Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico

Journal of Latin American Studies

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 223-248

  Knight, Alan ^a,b  

^a Dept of History of Latin America ^*  (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0001565314     PISSN: 0022216X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022216X98005033     Document Type: Article

References (188)

1. This article is partly based on an earlier paper, given at a conference in Mexico in 1992, and subsequently published as 'El abrigo de Arturo Alessandri: populismo, estado y sociedad en América Latina, siglo XX', in Maria Luisa Tarrés, (coord.), Transformaciones sociales y acciones colectivas, América Latina en el contexto internacional de los noventa (Mexico, 1994), pp. 49-76. I would like to thank Michael Conniff and Paul Cammack for comments on an earlier draft.
2. John D. Wirth, 'Foreward', and Paul Drake, 'Conclusion: Requiem for Populism?', in Michael L. Conniff, (ed.), Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, 1982), pp. ix-xiii, 217;
3. Jeremy Adelman, 'Post-Populist Argentina', New Left Review, no. 203 (Jan.-Feb. 1994), p. 89, discerns the 'funeral of populism'. As I shall later suggest, responsibility for the death of populism is laid at different doors: the passing of the cycle of import-substitution industrialisation; the bitter learning experience provided by 'economic populism'; the acculturation of migrants who shed their 'traditional' ways in favour of a more 'modern' - ergo anti-populist - political culture. None of these explanations is entirely convincing.
4. On intellectual and academic distrust and dislike of populism, see Margaret Canovan, Populism (London, 1981), p. 11.
5. Panel chaired by Jeremy Adelman, American Historical Association conference, Chicago, January 1995. John D. Martz, 'The Regionalist Expression of Populism. Guayaquil and the CFP, 1948-60', Journal of Interamerican and World Affairs, 22/3 (Aug. 1980), p. 289, notes the concept's 'stubborn resilience in refusing to disappear'.
6. As Peter Worsley observed, given the recurrent use of the term, 'the existence of the verbal smoke might well indicate a fire somewhere': 'The Concept of Populism', in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, (eds.), Populism (London, 1970), p. 219. Emilio de Ipola, 'Populismo e ideología', Revista mexicana de sociología, 41/3 (Julio-set., 1979), p. 928, makes a similar point.
7. As Peter Worsley observed, given the recurrent use of the term, 'the existence of the verbal smoke might well indicate a fire somewhere': 'The Concept of Populism', in Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, (eds.), Populism (London, 1970), p. 219. Emilio de Ipola, 'Populismo e ideología', Revista mexicana de sociología, 41/3 (Julio-set., 1979), p. 928, makes a similar point.
8. Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London, 1977), pp. 145-6.
9. Laclau, Politics and Ideology, p. 143.
10. Laclau, Politics and Ideology, p. 164.
11. Kenneth M. Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America. The Peruvian Case', World Politics, 48 (Oct. 1995), p. 88, n. 21, citing David Collier and James E. Mahon Jr.
12. Wirth, 'Foreward', p. ix; Alistair Hennessy, 'Latin America', in Ionescu and Gellner, Populism, pp. 28-61; Torcuato di Tella, 'Populism and Reform in Latin America', in Claudio Véliz, (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (Oxford, 1969), pp. 47-74; Sagrario Torres Ballesteros, 'El populismo: un concepto escurridizo', in José Alvarez Junco, (ed.), Populismo, caudillaje y discurso demagógico (Madrid, 1987), pp. 159-80.
13. Wirth, 'Foreward', p. ix; Alistair Hennessy, 'Latin America', in Ionescu and Gellner, Populism, pp. 28-61; Torcuato di Tella, 'Populism and Reform in Latin America', in Claudio Véliz, (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (Oxford, 1969), pp. 47-74; Sagrario Torres Ballesteros, 'El populismo: un concepto escurridizo', in José Alvarez Junco, (ed.), Populismo, caudillaje y discurso demagógico (Madrid, 1987), pp. 159-80.
14. Wirth, 'Foreward', p. ix; Alistair Hennessy, 'Latin America', in Ionescu and Gellner, Populism, pp. 28-61; Torcuato di Tella, 'Populism and Reform in Latin America', in Claudio Véliz, (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (Oxford, 1969), pp. 47-74; Sagrario Torres Ballesteros, 'El populismo: un concepto escurridizo', in José Alvarez Junco, (ed.), Populismo, caudillaje y discurso demagógico (Madrid, 1987), pp. 159-80.
15. Wirth, 'Foreward', p. ix; Alistair Hennessy, 'Latin America', in Ionescu and Gellner, Populism, pp. 28-61; Torcuato di Tella, 'Populism and Reform in Latin America', in Claudio Véliz, (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (Oxford, 1969), pp. 47-74; Sagrario Torres Ballesteros, 'El populismo: un concepto escurridizo', in José Alvarez Junco, (ed.), Populismo, caudillaje y discurso demagógico (Madrid, 1987), pp. 159-80.
16. Canovan, Populism, p. 5.
17. Michael L. Conniff, Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925-45 (Pittsburgh, 1981), p. 25; Canovan, Populism, p. 11; Di Tella, 'Populism and Reform', p. 47. I discuss the pejorative notion of 'economic populism', now much in vogue, below.
18. Michael L. Conniff, Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925-45 (Pittsburgh, 1981), p. 25; Canovan, Populism, p. 11; Di Tella, 'Populism and Reform', p. 47. I discuss the pejorative notion of 'economic populism', now much in vogue, below.
19. Michael L. Conniff, Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925-45 (Pittsburgh, 1981), p. 25; Canovan, Populism, p. 11; Di Tella, 'Populism and Reform', p. 47. I discuss the pejorative notion of 'economic populism', now much in vogue, below.
20. De Ipola, 'Populismo e ideología', p. 934;
21. Paul Cammack, 'What Populism Was, What Neo-populism Is', paper presented at the conference on 'Old and New Populism in Latin America', Institute of Latin American Studies, London, Nov. 1995, p. 1.
22. Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism (Chicago, 1986), p. 49. On the polysemic quality of 'pueblo' in Spanish: Norberto Rodríguez Bustamante, 'Sociología del populisme', in José Isaacson, (coord.), El populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1974), pp. 123-4.
23. Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism (Chicago, 1986), p. 49. On the polysemic quality of 'pueblo' in Spanish: Norberto Rodríguez Bustamante, 'Sociología del populisme', in José Isaacson, (coord.), El populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1974), pp. 123-4.
24. Etymological logic can be a false guide; it would not help much, for example, in divining the significance of 'fascism'; and those who preface analyses of modern revolutions with erudite references to wheels-in-motion do not necessarily advance our knowledge. In this case, however, the etymology is sufficiently clear, recent, and compelling for us to take it seriously.
25. Francisco Corrêa Weffort, O populismo na politica brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1980), p. 25.
26. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', p. 2.
27. John W. F. Dulles, Vargas of Brazil, A Political Biography (Austin, 1967), p. 10;
28. Herbert Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán. Public Life and Urban Violence in Colombia (Madison, 1985), pp. 101-3.
29. The 50,000 or so Gaitanistas who gathered for a mass rally in Bogota's Circo de Santamaría on 23 September 1945 went further in presuming an intimacy between leader and led: 'guste o no le guste...,' was the cry ', Gaitán será tu padre': Carlos de la Torre, 'The Ambiguous Meanings of Latin American Populisms', Social Research, 59/2 (summer 1992), p. 406.
30. A recurrent rhetorical quirk of populism is to emphasise the militant, confrontational, even class-conscious significance of the (otherwise) bland term 'people', which is done by adopting pejorative (elitist, snobbish) labels and wearing them with pride: hence, Perón's descamisados, Gaitan's gleba gloriosa, Velasco Ibarra's querida chusma (which he borrowed from Arturo Alessandri): Daniel James, Resistance and Integration, Peronism and the Argentine Working Class, 1946-76 (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 22-3;
31. Braun, Assassination of Gaitan, p. 102;
32. Osvaldo Hurtado, 'Populismo y carisma', in Felipe Burbano de Lara y Carlos de la Torre Espinosa, El populismo en Ecuador (Quito, 1989), pp. 180-1.
33. Quoted in Cammack, 'What Populism Was', p. 1.
34. Bruce H. Kay, '"Fuji-populism" and the Liberal State in Peru, 1990-5', Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 38/4 (winter, 1996), p. 57.
35. discuss the notion of 'crisis' more fully in Alan Knight, 'Crisis and Regime Change: Historical Considerations', paper given at the Coloquio Internacional 'Elite Change and Political Crises', Santa Maria de El Paular, Spain, 30 May-1 June 1996.
36. 'Crisis' being a vague term, it is easily coined and devalued. Thus it is not difficult to associate 'populism' (or almost anything else) with 'crisis'. There is also a tautological tendency to impute populism (or anything else) to 'crisis', as if 'crisis' were a discernible cause, when, in fact, it is often a loose description of a bundle of phenomena which need to be disaggregated. Disaggregation sometimes reveals that it was not 'crisis' which generated populism (or mobilisation, rebellion, etc.), but rather populism (or mobilisation, rebellion, etc.) which generated crisis.
37. Here I tend to agree with Canovan, Populism pp. 160-71. On rational and irrational interpretations of populism, see de la Torre, 'The Ambiguous Meanings of Latin American Populisms', pp. 408-9.
38. Here I tend to agree with Canovan, Populism pp. 160-71. On rational and irrational interpretations of populism, see de la Torre, 'The Ambiguous Meanings of Latin American Populisms', pp. 408-9.
39. Daniel James, 'October seventeenth and eighteenth, 1945: Mass Protest, Peronism, and the Argentine Working Class', Journal of Social History, 21 (1988), pp. 441-61; and the same author's Resistance and Integration, ch. 1, especially p. 33.
40. Daniel James, 'October seventeenth and eighteenth, 1945: Mass Protest, Peronism, and the Argentine Working Class', Journal of Social History, 21 (1988), pp. 441-61; and the same author's Resistance and Integration, ch. 1, especially p. 33.
41. Cf. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', pp. 1, 8; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 90, which sees contemporary Peruvian populism as characterised by 'the direct, unmediated mobilisation of atomised masses by personalist leaders'. (I should add that this is my only qualified point of dispute with Roberts' perceptive analysis, with which I am otherwise in full agreement). My objection to the notion of 'unmediated' mobilisation or appeal is that it reinforces the old idea of lumpen masses, lacking political bearings, swayed by a single spellbinding orator. In doing so, it both follows an old tradition, tracing back to Le Bon, and tends to traduce history - since we know that many adherents of populism (e.g., of Cardenismo or Peronism) were not political neophytes, members of a rudderless masa disponible, but people with pre-existing loyalties - to peasant community or urban sindicato, for example. Cf. Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición (Buenos Aires, 1965) and the critique of Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 1971). A comparable debate surrounds Ecuadorean populism: cf. Hurtado, 'Populismo y carisma', pp. 176-9, and the critique of Rafael Quintero, El mito del populismo en Ecuador (Quito, 1980), pp. 26-7, 29-33ff.
42. Cf. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', pp. 1, 8; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 90, which sees contemporary Peruvian populism as characterised by 'the direct, unmediated mobilisation of atomised masses by personalist leaders'. (I should add that this is my only qualified point of dispute with Roberts' perceptive analysis, with which I am otherwise in full agreement). My objection to the notion of 'unmediated' mobilisation or appeal is that it reinforces the old idea of lumpen masses, lacking political bearings, swayed by a single spellbinding orator. In doing so, it both follows an old tradition, tracing back to Le Bon, and tends to traduce history - since we know that many adherents of populism (e.g., of Cardenismo or Peronism) were not political neophytes, members of a rudderless masa disponible, but people with pre-existing loyalties - to peasant community or urban sindicato, for example. Cf. Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición (Buenos Aires, 1965) and the critique of Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 1971). A comparable debate surrounds Ecuadorean populism: cf. Hurtado, 'Populismo y carisma', pp. 176-9, and the critique of Rafael Quintero, El mito del populismo en Ecuador (Quito, 1980), pp. 26-7, 29-33ff.
