Rebuilding bilateral consensus: Assessing U.S.‐China arms control and nonproliferation achievements

Nonproliferation Review

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 131-140

  Medeiros, Evan S ^a  

^a MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84903495311     PISSN: 10736700     EISSN: 17461766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10736700108436844     Document Type: Article

References (39)

1. Thomas Graham, “Strengthening Arms Control,” Washington Quarterly 23 (Spring 2000), pp. 183-196. Ambassador Graham led the U.S. effort in 1995 to indefinitely and unconditionally extend the NPT.
2. U.S. and Chinese officials, interviews with author, Beijing, spring 2000.
3. In the CTBT, the “green-light” procedure is one in which an OSI is not automatic and 30 members of the Executive Committee have to agree for it to go forward; a “red-light” procedure is one in which an inspection is automatic unless stopped by a vote of the Executive Committee.
4. U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control, Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Conference Report, East Asia Nonproliferation Program, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, September 1998.
5. Chinese arms control officials, conversations with author, 1998-2000.
6. For an official U.S. State Department acknowledgment of the assistance that China provided in checking North Korean behavior
7. Robert J. Einhom, “Nonproliferation Challenges In Asia,” speech before the Asia Society, Hong Kong, June 7,2000.
8. U.S. and Chinese arms control officials, conversations with author, 1998-2000.
9. Zou Yunhua, Chinese Perspectives on South Asian Nuclear Tests (Stanford: Center for International Security and Cooperation (CIS AC), working paper, January 1999).
10. U.S.-China Presidential Joint Statement on South Asia, Beijing, June 27, 2000. Recent Chinese statements have called into question the scope of China’s promises included in this statement Sha Zukang has said publicly
11. “China, India Agree to Establish Security Dialogue,” Indian Express, June 15, 1999, p. 1 Damon Bristow, “India and China Hold First Ever Security Talks to Strengthen Relations,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 2000, p. 3;
12. “China, India Agree to Establish Security Dialogue,” Indian Express, June 15, 1999, p. 1 Damon Bristow, “India and China Hold First Ever Security Talks to Strengthen Relations,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, April 2000, p. 3;
13. “Indo-China Talks Friendly,” Inside China Today, May 2, 1999, p. 4.
14. The United States imposed sanctions in 1991 and 1993 for the export of controlled missile technologies to entities in Iran and Pakistan. The sanctions were lifted in 1992 and 1994 Unclassified Report to Congress on the Nonproliferation Policies and Practices of the People’s Republic of China, Report Submitted to Congress as required by Public Law 99-103.
15. “The U.S.-China Lab-to-Lab Technical Exchange Program,” Nonproliferation Review 5, (Spring-Summer 1998), pp. 111-118.
16. China joined the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in the late 1970s and began negotiating a number of arms control issues with the United States
17. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons ofMass Destructionand Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1 July to 31 December 1999, August 9, 2000;
18. Zou Yunhua, “Bukuosan Hewuqi” [The Nonproliferation ofNuclear Weapons], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu, Issue 4, (1990).
19. Yu Zhiyong “Guanyu He Bu Kuosan Tiaoyue de Wenti” [Concerning Some Issues About the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty], Shijie JingjiyuZhengzhi, No. 6 (1988).
20. China’s post-Tiananmen, anti-isolation strategy played a very limited role in China’s decisionjoin the NPT.
21. Rebecca Johnson, A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Signed but not Sealed, a review of the CTBT Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament'. January - September 1996, ACRONYM Report No. 10 (May 1997);
22. Rebecca Johnson, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: The Endgame a review of the CTBT Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament January - March 1996, ACRONYM Report No. 9 (April 1996).
23. For mainstream Chinese views on the threats posed by nuclear proliferation in Korea
24. Cheng Yujie, “Chaoxian He Wenti de Lailong Qumai” [The Origins and Development of the Korean Nuclear Issue], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi 9 (1994), pp. 43-47.
25. Chinese arms control offtcials, conversations with author, 1998-2000
26. Robert J. Einhom, “Nonproliferation Challenges In Asia,” speech before the Asia Society, Hong Kong, June 7,2000.
27. “Fernandes Sounds Warning on China,” Hong Kong Standard, May 5,1998, p. 6
28. “India’s New Defense Chief Sees Chinese Military Threat,” New York Times, May 5, 1998; “India Defence Minister Says China a Threat,” Reuters, May 18, 1998.
29. Evan S. Medeiros, “The Changing Character of China’s WMD Proliferation Activities,” paper presented at U.S. Congressional Research Service conference on “China and Weapon of Mass Destruction,” Washington, D.C., November 1999.
30. Barton Gellman, “Reappraisal Led to New China Policy,” Washington Post, June 22,1988, p. 1; Barton Gellman, “U.S. and China Nearly Came to Blows in 1996,” Washington Post, June 21,1998, p. 1.
31. “Chinese missile-related technical assistance to Pakistan increased during this reporting period.” Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions: 1
32. Sha Zukang. The department has four divisions devoted to nuclear affairs, missiles and conventional weapons affairs, chemical and biological weapons issues, and a comprehensive division that handles the research needs of the department.
33. Bates Gill and Evan S. Medeiros, “The Foreign and Domestic Influences on China’s Arms Control and Nonproliferation Policies,” China Quarterly (March 2000), pp. 66-94
34. Fan Jishe, “Junkong he Zhongmei Guanxi Yantaohui Zongshu” [Summary of Conference on Arms Control and US-China Relations],” Meiguo Yanjiu 13 (Summer 1999)
35. Fan Jishe, “Junkong Xingshi Yantaohui Zongshu” [Summary of Conference on the Arms Control Situation], Meiguo Yanjiu 14 (Spring 2000).
36. Evan S. Medeiros, Missiles, Missile Defense and Regional Stability, Conference Report of the 2nd U.S.-China Conference on Arms Control Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, April 1999.
37. Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Weapons
38. Tyler, T A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1999).
39. David Shambaugh, “Sino-U.S. Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors,” Survival 42 (Spring 2000), pp. 97-115.