Foreign and domestic influences on China's arms control and nonproliferation policies

China Quarterly

Volumn , Issue 161, 2000, Pages 67-93

  Gill, Bates ^a   Medeiros, Evan S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 33745902225     PISSN: 03057410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (76)

1. The majority of the current literature on China and arms control is devoted to documenting and characterizing the shifts in China's arms control and nonproliferation practices. A small number of sources explicitly discuss the various institutions involved in arms control and nonproliferation policy-making and the influences on their decisions. See Bates Gill and Mathew Stephenson, "Search for common ground: breaking the Sino-U.S. non-proliferation stalemate," Anns Control Today, September 1996; Alastair lain Johnson, "Learning versus adaptation: explaining change in Chinese arms control policy in the 1980s and 1990s," The China Journal, January 1996; Individuals, Institutions, and Policies in the Chinese Nonproliferation and Anns Control Community, Conference Report, East Asia Nonproliferation Project (Monterey, CA: Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 1997); Evan S. Medeiros and Bates Gill, Chinese Anns Exports: Policy, Players and Process, unpublished manuscript, 2000; John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's defense establishment: solving the arms-export enigma," International Security, Spring 1991.
2. Some key Chinese sources include: Chen Xiaogong (ed.), Junbei kongzhi yu guoji anquan shouce (Arms Control and International Security Handbook);
3. Pan Zhenqiang et al. (eds.), Guoji caijtin yu junbei kongzJii (International Disarmament and Anns Control) (Beijing: Guofang daxue chubanshe, 1996);
4. Du Xiangwan (ed.), Hejunbei kongzhi de kexue jishu (Foundations of Nuclear Anns Control Science and Technology) (Beijing: Guofang gongye chubanshe, 1996);
5. Wang Deli et al. (eds.), Junbei kongzhi liinwen xuanji (Arms Control Collected Works) (Beijing: Kexue yu guojia anquan yanjiu jihua, 1995);
6. Zhu Mingquan, Hekuosan: weixian yufangzhi (Nuclear Proliferation: Danger and Prevention) (Shanghai: Shanghai kexue jishu wenxian chubanshe, 1995);
7. Zhu Mingquan, 'The evolution of China's nuclear nonproliferation policy," The Nonproliferation Review (Winter 1997); Weixing Hu, "Nuclear nonproliferation," in Yong Deng and Fe-Ling Wang (cds.), In the Eyes of the Dragon (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999); Wu Yun, "China's policies
8. In fact, since the early 1980s, China has changed its position on when it would enter into strategic arms control discussions with the other nuclear powers. In the early 1980s, China initially stated that it would consider such a step when the U.S. and Soviet Union achieved a 50% reduction in their nuclear arsenals. However, by 1988 China stated that the United States and Soviet Union would have to achieve "drastic" or "substantial" reductions in their nuclear arsenals before China would be willing to enter multilateral arms reduction negotiations. It now appears China may place qualitative as well quantitative conditions on any future decision to join multilateral strategic reductions talks.
9. The Soviet Union last tested in October 1990; Russia has not since tested; the last U.S. test was in September 1992; the last UK test was in November 1991. France had participated in the moratorium for nearly four years, from late 1991 until late 1995, when it resumed its final series of six tests which ran from September 1995 to January 1996. Also during this period, the international community reached the decision to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (in May 1995), which was achieved in large measure by a commitment on the part of the nuclear powers to engage earnestly in meaningful disarmament efforts, such as the CTBT.
10. Michael Littlejohns, "UN votes against N-testing," The Financial Times, 14 December 1995, p. 6.
11. "Sources indicate plans for nuclear test halted," Itar-Tass, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, FB1S-CHI-95-211, 31 October 1995; "Intention to grant yen loans to PRC firms up," Yomiuri Shimbun, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Asia, FBIS-EAS-95-208, 26 October 1995.
12. Douglas Busvine, "China's Jiang calls for nuclear test ban treaty," Reuters, 5 July 1996.
13. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 29 July 1996; Conference on Disarmament document CD/1410, 29 July 1996.
14. Sha Zukang quoted in the Jiefangjun bao (Liberation Army Daily), 16 November 1996, p. 4, and reprinted by the NAPSNet Daily Report, Nautilus Institute, 21 November 1996.
15. The UNROCA was established by United Nations General Assembly resolution 46/36L in December 1991. The register first began recording submissions from United Nations members in 1993 for their imports and exports of major conventional weapons in calendar year 1992. China's 1998 defence white paper compiles and presents all of its UNROCA submissions. The register can be accessed via the internet at: http://domino.un.org/ REGISTER.nsf.
16. GaoWei, "Military shines in civilian sector," China Daily, 19 January 1998. According to this source, "exports by 1,400 military firms and research institutes in 1997 are expected to add up to US$7 billion, half of which were civilian products."The Congressional Research Service (CRS) estimates that China exported USS1 billion in 1997 to developing countries and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the volume of Chinese arms exports in 1997 approximated US$338 million.