43. Cf. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', pp. 1, 8; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 90, which sees contemporary Peruvian populism as characterised by 'the direct, unmediated mobilisation of atomised masses by personalist leaders'. (I should add that this is my only qualified point of dispute with Roberts' perceptive analysis, with which I am otherwise in full agreement). My objection to the notion of 'unmediated' mobilisation or appeal is that it reinforces the old idea of lumpen masses, lacking political bearings, swayed by a single spellbinding orator. In doing so, it both follows an old tradition, tracing back to Le Bon, and tends to traduce history - since we know that many adherents of populism (e.g., of Cardenismo or Peronism) were not political neophytes, members of a rudderless masa disponible, but people with pre-existing loyalties - to peasant community or urban sindicato, for example. Cf. Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición (Buenos Aires, 1965) and the critique of Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 1971). A comparable debate surrounds Ecuadorean populism: cf. Hurtado, 'Populismo y carisma', pp. 176-9, and the critique of Rafael Quintero, El mito del populismo en Ecuador (Quito, 1980), pp. 26-7, 29-33ff.
44. Cf. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', pp. 1, 8; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 90, which sees contemporary Peruvian populism as characterised by 'the direct, unmediated mobilisation of atomised masses by personalist leaders'. (I should add that this is my only qualified point of dispute with Roberts' perceptive analysis, with which I am otherwise in full agreement). My objection to the notion of 'unmediated' mobilisation or appeal is that it reinforces the old idea of lumpen masses, lacking political bearings, swayed by a single spellbinding orator. In doing so, it both follows an old tradition, tracing back to Le Bon, and tends to traduce history - since we know that many adherents of populism (e.g., of Cardenismo or Peronism) were not political neophytes, members of a rudderless masa disponible, but people with pre-existing loyalties - to peasant community or urban sindicato, for example. Cf. Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición (Buenos Aires, 1965) and the critique of Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 1971). A comparable debate surrounds Ecuadorean populism: cf. Hurtado, 'Populismo y carisma', pp. 176-9, and the critique of Rafael Quintero, El mito del populismo en Ecuador (Quito, 1980), pp. 26-7, 29-33ff.
45. Cf. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', pp. 1, 8; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 90, which sees contemporary Peruvian populism as characterised by 'the direct, unmediated mobilisation of atomised masses by personalist leaders'. (I should add that this is my only qualified point of dispute with Roberts' perceptive analysis, with which I am otherwise in full agreement). My objection to the notion of 'unmediated' mobilisation or appeal is that it reinforces the old idea of lumpen masses, lacking political bearings, swayed by a single spellbinding orator. In doing so, it both follows an old tradition, tracing back to Le Bon, and tends to traduce history - since we know that many adherents of populism (e.g., of Cardenismo or Peronism) were not political neophytes, members of a rudderless masa disponible, but people with pre-existing loyalties - to peasant community or urban sindicato, for example. Cf. Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición (Buenos Aires, 1965) and the critique of Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 1971). A comparable debate surrounds Ecuadorean populism: cf. Hurtado, 'Populismo y carisma', pp. 176-9, and the critique of Rafael Quintero, El mito del populismo en Ecuador (Quito, 1980), pp. 26-7, 29-33ff.
46. Cf. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', pp. 1, 8; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 90, which sees contemporary Peruvian populism as characterised by 'the direct, unmediated mobilisation of atomised masses by personalist leaders'. (I should add that this is my only qualified point of dispute with Roberts' perceptive analysis, with which I am otherwise in full agreement). My objection to the notion of 'unmediated' mobilisation or appeal is that it reinforces the old idea of lumpen masses, lacking political bearings, swayed by a single spellbinding orator. In doing so, it both follows an old tradition, tracing back to Le Bon, and tends to traduce history - since we know that many adherents of populism (e.g., of Cardenismo or Peronism) were not political neophytes, members of a rudderless masa disponible, but people with pre-existing loyalties - to peasant community or urban sindicato, for example. Cf. Gino Germani, Política y sociedad en una época de transición (Buenos Aires, 1965) and the critique of Miguel Murmis and Juan Carlos Portantiero, Estudios sobre los origenes del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 1971). A comparable debate surrounds Ecuadorean populism: cf. Hurtado, 'Populismo y carisma', pp. 176-9, and the critique of Rafael Quintero, El mito del populismo en Ecuador (Quito, 1980), pp. 26-7, 29-33ff.
47. Alan Knight, 'Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?', Journal of Latin American Studies, 26 (1994), pp. 96-8; David Tamarin, The Argentine Labor Movement, 1930-1945. A Study in the Origins of Peronism (Albuquerque, 1985), pp. 190-2; Amparo Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil, 1948-78: el nivel local', in Burbano de Lara and de la Torre, Elpopulismo en Ecuador, p. 441.
48. Alan Knight, 'Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?', Journal of Latin American Studies, 26 (1994), pp. 96-8; David Tamarin, The Argentine Labor Movement, 1930-1945. A Study in the Origins of Peronism (Albuquerque, 1985), pp. 190-2; Amparo Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil, 1948-78: el nivel local', in Burbano de Lara and de la Torre, Elpopulismo en Ecuador, p. 441.
49. Alan Knight, 'Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?', Journal of Latin American Studies, 26 (1994), pp. 96-8; David Tamarin, The Argentine Labor Movement, 1930-1945. A Study in the Origins of Peronism (Albuquerque, 1985), pp. 190-2; Amparo Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil, 1948-78: el nivel local', in Burbano de Lara and de la Torre, Elpopulismo en Ecuador, p. 441.
