Left-wing populism in the European periphery: The case of SYRIZA

Journal of Political Ideologies

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 119-142

  Stavrakakis, Yannis ^a   Katsambekis, Giorgos ^a  

^a ARISTOTLE UNIVERSITY OF THESSALONIKI   (Greece)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY; PARTY POLITICS; POLITICAL DISCOURSE; POPULISM;

EUROPE;

EID: 84902968145     PISSN: 13569317     EISSN: 14699613     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13569317.2014.909266     Document Type: Article

References (137)

1. SYRIZA was initially founded as an electoral coalition of radical left political parties and extraparliamentarian organizations in 2004. Its main constituent, Synaspismos (founded in 1992), originates in the Greek Eurocommunist tradition, which acquired a distinct presence following a major split in the Communist Party of Greece in 1968.
2. Only to be repeated a few months later by Beppe Grillo's Five Star Movement in the February 2013 Italian elections.
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12. Y. Voulgaris, 'The radical conservatism of SYRIZA', Ta Nea, 8 December 2012
13. N. Marantzidis, 'The year that populism almost destroyed us', Kathimerini, 30 December 2012
14. A-.S. Chrysogelos, 'The evolution of the "populist potential" in European politics: from new right radicalism to antisystem opulism', European View, 12 (2013), pp. 75-83.
15. Der Spiegel, 'Photogallery', 8 July 2012, available at http://goo.gl/nRXEi
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18. The choreography of events in and around Greece is so fast moving, that only a few months later (14 March 2013) Featherstone hosted a lecture by Tsipras, now leader of the parliamentary opposition, at the Hellenic Observatory of the LSE.
19. R. Brading, Populism in Venezuela (London: Routledge, 2013), p. 4.
20. Hawkins, Venezuela's Chavismo and Populism in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 6.
21. E. Laclau and C. Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985).
22. D. Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000).
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25. Hawkins, op. cit., Ref. 12, p. 10.
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27. C. Mudde and C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds), 'Populism and (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis', Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012), p. 4.
28. Canovan, op. cit., Ref. 15, p. 549.
29. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, op. cit., Ref. 16, p. 6.
30. Canovan, 'Trust the people! populism and the two faces of democracy', Political Studies, 47(1) (1999), p. 3.
31. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, op. cit., Ref. 16, p. 8.
32. We are merely enacting here the exclusion of adjectives they themselves demand from other definitions, like the one of democracy, 'nothing more, nothing less' (p. 10).
33. D. Howarth and Y. Stavrakakis, 'Introducing discourse theory and political analysis', in D. Howarth, A. Norval and Y. Stavrakakis (Eds) Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change (Manchester: Manchester University Press - St Martin's Press), pp. 3-4.
34. E. Laclau, The Making of Political Identities (London: Verso, 1994).
35. Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis, op. cit., Ref. 20.
36. D. Howarth and J. Torfing, Discourse Theory in European Politics (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2005).
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43. B. Arditi, Politics on the Edges of Liberalism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007).
44. Paradoxically, in the latest reformulations of his theory, Laclau (op. cit., Ref. 23) himself seems to have shifted his position as far as the first criterion is concerned: populism becomes synonymous with politics and any signifier can potentially become the nodal point of a populist discourse. If, however, this is the case, then how can we conceptually account for the difference between an antagonistic discourse articulated around 'the people' and any other such discourse?
45. In other words, the risk here is to loose the conceptual particularity and operationality of 'populism' as a tool for concrete political analysis (Stavrakakis, 'Antinomies of Formalism', op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 263) and thus to weaken the empirical applicability of this whole approach (Mudde and Kaltwasser, op. cit., Ref. 16, pp. 6-7). It is clear that this move needs to be resisted.
46. G. Lievesley and S. Ludlam, Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social Democracy (London: Zed Books, 2009), p. 17.
