Legislation and Statutory Interpretation

The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages

  Garrett, Elizabeth ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Congress; Courts; Intentionalism; Judiciary; Law; Legislation; Political science; Politics; Purposivism; Statutory interpretation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84903127903     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199208425.003.0020     Document Type: Chapter

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