17. China: Arms Control and Disarmament (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, November 1995).
18. See Kang Choi and Panitan Wattanayagorn, "Development of defence white papers in the Asia-Pacific Region," in Bates Gill and J.N. Mak (eds.), Anns, Transparency and Security in South-East Asia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 79-92.
19. Chairman 's Statement of the Second ASEAN Regional Forum, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 1 August 1995, reprinted by NAPSNet, Nautilus Institute, 11 September 1995.
20. China's National Defense (Beijing: Information Office of the State Council, July 1998). For an English version see: www.chinanews.org; for a Chinese version see www.peopIedaily.com.cn/9807/28/current/newfiles/al010.html.
21. Interviews with Foreign Ministry officials, Beijing, September 1998; Monterey, CA, April 1999.
22. Noriyoshi Itokawa, "Sino-Japanese security talks discussed," Asahi Shimbun, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: China, FBIS-CHI-96-Q13,16 January 1996.
23. Interviews, Beijing, November 1996.
24. Conversations with current and former PLA officials, Beijing, September 1998.
25. Bates Gill, Silkw-orms and Summitry: Chinese Anns Exports to Iran and U.S.-China Relations (Washington, D.C.: Asia Pacific Rim Institute, December, 1997.)
26. On U.S.-China relations and the silkworm missile deal see R. Bates Gill, Chinese Arms Transfers: Purposes, Patterns and Prospects in the New World Order (Wesport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), pp. 99-100, 110; see also Nayan Chanda, "Technology cocooned: U.S. retaliates against China's sale of Silkworm missiles," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1987, p. 27.
27. This act, also known as the Gore-McCain Act, is targeted at countries that transfer "destabilizing numbers and types" of conventional weapons to either Iran or Iraq.
28. Benjamin Lim, "Beijing defends selling Iran arms," The Washington Times, 4 June 1997, p. A4.
29. Warren P. Strobel and Bill Gertz, "Chinese general hits arms reports," The Washington Times, 10 December 1996, p. AI; "Perry tells Chinese that sales of arms to Iran could backfire," Associated Press, 10 December 1995; "Chi says Chinese arms proliferation 'exaggerated'," Reuters, 9 December 1996.
30. Bill Gertz, "Senate asks for sanctions on China," TVielVaj/imgro/i TV/, ISJune 1997, p. 13.
31. Barton Gellman, "Reappraisal led to new China policy," The Washington Post, 22 June 1988, p. 1 ; Barton Gellman, "U.S. and China nearly came to blows in 1996," The Washington Post, 21 June 1998, p. 1.
32. Steve Erlanger, "U.S. says Chinese will stop sending missiles to Iran," The New York Times, 11 October 1997, p. 1.
33. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Fact sheet: accomplishments of the U.S.-China summit," 30 October 1997.
34. Report of Proliferation-Related Acquisition in 1997, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, July 1998). This report was submitted by the CIA Director to Congress as required by Section 721 of the FY 1997 Intelligence Authorization Act. This report is unclassified and can be found on the internet at http://www.cia.goy/cia/publications/acq 1997.html.
35. Bill Gertz, "China agrees to deal with Iran on missiles," The Washington Times, 19 August 1999, p. 1.
36. Timothy V. McCarthy, A Chronology of PRC Missile Trade and Developments (Monterey: Monterey Institute of International Studies, February 1992).
37. On Chinese ballistic missile-related assistance to Iran, see Director of Central Intelligence, The Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions - July-December 1996, June 1997. A more detailed account is in Gill, Silbvonns and Summitry.
38. China only agreed to adhere to the original 1987 guidelines and parameters of the MTCR which ban the export of missiles which are inherently capable of delivering a 300 km payload over 500 km. If China agrees to the 1993 revisions of the MTCR, which ban the exports of any delivery vehicles intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction, then China's exports of the 8610 may no longer be permissible.
39. See Shirley A. Kan, Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Background and Analysis, Congressional Research Service (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1996).
40. Testimony of Dr Gordon Oehler, Hearing on Proliferation of Chinese Missiles, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate, II June 1998; Bill Gertz, "China assists Iran, Libya on missile," The Washington Times, 16 June 1998, pp. 1-3.
41. The largest MTCR loophole for China is the fact that Beijing has not agreed to accept the MTCR's annex which outlines all the missile sub-systems and related missile technologies controlled by the MTCR. Chinese officials claim to have an internal control list but have refused to show it to U.S. officials during negotiations. Without acceptance of the MTCR annex, Chinese companies can export certain missile technologies - especially dual-use ones like titanium stabilized duplex stainless steel - while maintaining that China is in compliance with the MTCR.
42. A comprehensive discussion of Iran's nuclear-related imports is found in Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, "Iran's nuclear procurement program: how close to the bomb?" Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1997, pp. 123-135.
43. Mark Hibbs, "IAEA explores Iran's intentions, minus evidence of weapons drive," Nucleonics Week, 13 February 1992, p. 12; Mark Hibbs, "IAEA says it found no non-peaceful activity during recent Iran visit," Nucleonics Week, 16 December 1993, p. 11.