50. Like many of the criteria used by analysts of populism, 'mediation' (like 'crisis', 'mobilisation', 'charisma') is not amenable to measurement; hence analysts trade comparisons without, it seems to me, sharing an agreed methodology which would help advance the debate; and the debate therefore assumes a distinctly circular and assertive character (my contribution included).
51. Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil', p. 433; Knight, 'Cardenismo', p. 80; Dulles, Vargas, pp. 318, 346; Robert M. Levine, The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-38 (New York, 1970), p. 37 quotes Oswaldo Aranha on Vargas: 'a Christ among thieves'.
52. Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil', p. 433; Knight, 'Cardenismo', p. 80; Dulles, Vargas, pp. 318, 346; Robert M. Levine, The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-38 (New York, 1970), p. 37 quotes Oswaldo Aranha on Vargas: 'a Christ among thieves'.
53. Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil', p. 433; Knight, 'Cardenismo', p. 80; Dulles, Vargas, pp. 318, 346; Robert M. Levine, The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-38 (New York, 1970), p. 37 quotes Oswaldo Aranha on Vargas: 'a Christ among thieves'.
54. Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil', p. 433; Knight, 'Cardenismo', p. 80; Dulles, Vargas, pp. 318, 346; Robert M. Levine, The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-38 (New York, 1970), p. 37 quotes Oswaldo Aranha on Vargas: 'a Christ among thieves'.
55. Michael L. Conniff, 'Populism in Brazil, 1925-45', in Conniff, (ed.), Latin American Populism p. 85.
56. By the same token, I would hesitate to equate populism with 'exceptionalism', as in the familiar formula, 'the exceptional capitalist state' (e.g., the fascist, Bonapartist, or Peronist state: e.g., Laclau, Politics and Ideology, pp. 57, 197-8). The chief problem with this formula is the assumption of a 'normal', 'unexceptional' capitalist state (presumably, a liberal-democratic bourgeois-capitalist state). But late-Victorian Britain is hardly a yardstick of historical normality. On Bonapartism, see n. 81 below.
57. 'Since the advent of mass political mobilisation, virtually any modern regime, however, repressive, needs to have some populist elements, even if these do not go beyond rhetoric': Canovan, Populism, p. 148.
58. Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil', p. 433; George I. Blanksten, Perón's Argentina (Chicago, 1974, first pubd., 1953), PP. 272-3.
59. Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil', p. 433; George I. Blanksten, Perón's Argentina (Chicago, 1974, first pubd., 1953), PP. 272-3.
60. Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán, pp. 100-101; John Green, '"Vibrations of the Collective": The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia's Atlantic Coast, 1944-48', Hispanic American Historical Review, 76/2 (1996), p. 305.
61. Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán, pp. 100-101; John Green, '"Vibrations of the Collective": The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia's Atlantic Coast, 1944-48', Hispanic American Historical Review, 76/2 (1996), p. 305.
62. In fact, there may be considerable differences between these phenomena - roughly, 'economic nationalism On the one hand and popular 'xenophobia' on the other: Alan Knight, 'Peasants into Patriots: Thoughts on the Making of the Mexican Nation', Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 10/1 (winter 1994), pp. 151-3. Both, however, are consonant with populist mobilisation. On Peronist anti-intellectualism, see James, 'October seventeenth and eighteenth', p. 452, and the same author's Resistance and Integration, p. 27, which, noting the tangoesque discourse of (early) Peronism, quotes Discépolo's 'great tango', Cambalache: 'It's better to be a jackass than a great professor'.
63. In fact, there may be considerable differences between these phenomena - roughly, 'economic nationalism On the one hand and popular 'xenophobia' on the other: Alan Knight, 'Peasants into Patriots: Thoughts on the Making of the Mexican Nation', Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 10/1 (winter 1994), pp. 151-3. Both, however, are consonant with populist mobilisation. On Peronist anti-intellectualism, see James, 'October seventeenth and eighteenth', p. 452, and the same author's Resistance and Integration, p. 27, which, noting the tangoesque discourse of (early) Peronism, quotes Discépolo's 'great tango', Cambalache: 'It's better to be a jackass than a great professor'.
64. In fact, there may be considerable differences between these phenomena - roughly, 'economic nationalism On the one hand and popular 'xenophobia' on the other: Alan Knight, 'Peasants into Patriots: Thoughts on the Making of the Mexican Nation', Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, 10/1 (winter 1994), pp. 151-3. Both, however, are consonant with populist mobilisation. On Peronist anti-intellectualism, see James, 'October seventeenth and eighteenth', p. 452, and the same author's Resistance and Integration, p. 27, which, noting the tangoesque discourse of (early) Peronism, quotes Discépolo's 'great tango', Cambalache: 'It's better to be a jackass than a great professor'.
65. The role of patriarchy and gender relations within populism would no doubt repay further consideration, although I doubt that I am the person to do it. With the obvious exception of Eva Perón, the Latin American populist pantheon is notably lacking in women; but then so, too, is the Latin American political pantheon in general. In this, as in other respects, populism may not be particularly exceptional.
66. Blanksten, Peron's Argentina, pp. 274-5, on populist (i.e., Peronist) ignorance, typified by a cabinet minister's statement that 1950 was the year of the three S's: el año Santo, the anniversary of the death of San Martín and the number Sincuenta. Intellectual populism appears to have been rarer in Latin America than, say, Russia: cf. Canovan, Populism, pp. 104-5. Some Latin American intellectuals - e.g., Mexican and Andean indigenistas - exalted popular, Indian, folkloric values and traditions; but they did so 'from above', paternalistically, aiming to integrate Indians into a mestizo nation state (forjando patria, as Gamio put it); they did not envisage Indianising the nation, or transposing popular ways and customs to the elite. No more did porteño populist/ nationalists start dressing like gauchos or eating raw beef.