47. F. Panizza, Contemporary Latin America: Development and Democracy Beyond the Washington Consesus. The Rise of the Left (London: Zed Books, 2009), p. 178.
48. C. Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000).
49. P. de Vos, 'The sacralisation of consensus and the rise of right-wing populism in Flanders', Studies in Social and Political Thought, 7 (2002), pp. 3-29.
50. Y. Mény and Y. Surel (Eds), Democracies and the Populist Challenge (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002).
51. P. Taggart, Populism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000).
52. Canovan, op. cit., Ref. 18.
53. Colin Crouch, Jacques Ranciere and Chantal Mouffe have discussed this development under the rubric of post-democracy.
54. Mouffe, op. cit., Ref. 26.
55. C. Crouch, Post-democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).
56. J. Ranciere, The Hatred of Democracy (London: Verso, 2006).
57. Y. Stavrakakis, The Lacanian Left (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), pp. 254-285.
58. PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) was founded by Andreas Papandreou in 1974. Emerging as a radical left political force in the 1970s, it would adopt a more pragmatic and moderate profile when in office in the 1980s, before gradually joining the trajectory of third-way European social democracy.
59. The equivalent of Juan Peron's 'descamisados'.
60. C. Lyrintzis, 'The power of populism: the Greek case', European Journal of Political Research, 15(6) (1987), pp. 667-686.
61. N. Diamandouros, 'Cultural dualism and political change in post-authoritarian Greece', ESTUDIOS Working Papers 50 (1994).
62. N. Demertzis (Ed.), Greek Political Culture Today (Athens: Odysseas, 1994)
63. M. Spourdalakis, The Rise of the Greek Socialist Party (London: Routledge, 1988).
64. C. Lyrintzis, 'The changing party system: stable democracy, contested "modernisation"', West European Politics, 28(2) (2005), pp. 249-252.
65. C. Lyrintzis, 'Greek politics in the era of economic crisis: reassessing causes and effects', Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast Europe, 45 (2011), p. 16.
66. Y. Stavrakakis, 'Religious populism and political culture: the Greek case', South European Society and Politics 7(3) (2003), pp. 29-52.
67. Stavrakakis, 'Antinomies of Formalism', op. cit., Ref. 24.
68. Stavrakakis, 'Religion and Populism in Contemporary Greece', op. cit., Ref. 24.
69. LAOS (Popular Orthodox Rally) is a political party founded in 2000 by an ousted Nea Dimokratia (ND) MP.
70. It is a party ideologically similar in many ways to other European extreme-right, neo-populist forces such as the Front National in France or the FPO of Haider in Austria.
71. ELSTAT, The Greek Economy, 22 March 2013, available at http://goo.gl/zkuHD.
72. Eurostat, 'Euro area unemployment rate at 11.9%', euroindicators, STAT/13/31, 1 March 2013, available at http://goo.gl/Lajnh
73. A word that signifies both the three organizations overseeing Greece's 'bailout agreement' since 2010 (the European Commission (EC), ECB and IMF) as well as the representations of functionaries belonging to them, who visit the country every few months to assess 'progress' and release tranches of funding.
74. Founded in 1974 by Konstantinos Karamanlis, ND is a centre-right party, one of the main pillars-together with PASOK-of the Greek two-party system (1974-2012). In 1974, it won the elections with an overwhelming 54.37% and formed the first government of the Third Hellenic Republic. In autumn 2011 it performed a political U-turn overnight from 'anti-austerity' and 'anti-memorandum' to 'pro-memorandum' and 'pro-austerity' to participate in the coalition government under Papademos, something that cost it an unprecedented loss of supporters.
75. M. Prentoulis and L. Thomassen, 'Political theory in the square: protest, representation and subjectification', Contemporary Political Theory 12(3) (2013), pp. 166-184.
76. A. Tsipras, 'Public talk by Alexis Tsipras for SYRIZA London', 15 March 2013, available at http://goo.gl/kSGs9
77. A. Tsipras, 'Speech at the central pre-election rally of SYRIZA in Athens (Omonia Square)', 3 May 2012, available at http://goo.gl/c9YuJ.
78. E. Laclau, 'Populism: what's in a name', in Panizza, op. cit., Ref. 24, p. 38.
79. SYRIZA, op. cit., Ref. 49.
80. SYRIZA, op. cit., Ref. 48.
81. SYRIZA, Political Programme of SYRIZA-USF for the elections of May 6th 2012 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/Tfyw2.
82. Synaspismos, 5th Congress Political Resolution (2008), p. 21, available at http://goo.gl/0CT2D.
83. C. Mudde and C. Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Exclusionary vs. inclusionary populism: comparing contemporary Europe and Latin America', Government and Opposition, 48(2) (2013), pp. 147-174.