44. Zlionghua remain gonghegiio he chukou guanzhi tiaoli (Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Exports) (Beijing: Guowuyuan, September 1997.) Also see "Regulations on nuclear export control," Xinhua, in FBIS-CHI-97-256, 11 September 1997; Jiang Wandi, 'Tighter export controls on nuclear exports," Beijing Review, 1-7 December 1997, pp. 21-23.
45. "Nuclear product controls issued," Xinhua, in FBIS-CHI-98-170, 19 June 1998.
46. Mark Hibbs, "Sensitive Iran reactor deal may hinge on MFN for China," Nucleonics Week, 1 October 1992, pp. 5-6; Steve Coll, "U.S. halted nuclear bid by Iran," The Washington Post, 17 November 1992, p. Al.
47. Elaine Sciolino, "China cancels deal for selling Iran two reactors," The New York Times, 28 September 1995, p. Al.
48. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Press briefing by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and National Security Advisor Sandy Berger," 29 October 1997; R. Jeffrey Smith, "China's pledge to end Iran nuclear aid yields U.S. help," The Washington Post, 30 October 1997, p. 1.
49. "China agrees to end nuclear trade with Iran when two projects completed," Nuclear Fuel, 3 November 1997, pp. 3-4.
50. Interviews, Beijing, September 1999.
51. Xie Guang et al. (eds.), Dangdai Zliongguo de giiotang keji shiye (Contemporary China's Defence Science and Technology Undertakings) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 1992), pp. 73-81. On Chinese cruise missile-related assistance to Iran, see Gordon Jacobs and Tim McCarthy, "China's missile sales - few changes for the future," Jane's Intelligence Review, December 1992, p. 561.
52. Bill Gertz, "China agrees to deal with Iran on missiles," The Washington Times, 11 August 1999, p. 1.
53. Interview, Beijing, December 1997.
54. The Chinese translation of the General Armaments Department is Zong zhuangbei bit. Although the term "zhuangbei" is often translated as "equipment," Chinese officials and scholars normally refer to this new organization as the General Armaments Department and not the General Equipment Department.
55. Draft version of Richard T. Cupitt and Vuzo Murayama, Export Controls of the People 's Republic of China 1998, Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, p. 17.
56. Interviews and discussions with Chinese officials and nonproliferation specialists, Beijing, April and May 1998.
57. Xiangli Sun, Implications of a Comprehensive Test Ban for China's Security Policy, Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, June 1997, p. 8. Dr Sun is a physicist working for the Arms Control Research Division of the Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics within the Chinese strategic weapons research and development complex.
58. "China still balks at total test ban," The Washington Times, 12 January 1996, p. A13.
59. Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 29 July 1996; Conference on Disarmament document CD/1410, 29 July 1996.
60. With 45 tests overa period of 381 months (October 1964 to July 1996), China averaged about 0.118 tests every month, or 2.95 tests over a 25-month period. Comparably intensive testing occurred over the period October 1975 to December 1978, when China tested nine times over a 38-month period, and four times in 1976 alone.
61. Thirty-two of China's 45 tests - more than 70% - took place in either May-June or September-October.
62. This statement was made in a report released by Zhao Qizheng, Minister of Information of the State Council. "Facts speak louder than words and lies will collapse by themselves further refutation of the Cox Report," Information Office of the State Council, 15 July 1999. This report can be found on the internet at http://www.china.org.cnJ.
63. Zou Yunhua in Guoji wentiyanjiu (International Studies), No. 1 (January 1994). Sr. Col. Zou is posted to the Arms Control Group of the GAD (formerly COSTIND) and served in Geneva with the Chinese delegation to the CD during the CTBT negotiations.
64. These points are made by Sun, "Implications of a comprehensive test ban," p. 11. Sha Zukang, who served as the Chinese ambassador to the CD during CTBT talks, was especially active in presenting the Ministry's case to the military leadership. Interviews, Beijing, April 1997.
65. Lewis et al., "Beijing's défense establishment," p. 95.
66. Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisionmaking in China, pp. 113-17.
67. Ibid.
68. Lewis et al., "Beijing's defense establishment" p. 95.
69. China: Anns Control and Disarmament, section 5.
70. "Regulations on nuclear export control," Xinhua, FBIS-CHI-97-256, 11 September 1997.
71. "Nuclear product controls issued," Xinhua, FBIS-CHI-98-170, 19 June 1998.
72. Medeiros and Gill, Chinese Arms Exports: Policy, Process and Players, pp. 33-41.
73. Lu Ning, The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decisioninaking in China, pp. 113-17.
74. 1989 interview with COSTIND official as cited in Lewis et al., "Beijing's défense establishment," p. 95.
75. These missiles' names are derived from the English word "missile," indicating their explicit export orientation. Once the M-9 and M-ll were completed and tested, the PLA purchased some and gave them the designations DF-15 and DF-11 respectively.
76. Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China 1978-1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 16-36; Nicholas R. Lardy, "Chinese foreign trade," in Robert Ash et al. (eds.), The Chinese Economy Under Deng Xiaoping (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1996), pp. 217-246.