67. Blanksten, Peron's Argentina, pp. 274-5, on populist (i.e., Peronist) ignorance, typified by a cabinet minister's statement that 1950 was the year of the three S's: el año Santo, the anniversary of the death of San Martín and the number Sincuenta. Intellectual populism appears to have been rarer in Latin America than, say, Russia: cf. Canovan, Populism, pp. 104-5. Some Latin American intellectuals - e.g., Mexican and Andean indigenistas - exalted popular, Indian, folkloric values and traditions; but they did so 'from above', paternalistically, aiming to integrate Indians into a mestizo nation state (forjando patria, as Gamio put it); they did not envisage Indianising the nation, or transposing popular ways and customs to the elite. No more did porteño populist/ nationalists start dressing like gauchos or eating raw beef.
68. Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-52 (Urbana, 1978), pp. 2, 7.
69. Canovan, Populism, pp. 13, 138. Thus, the Mexican and Argentine variants of populism tend to get separated; a point to which I will return.
70. That is, 'charisma' does not reside, an innate quality, in the bosom of the 'charismatic' leader; it denotes a relationship between leader and followers. Similarly, populism must be understood as a reciprocal relationship, not a top-down imposition.
71. Samuel Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, 1933-1960 (Middletown, 1976), pp. 20-1; Jeffrey L. Gould, To Lead As Equals, Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Cbinandega, Nicaragua, 1912-1979 (Chapel Hill, 1990), ch's 2, 3, especially p. 81.
72. Samuel Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, 1933-1960 (Middletown, 1976), pp. 20-1; Jeffrey L. Gould, To Lead As Equals, Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in Cbinandega, Nicaragua, 1912-1979 (Chapel Hill, 1990), ch's 2, 3, especially p. 81.
73. Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, 'Populism and Economic Policy in Brazil', Journal of Interamerican and World Affairs, 33/2 (summer, 1991), p. 7.
74. James, Resistance and Integration, ch. 1.
75. For example, the extension of rural schooling, which could have a decisive (but often non-quantifiable) effect on local communities: Eyler Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico's Way Out (Chapel Hill, 1937), p. 108;
76. Mary Kay Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution. Teachers, Peasants and Schools in Mexico, 1930-1940 (Tucson, 1997), pp. 193-8.
77. Knight, 'Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?', develops this argument.
78. John French, The Brazilian Workers ABC. Class Conflicts and Alliances in Modern São Paulo (Chapel Hill, 1992), argues for the relative autonomy of the greater São Paulo working class during the process of supposed 'populist incorporation'.
79. Joel Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men, São Paulo and the Rise of Brazil's Industrial Working Class, 1900-1955 (Durham, 1993), dissents from (some of) French's analysis (see pp. 262-3, n. 13),
80. but Wolfe also depicts the São Paulo working class as rationally aware of the benefits, opportunities - and costs of Varguismo: see pp. 110-114.
81. Jorge Basurto, 'The Late Populism of Luis Echeverria, in Conniff, (ed.), Latin American Populism, pp. 103-111.
82. Roger Bartra, Agrarian Structure and Political Power in Mexico (Baltimore, 1993), pp. 118-126, offer an interesting analysis.
83. Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil', p. 441.
84. Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil', p. 445, n. 143, quotes an ex-CFP militant to the effect that the party did not practice terrorism (as critics alleged) but rather resorted to 'la instigación del miedo en alguna gente'. Cardenistas and Peronistas were, of course, familiar with political violence - as perpetrators and victims alike.
85. This, of course, is the normal state of affairs in history, and much of the social sciences. By 'intutively' I mean simply that the value of a particular criterion - or 'organising concept' - has to be evaluated, justified and debated using 'impressionistic' non-quantifiable data and arguments. While we might agree that some are non-starters (e.g., populism as a movement determined by the genetic make-up of inferior peoples), there is no definitive way of proving the superiority (i.e., the superior usefulness) of other competing criteria/concepts which appear more promising; we are likely to conclude, lamely that there is 'some sense', hence 'some use', in several of them; and, even if we arrive at a preference for one, it may prove difficult or impossible to persuade dissenters to that effect. Hence the occasional feeling of circularity and déjà vu which can creep up when we reprise these old debates....
86. The list is political; I have resisted the temptation to encompass 'populist' art, literature, music or film.
87. Or they may wish to strike some names from the list. Two additional points bear mention: first, we again note the tendency for some leaders to progress (?) over time from populism to non-populism (usually conservatism): e.g., Alessandri and Batista. Movements in the other direction appear to be rarer, at least in Latin America. It is easier - or, at least, more tempting - to foreswear a populist past than to build a belated populist following (though Vargas may be an example of the latter: Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men, pp. 119-24). Secondly, emblematic populists spring to mind more readily than non-populists; the latter, in fact, tend to be less celebrated - or less notorious - than their populist counterparts (note the discrepancy in stature between, say, Obregón and Ortiz Rubio, Cárdenas and Rodríguez, Vargas and Dutra). Maybe this tells us something about 'mass politics' in general and Latin American politics in particular?
88. On the notion of nineteenth-century populist caudillos (Alvarez, Artigas, Carrera), see John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800-1850 (Oxford, 1992), pp. 38, 41-4, 87, 128-9, 217-24, 364-401; and cf. pp. 201-5, 431-3.
89. I am not trying to resuscitate the moribund myth of the Mexican Revolution (although I do think that myth has more to it than some recent revisionist critiques allow). The Revolution did not usher in an era of benign social-democratic - still less socialist - reform. It did, however, change Mexican politics and society in profound ways sometimes less by virtue of planned legislation than of de facto, unplanned, haphazard events/processes (migration, inflation, demographic shifts, class and communal mobilisation). Hence the move towards populist politics referred to here.
90. Díaz began his political career as a local caudillo with populist leanings, and these did not instantly disappear when he assumed the presidency. Over time, however, he went the way of many later populists, shifting to the right, spurning his popular constituency, cutting deals with Church, oligarchs and businessmen. The contrast between the populist Revolution and the oligarchic Porfiriato is therefore stronger if we compare the late Porfiriato (c. 1890-1910) with the early Revolution (1910-40). The early Porfiriato was a different matter; so, too, was (is?) the 'late Revolution' (since 1940), which many commentators now see as an increasingly 'neo-Porfirian' regime.