84. G. Moschonas, 'A new left in Greece: PASOK's fall and SYRIZA's rise', Dissent, 60(4) (2013), p. 36.
85. T. Dupont, 'Mélenchon: "Populiste, moi? J' assume!"', L' Express, 16 September 2010, available at http://goo.gl/MEdWs.
86. Indeed, as Chantal Mouffe has recently observed: Mélenchon and Alexis Tsipras, the leader of Syriza, are often accused of being 'populist'. Far from being a ground for critique, this should be seen as a virtue. The aim of a left popular movement should be to mobilize passions towards the construction of a 'people' so as to bring about a progressive 'collective will'. A 'people' can, of course, be constructed in different ways, some of which are incompatible with a leftwing project. It all depends on how the adversary is defined. Whereas for right-wing populism the adversary is identified with immigrants or Muslims, the adversary for a left-wing populist movement should be constituted by the configuration of forces that sustains neo-liberal hegemony.
87. C. Mouffe, Agonistics (London: Verso, 2013), p. 123
88. W. Baier, 'Right-wing populism in Europe', Transform! 9 (2011), pp. 128-131.
89. H. G. Betz, Radical Right- Wing Populism in Western Europe (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
90. C. Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
91. E. Meijers, Populism in Europe (Vienna: Green European Foundation, 2011).
92. Laclau, op. cit., Ref. 23, 132, 137, 177.
93. Taggart, op. cit., Ref. 28, pp. 2, 4-5, 93-94, 117.
94. Hawkins, op. cit., Ref. 12, pp. 6, 8, 14, 33, 40, 87, 94.
95. This, of course, does not mean that populism manifests itself only in times of crisis, but merely that the existence of a systemic crisis usually favours its rise. In other words, we can see the association between crisis and populism as 'a rough tendency or correlation, not a definitional requirement or essential criterion
96. A. Knight, 'Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico', Journal of Latin American Studies 30(2) (1998), p. 227).
97. C. de la Torre, Populist Seduction in Latin America (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), pp. 115-119.
98. Halimi, 'Un raisonnement de fou', Le monde diplomatique (June 2011).
99. Ranciere, op. cit., Ref. 30, p. 80.
100. Smith, op. cit., Ref. 4.
101. S. Goutzanis, 'Samaras to FT: "Give your instructions elsewhere"', Proto Thema online, 15 June 2012, available at http://goo.gl/T0WSy.
102. 'Coalition leaders opt for common front after spate of violent attacks', Kathimerini, 15 January 2013, available at http://goo.gl/NVali
103. M. Pollatos, 'Samaras from Brussels against extremists and populists', 15 October 2013, available at http://www.protothema.gr/news-in-english/article/319690/samaras-from-brussels-against-extremists-andpopulists/
104. M. Goodwin, Right Response: Understanding and Countering Populist Extremism in Europe (London: Chatham House, 2011).
105. R. Gerodimos, 'The ideology of far left populism in Greece', Political Studies, advance online version (2013), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9248.12079/pdf
106. A. Painter, Democratic Stress, the Populist Signal and the Extremist Threat (London: Policy Network, 2013).
107. M. Marley, 'European leaders must be wary of rising Eurosceptic populism from both and left and right' (2012), available at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2012/03/26/eurosceptic-populis/
108. K. Rovira Kaltwasser, 'Populism, its opposites, and its contentious relationship with democracy' (2013), available at http://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/crist%C3%B3bal-rovira-kaltwasser/populism-itsopposites-and-its-contentious-relationsh
109. Needless to say, the repercussions of such associations can exceed the level of academic analysis and political competition. Indeed, members of SYRIZA's twin party in Germany, Die Linke, had been for many years under surveillance from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, which targets extremist anticonstitutional activities. When he was interior minister, Wolfgang Schäuble had also highlighted Die Linke as a potential extremist threat that needs to be monitored, alongside Islamic fundamentalists and neo-Nazis (see 'Schäuble: Islamists top threat to Germany', 15 May 2008, available at http://www.thelocal.de/20080515/11889).
110. Following a legal challenge from the former vice-chairman of Die Linke, Bodo Ramelow, the Federal Constitutional Court has very recently declared the observation of Ramelow's activities as a violation of his constitutional rights and his independent mandate as parliamentarian
