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see id. at 16-28.
66. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
67. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 926, 937-43, 948-49 (1973).
68. John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 77 VA. L. REV. 833, 865-66 (1991). Ely noted: "I'm not sure this account is correct" Id. at 866 n.102.
69. ELY, supra note 70, at 76-78 (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,152 n.4 (1938))
70. citing Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944).
71. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted); see also David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 745 (1981) (identifying footnote four's influence on the Roosevelt Court's anti-totalitarian theory of the Constitution).
72. Nairn v. Nairn, 350 U.S. 891, 891 (1955) (mem.) (per curiam), appeal denied, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (mem.) (per curiam).
73. Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
74. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND (2d ed. 2011).
75. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947) (laying out the so-called "Hand Formula" where the burden of precaution required is a function of the probability and the gravity of injury).
76. Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 514-15 (1994) (reviewing GUNTHER, supra note 85); see id. at 513-20
77. contrasting Hand's opinions in Masses Publishing Co. V. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev'd, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917)
78. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1950), affd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)). Posner concluded: "I would rate Hand's contribution to constitutional thought slight" Id. at 520.
79. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978).
80. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
81. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
82. Tensions among CLS, CRT, and FLT existed from the beginning. CLS's indeterminancy thesis clashed with some of CRT's and FLT's emphasis on rights. See Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1520 (1991) ("[S]ome feminist and minority scholars who share the [CLS] political location have disagreed with some formulations of the indeterminacy thesis, and in particular with the use of that thesis to challenge the importance of the vindication of rights, especially constitutional rights.").
83. Others associated with CRT, including Derrick Bell, echoed CLS's skepticism. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
84. Compare Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339, 339 (1996) (proposing an indeterminacy thesis that is not vulnerable to the criticisms lodged against the original version)
85. Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 558-59 (1993) (arguing that claims premised on the "indeterminacy thesis" are unpersuasive)
86. Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 462-63 (1987) (offering a critique of the indeterminacy thesis).
87. John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate, Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 391, 392-93 (1984).
88. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563 (1982)
89. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976)
90. see also MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15-63 (1987) (critiquing the debate about rules and standards).
91. Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 39 (1984).
92. Richard Michael Fischl, The Question That Killed Critical Legal Studies, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 779, 780 (1992) (reviewing KELMAN, supra note 102).
93. But see John Henry Schlegel, CLS Wasn't Killed by a Question, 58 ALA. L. REV. 967, 968 (2007) ("CLS wasn't killed by a question; it simply drifted out of fashion for want of a 'new look.'").
94. Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: William J. Brennan, Jr., 111 HARV. L. REV. 9, 9 (1997) [hereinafter Posner, In Memoriam]
95. Richard A. Posner, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 13 (1990).
96. Interview, A Conversation with Judge Richard A. Posner, 58 DUKE L.J. 1807, 1812 (2009) (describing Elman as "a former boss of mine whom I greatly respected")
97. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 761, 761-62 (2005) (discussing Elman).
98. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 4 (1981) (describing them as "pioneers").
99. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
100. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961).
101. For a discussion of Calabresi's role in developing the ideas in the Coase Theorem, see Alain Marciano, Calabresi, "Law and Economics" and the Coase Theorem (Int'l Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 26/2010, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmPabstract-id=1710608.
102. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 541-42 (2011).
103. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
104. See generally Keith N. Hylton, Calabresi and the Intellectual History of Law and Economics, 64 MD. L. REV. 85 (2005) (discussing Calabresi's book, as well as exploring its influences and impact on current scholarship).
105. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 1-8 (1973).
106. He is the most cited legal scholar of all time. See Charles K. Rowley, An Intellectual History of Law and Economics: 1739-2003, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 3, 20 (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eck., 2005) (describing Posner as "unequivocally" the "most important scholar in law and economics" since he published Economic Analysis of Law); supra note 67.
107. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972).
108. See generally RICHARD H. THALER SC CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE (2008).
109. Duncan Kennedy, Law-and-Economics from the Perspective of Critical Legal Studies, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 465, 465 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); see also KELMAN, supra note 102, at 151-85 (discussing Kennedy's and Michelman's critiques of the conservative preferences in law and economics).
110. Duncan M. Kennedy, HARV. L. SCH., http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ directory/10469/Kennedy (last visited Apr. 12, 2014).
111. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 198-214 (1995).