91. Frans J. Schryer, The Rancheros of Pisaflores. The History of a Peasant Bourgeoisie in Twentieth-Century Mexico (Toronto, 1980), pp. 7-9 and ch. 4.
92. Pending the publication of Wil Pansters' study of Santos, the best source is Santos' own remarkable autobiography, Memorias (Mexico, 1986).
93. Ross Parmenter, Lawrence in Oaxaca (G. M. Smith, 1984), p. xxx, quoting Vasconcelos.
94. Linda B. Hall, Alvaro Obregón. Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920 (College Station, 1981), pp. 19-26 on Obregon's character and origins. One of many Obregón jokes captures something of his 'populist' manner: in 1926 the retired President, dressed 'in peasant garb' (i.e., loose pyjama-style cotton shirt and drawers), welcomed the Japanese ambassador to his Sonoran hacienda: 'surprised, the Japanese commented: "I had difficulty in recognising you, General, in your peasant disguise", to which Obregon replied: 'No, your excellency, this is my real self (verdadera forma de ser). The one in disguise was the Obregón you met in the National Palace"': Jorge Mejía Prieto, Ah, qué risa me dan las politicos (Mexico, 1992), p. 44. Vargas, too, 'never put on airs as president; frequently he met visitors to his Petrópolis summer residence in his pajamas, an old rural Brazilian custom': Levine, The Vargas Regime, pp. 37-8. I am not, however, proposing a new pyjama-populism paradigm.
95. Linda B. Hall, Alvaro Obregón. Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920 (College Station, 1981), pp. 19-26 on Obregon's character and origins. One of many Obregón jokes captures something of his 'populist' manner: in 1926 the retired President, dressed 'in peasant garb' (i.e., loose pyjama-style cotton shirt and drawers), welcomed the Japanese ambassador to his Sonoran hacienda: 'surprised, the Japanese commented: "I had difficulty in recognising you, General, in your peasant disguise", to which Obregon replied: 'No, your excellency, this is my real self (verdadera forma de ser). The one in disguise was the Obregón you met in the National Palace"': Jorge Mejía Prieto, Ah, qué risa me dan las politicos (Mexico, 1992), p. 44. Vargas, too, 'never put on airs as president; frequently he met visitors to his Petrópolis summer residence in his pajamas, an old rural Brazilian custom': Levine, The Vargas Regime, pp. 37-8. I am not, however, proposing a new pyjama-populism paradigm.
96. Linda B. Hall, Alvaro Obregón. Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-1920 (College Station, 1981), pp. 19-26 on Obregon's character and origins. One of many Obregón jokes captures something of his 'populist' manner: in 1926 the retired President, dressed 'in peasant garb' (i.e., loose pyjama-style cotton shirt and drawers), welcomed the Japanese ambassador to his Sonoran hacienda: 'surprised, the Japanese commented: "I had difficulty in recognising you, General, in your peasant disguise", to which Obregon replied: 'No, your excellency, this is my real self (verdadera forma de ser). The one in disguise was the Obregón you met in the National Palace"': Jorge Mejía Prieto, Ah, qué risa me dan las politicos (Mexico, 1992), p. 44. Vargas, too, 'never put on airs as president; frequently he met visitors to his Petrópolis summer residence in his pajamas, an old rural Brazilian custom': Levine, The Vargas Regime, pp. 37-8. I am not, however, proposing a new pyjama-populism paradigm.
97. Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution (2 vols., Cambridge, 1986), II, pp. 314-16.
98. Schryer, Rancheros of Pisaflores, p. 92.
99. For example, Luis Gonzalez, San José de Gracia, Mexican Village in Transition (Austin, 1983), pp. 204-5. Echoes of the cult of Tata Lázaro are to be found, fifty years on, in Adolfo Gilly, Cartas a Cuaubtémoc Cárdenas (Mexico, 1989). Such peripatetic populism is quite common: consider Lula's 'Caravan of Citizenship', which covered 45,000 km in 1994: Céli Regina Jardim Pinto, 'Neo-populism in Brazilian Politics: The Rapid Exhaustion of a Model', paper presented at the LASA conference, Guadalajara, April 1997, p. 14.
100. For example, Luis Gonzalez, San José de Gracia, Mexican Village in Transition (Austin, 1983), pp. 204-5. Echoes of the cult of Tata Lázaro are to be found, fifty years on, in Adolfo Gilly, Cartas a Cuaubtémoc Cárdenas (Mexico, 1989). Such peripatetic populism is quite common: consider Lula's 'Caravan of Citizenship', which covered 45,000 km in 1994: Céli Regina Jardim Pinto, 'Neo-populism in Brazilian Politics: The Rapid Exhaustion of a Model', paper presented at the LASA conference, Guadalajara, April 1997, p. 14.
101. For example, Luis Gonzalez, San José de Gracia, Mexican Village in Transition (Austin, 1983), pp. 204-5. Echoes of the cult of Tata Lázaro are to be found, fifty years on, in Adolfo Gilly, Cartas a Cuaubtémoc Cárdenas (Mexico, 1989). Such peripatetic populism is quite common: consider Lula's 'Caravan of Citizenship', which covered 45,000 km in 1994: Céli Regina Jardim Pinto, 'Neo-populism in Brazilian Politics: The Rapid Exhaustion of a Model', paper presented at the LASA conference, Guadalajara, April 1997, p. 14.
102. Coastal Ecuador is a good example: Martz, 'The Regionalist Expression' and Menéndez-Carrión, 'Estructura y dinámica de la articulación electoral en las barriadas de Guayaquil'.
103. Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, From the MNR to Military Rule (New York, 1977).