111. Federal Constitutional Court-Press Office, 'Observation of Parliamentarians by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution is Subject to Strict Proportionality Requirements', Press release no. 60/2013 of 9 October 2013, available at https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg13-060en.html
112. A. Tsipras, 'They aren't done with us. they see us in their sleep', Interview to Unfollow, 9 September 2012, p. 48.
113. Unfollow, 10 October 2012. The Golden Dawn emerged in the mid-1980s as an extremist, militaristic, neo- Nazi organization. Since its foundation it remained at the margins of the political system and many of its members have been associated with violent activities against immigrants, leftists and anarchists. It gained momentum during the peak of the Greek crisis in 2012 and eventually entered the parliament after receiving a significant 6.92% of the vote in the June elections.
114. Psarras, The Black Bible of the Golden Dawn (Athens: Polis, 2012).
115. In fact, it may be the case that there is increasingly a fertile soil for the rise of leftist (inclusionary) populist forces in those European countries that have been severely hit by the current economic crisis (e.g. Greece and the so-called PIIGS [Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain]), while the chances are that this is not equally the case with other European countries that have avoided the worst.
116. S. Gratius, 'The "third wave of populism" in Latin America', FRIDE Working Papers 45 (2007).
117. P. Barrett, D. Chavez and C. Rodriguez-Garavito, The New Latin American Left (London: Pluto Books, 2008).
118. G. Lievsley and S. Ludlam (Eds), Latin America: Experiments in Radical Social Democracy (London: Zed Books, 2009).
119. Panizza, op. cit., Ref. 24.
120. Panizza, op. cit., Ref. 26.
121. Brading, op. cit., Ref. 11.
122. However, there are no guarantees here: our argument is not that left-wing populism inevitably has a positive impact on democracy.
123. it is rather that its impact (negative or positive or both) cannot be predetermined in advance and certainly should not be a priori dismissed as negative. As is the case with all populism(s), Latin American populism(s) remain an ambivalent phenomenon, having historically functioned 'both [as] a threat to and [as] a corrective for democracy' (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, op. cit., Ref. 57, p. 168).
124. Levitsky and Loxton, 'Populism and competitive authoritarianism in the Andes', Democratization, 20(1) (2013), pp. 107-136.
125. Needless to say, the virtually progressive legacy of populist politics is not confined to Latin America, but has surfaced in a variety of geographical and historical contexts, including the US. See, in this respect, among others
126. N. Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962)
127. L. Goodwyn, The Populist Moment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).
128. Laclau, op. cit., Ref. 23, p. 176.
129. Surel in Laclau, ibid.
130. M. Fiorese, 'Golden Dawn: rise of populism in Greece', Europe Inside, 27 November 2012, available at http://goo.gl/YmWUm.
131. A. Papachelas, 'On a dangerous path', Kathimerini, 19 May 2013, available at http://goo.gl/vDyfw.
132. Doxiadis and Matsaganis, op. cit., Ref. 7.
133. M. Caiani and D. Della Porta, 'The elitist populism of the extreme right', Acta Politica, 46 (2011), p. 197.
134. T. di Tella, 'Populism into the twenty-first century', Government and Opposition, 32(2) (1997), p. 190.
135. If the justification of lumping together SYRIZA and Golden Dawn under the banner of extremist populism turns out to be rather unfounded (also see, in this respect
136. L. Phillips, 'Kick 'em all out? Anti-politics and post-democracy in the European Union', Statewatch, 23(1) (2013), pp. 9-20, available at http://www.andereuropa.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/statewatch-journal-vol23n1-march-2013.pdf#page=9), further research is required on the relationship between SYRIZA and a populist-nationalist party of the Right, ANEL (Independent Greeks), a political party that was created by a former MP of ND, literary overnight, on 24 February 2012, and achieved 10.62% in May and 7.51% in the consecutive elections of June 2012 (see Table 1). This is justified not only on the basis of its strong 'anti-memorandum' stance and antielitist discourse, but also because SYRIZA itself officially keeps an open door to a potential collaboration with ANEL in the future, at least at the local or peripheral level, a clear indication of the difficulties involved in its coalition strategy.
137. Overall, to return to the opening paragraphs of this essay, even if SYRIZA eventually proves to be 'incompetent', 'irresponsible' or even 'dangerous', that is not likely to be a result of its populism.