112. Posner, supra note 1, at 539; see id. 539-42; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 5 (2013) ("I am a pragmatic judge ⋯."); id. at 5-6 (linking pragmatism with legal realism)
113. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230-65 (2008) ("The word that best describes the average American judge at all levels of our judicial hierarchies and yields the greatest insight into his behavior is 'pragmatist' ⋯."); see id. at 230-65
114. RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO 28 (1990) ("Cardozo's extrajudicial writings constitute in fact the fullest statement of a jurisprudence of pragmatism that we possess ⋯. Cardozo's formulation was not only more fully developed but also clearer, more explicit, and more coherent [than Holmes's]." (footnote omitted)).
115. Edwin Meese III, The Great Debate: Attorney General Ed Meese III, FEDERALIST SOC'Y (July 9, 1985), http://www.fed-soc.org/resources/page/the- great-debate-attorney-generaled-meese-iiijuly-9-1985.
116. see Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2009) (positing that originalism was an instrument of the Reagan Administration to put its critique of the Warren and Burger Courts in "jurisprudential terms," and that Ed Meese instituted a campaign to publicly promote this idea).
117. David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn't Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 969, 975 (2008) (describing Black as "the most successful originalist of the last century" and as using it "to attack what was, in his view, a corrupt tradition ⋯ of the pre-New Deal Court")
118. see also David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 143 (2011) (describing Black and Scalia as the "two most prominent originalists of the last hundred years").
119. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK 349-60 (2d ed. 1997)
120. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, app. at 92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting)
121. Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 866 (1960).
122. Akhil Reed Amar, 2000 Daniel J. Meador Lecture: Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1221, 1242 (2002) ("[A] forceful case can be made for Hugo Black as the true intellectual leader-the most valuable player-of the Warren Court.")
123. Roger K. Newman, The Warren Court and American Politics: An Impressionistic Appreciation, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 661, 696 (2001) (reviewing POWE, supra note 34) (citing mid-1960s commentators dubbing Black the Warren Court's intellectual leader); Posner, In Memoriam, supra note 107, at 11 ("Brennan was not the 'intellectual leader' of the 'Warren Court' The intellectual leader, if Uiere was one, was Black ⋯.").
124. For examples of Bork's work, see ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978)
125. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
126. See STEPHEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 135-80 (2008)
127. Our Background, FEDERALIST SOC'Y, http://www.fed-soc.org/aboutus/id.28/ default.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2014) ("We are committed to the principles that the state exists to preserve freedom, that the separation of governmental powers is central to our Constitution, and that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, not what it should be.").
128. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012)
129. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION (2005)
130. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINAUSM (2011).
131. Bator became the lead author of Hart and Wechsler's Federal Courts casebook. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (2d ed. 1973).
132. J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (2012).
133. Id. at 11-32 (describing living constitutionalism as "activism unleashed"); id. at 33-59 (describing originalism as "activism masquerading as restraint"). But see DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (defending a common law, precedent-based approach).
134. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, at ix (1999) (stating that the goal of his book "is to identify and defend a distinctive form of judicial decision-making, which I call 'minimalism'").
135. See Brad Snyder, The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts, 71 OHIO ST. L. REV. 1149, 1222 (2010).
136. Id. Kramer believed that Thurgood Marshall provided the fourth vote to grant cert in Bowers v. Hardwick because Kramer had circulated a memo that mistakenly indicated that Brennan would vote to grant cert SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BRENNAN 497-98 (2010).
137. EDWARD LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS 419 (1998) (revealing a conservative and liberal clerk fought in the courtyard of the Supreme Court and fell into the fountain).
138. But see Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming 108 YALE L.J. 835, 877 (1999) (reviewing Closed Chambers and taking Lazarus (Blackmun OT 1988) to task for breaching law clerk confidentiality and for such disclosures).
139. Nat Hentoff, Profiles: The Constitutionalist, NEW YORKER, Mar. 12, 1990, at 60.
140. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES (2004)
141. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004)
142. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5 (2001).
143. See RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE, THE PEOPLE RULE" 4-5 (1994)
144. JAMIN B. RASKIN, OVERRULING DEMOCRACY 1-2 (2003).
145. See MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154 (1999).
146. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 374 (2007).
147. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)
148. BRUCE ACKER-MAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
149. Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1768-70, 1781-82, 1786-87 (2007)
150. see id. at 1742, 1761,1792 (referencing "landmark statutes"). See generally 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014).
151. Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court, 2011 Term-Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (2012).