104. E.g., Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán, pp. 83-103, 121-2; Green, 'Gaitanismo on the Atlantic Coast', pp. 298-309; Steve Stein, 'Populism in Peru: APRA, the Formative Years', in Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism, pp. 113-34; and the same author's Populism in Peru (Madison, 1980), ch. 5, on Sanchezcerrismo.
105. E.g., Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán, pp. 83-103, 121-2; Green, 'Gaitanismo on the Atlantic Coast', pp. 298-309; Steve Stein, 'Populism in Peru: APRA, the Formative Years', in Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism, pp. 113-34; and the same author's Populism in Peru (Madison, 1980), ch. 5, on Sanchezcerrismo.
106. E.g., Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán, pp. 83-103, 121-2; Green, 'Gaitanismo on the Atlantic Coast', pp. 298-309; Steve Stein, 'Populism in Peru: APRA, the Formative Years', in Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism, pp. 113-34; and the same author's Populism in Peru (Madison, 1980), ch. 5, on Sanchezcerrismo.
107. E.g., Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán, pp. 83-103, 121-2; Green, 'Gaitanismo on the Atlantic Coast', pp. 298-309; Steve Stein, 'Populism in Peru: APRA, the Formative Years', in Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism, pp. 113-34; and the same author's Populism in Peru (Madison, 1980), ch. 5, on Sanchezcerrismo.
108. Dulles, Vargas, pp. 9 ('cold, reserved, cautious, impersonal'), 18 ('no extrovert...and apparently unemotional'). Osvald Bayer, 'Un movimiento popular en un gobierno populista', in Isaacson, El populismo en la Argentina, p. 17, notes that Hipólito Irigoyen - 'el ejemplo más puro de un gobernante populista' - 'llega a ser un caudillo popular sin saber hablar, sin tener balcón'.
109. Dulles, Vargas, pp. 9 ('cold, reserved, cautious, impersonal'), 18 ('no extrovert...and apparently unemotional'). Osvald Bayer, 'Un movimiento popular en un gobierno populista', in Isaacson, El populismo en la Argentina, p. 17, notes that Hipólito Irigoyen - 'el ejemplo más puro de un gobernante populista' - 'llega a ser un caudillo popular sin saber hablar, sin tener balcón'.
110. Paul Drake, 'Comment', in Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago, 1991), pp- 38-9.
111. Adelman, 'Post-Populist Argentina', pp. 66-7.
112. Weffort, O populismo, p. 15. Compare Perón's wheedling of the Buenos Aires Bolsa in 1944: Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill, 1990), p. 146.
113. Weffort, O populismo, p. 15. Compare Perón's wheedling of the Buenos Aires Bolsa in 1944: Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill, 1990), p. 146.
114. On Somocista populism: Gould, To Lead as Equals, ch's 4, 5.
115. Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, p. 20,
116. denotes (the early) Batista a 'Bonapartist Conservative'; Hennessy, 'Latin America', p. 48, refers to Batista's 'urban populism'; but a case could also be made for a rural dimension, e.g., in light of Batista's protection of Cuba's colono class. In general, Batista's 1930s/40s populism remains a neglected topic.
117. Hence, Drake's 'requiem', Adelman's 'funeral' (both n. 2) and Gibson's 'last flexing of [Peronism's] populist muscle' in 1989: Edward L. Gibson, 'The Populist Road to Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina', World Politics, 49/3 (April 1997), p. 354.
118. Cf. Alan Knight, 'Viewpoint, Revisionism and Revolution: Mexico Compared to England and France', Past and Present, 134 (Feb. 1992), pp. 176-7.
119. Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones, pp. 41, 50-1, 61-2.
120. R. McKenzie and A. Silver, Angels in Marble (London, 1968).
121. Braun, The Assassination of Gaitán, pp. 121-4, 128-9;
122. Green, 'Gaitanismo on the Atlantic Coast', pp. 293, 298.
123. Knight, 'Cardenismo', pp. 80-4.
124. French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Michael L. Conniff, 'The National Elite', in Michael L. Conniff and Frank D. McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective (Lincoln, 1989), p. 41. If 'populism' is, to a degree, a useful and discernible phenomenon, it is logical to look for its elitist counterpart, 'anti-populism', that is, a discourse/ideology/style which deplores the coarse, degenerate and feckless character of 'the people': see, for example, Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil, Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-64 (Chapel Hill, 1996), pp. 220-1, 227-8, 294-5; and Robert M. Levine, 'Elite Perceptions of the Povo', in Conniff and McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective, pp. 209-224.
125. French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Michael L. Conniff, 'The National Elite', in Michael L. Conniff and Frank D. McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective (Lincoln, 1989), p. 41. If 'populism' is, to a degree, a useful and discernible phenomenon, it is logical to look for its elitist counterpart, 'anti-populism', that is, a discourse/ideology/style which deplores the coarse, degenerate and feckless character of 'the people': see, for example, Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil, Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-64 (Chapel Hill, 1996), pp. 220-1, 227-8, 294-5; and Robert M. Levine, 'Elite Perceptions of the Povo', in Conniff and McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective, pp. 209-224.
126. French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Michael L. Conniff, 'The National Elite', in Michael L. Conniff and Frank D. McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective (Lincoln, 1989), p. 41. If 'populism' is, to a degree, a useful and discernible phenomenon, it is logical to look for its elitist counterpart, 'anti-populism', that is, a discourse/ideology/style which deplores the coarse, degenerate and feckless character of 'the people': see, for example, Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil, Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-64 (Chapel Hill, 1996), pp. 220-1, 227-8, 294-5; and Robert M. Levine, 'Elite Perceptions of the Povo', in Conniff and McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective, pp. 209-224.
127. French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Michael L. Conniff, 'The National Elite', in Michael L. Conniff and Frank D. McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective (Lincoln, 1989), p. 41. If 'populism' is, to a degree, a useful and discernible phenomenon, it is logical to look for its elitist counterpart, 'anti-populism', that is, a discourse/ideology/style which deplores the coarse, degenerate and feckless character of 'the people': see, for example, Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil, Industrialists and the Remaking of the Working Class in São Paulo, 1920-64 (Chapel Hill, 1996), pp. 220-1, 227-8, 294-5; and Robert M. Levine, 'Elite Perceptions of the Povo', in Conniff and McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective, pp. 209-224.
128. Conniff, Urban Politics, pp. 19, 125-30.
129. Canovan, Populism, p. 138; Hennessy, 'Latin America', p. 28. José Alvarez Junco, El emperador del paralelo. Lerroux y la demagogia populista (Madrid, 1990), p. 10 n. 3, defines (generic) populism as 'fundamentally urban' in terms of its mass constituency.
130. Canovan, Populism, p. 138; Hennessy, 'Latin America', p. 28. José Alvarez Junco, El emperador del paralelo. Lerroux y la demagogia populista (Madrid, 1990), p. 10 n. 3, defines (generic) populism as 'fundamentally urban' in terms of its mass constituency.
131. Canovan, Populism, p. 138; Hennessy, 'Latin America', p. 28. José Alvarez Junco, El emperador del paralelo. Lerroux y la demagogia populista (Madrid, 1990), p. 10 n. 3, defines (generic) populism as 'fundamentally urban' in terms of its mass constituency.
132. The rural clientelism of the PRI is such a commonplace in analyses of Mexican politics (Pablo González Casanova, Democracy in Mexico [New York, 1970] is the locus classicus) that it is surprising to find Gibson, 'The Populist Road to Market Reform', p. 341, stating that 'Peronism and the PRI have been largely analysed as labour-based movements whose political and electoral clout resided in the most urbanised and modern regions of the country' (though the statement is then somewhat confusingly qualified: p. 341, n. 3).
133. The rural clientelism of the PRI is such a commonplace in analyses of Mexican politics (Pablo González Casanova, Democracy in Mexico [New York, 1970] is the locus classicus) that it is surprising to find Gibson, 'The Populist Road to Market Reform', p. 341, stating that 'Peronism and the PRI have been largely analysed as labour-based movements whose political and electoral clout resided in the most urbanised and modern regions of the country' (though the statement is then somewhat confusingly qualified: p. 341, n. 3).
134. Mitchell, Legacy of Populism. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton, 1991), p. 165, make a useful distinction between 'labour populism' (e.g., Peronism) and 'radical populism' (revolutionary Mexico), which has the advantage of preserving the common 'populist' label.
135. Mitchell, Legacy of Populism. Ruth Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena (Princeton, 1991), p. 165, make a useful distinction between 'labour populism' (e.g., Peronism) and 'radical populism' (revolutionary Mexico), which has the advantage of preserving the common 'populist' label.
136. This might be the moment to mention - if only to dismiss - the notion of Bonapartism, which often rubs shoulders with populism (see, for example, Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, pp. 16-27; Maximilien Rubel, et al., Critical de la economia politico, Los Bonapartismos [Mexico, 1985]). Scholars have laboured long and hard to convert some of Marx and Engels' more confused and casual writings into the capstone of a general theory; but the deficiency of the material, in my view, jeopardises the theory; and, in this case, etymological logic is less help then hindrance.
137. This might be the moment to mention - if only to dismiss - the notion of Bonapartism, which often rubs shoulders with populism (see, for example, Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, pp. 16-27; Maximilien Rubel, et al., Critical de la economia politico, Los Bonapartismos [Mexico, 1985]). Scholars have laboured long and hard to convert some of Marx and Engels' more confused and casual writings into the capstone of a general theory; but the deficiency of the material, in my view, jeopardises the theory; and, in this case, etymological logic is less help then hindrance.
138. James, Resistance and Integration; French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men; Jonathan Brown, (ed.), Workers' Control in Latin America, 1930-1979 (Chapel Hill, 1997).
139. James, Resistance and Integration; French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men; Jonathan Brown, (ed.), Workers' Control in Latin America, 1930-1979 (Chapel Hill, 1997).
140. James, Resistance and Integration; French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Wolfe, Working Women, Working Men; Jonathan Brown, (ed.), Workers' Control in Latin America, 1930-1979 (Chapel Hill, 1997).
141. Dornbusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism.
142. Bresser Pereira, 'Populism and Economic Policy in Brazil'; Eliana Cardoso and Ann Helwege, Latin America's Economy (Cambridge, 1992), ch. 8.
143. Enrique Cárdenas, La industrialización mexicana durante la gran depresión (Mexico, 1987), pp. 88-95;
144. and the same author's 'La política económica en la época de Cárdenas', in Marcos Tonatiuh Aguila M. y Alberto Enríquez Perea, (coords.), Perspectivas sobre el Cardenismo (Mexico, 1996), pp. 53-61.
145. Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, 1971), P- 33, graphically depicts 'cartorialism' ('employment in the federal government'), showing an upward move with the Estado Nôvo, but then a levelling-off through the 1940s and early 1950s; the real take-off starts c. 1955, accelerating dramatically through the 1960s. On Vargas' fiscal prudence see also Dulles, Vargas, pp. 88, 246, 297, 306-7, 310: a story which starts with Vargas 'entering office with the conservative financial ideas of one who had studied budgets and been Washington Luis's Finance Minister' and ends with the deflationary measures of 1952 which, Vargas boasted, 'freed [Brazil] from the chronic evil of continuous deficits '.
146. Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, 1971), P- 33, graphically depicts 'cartorialism' ('employment in the federal government'), showing an upward move with the Estado Nôvo, but then a levelling-off through the 1940s and early 1950s; the real take-off starts c. 1955, accelerating dramatically through the 1960s. On Vargas' fiscal prudence see also Dulles, Vargas, pp. 88, 246, 297, 306-7, 310: a story which starts with Vargas 'entering office with the conservative financial ideas of one who had studied budgets and been Washington Luis's Finance Minister' and ends with the deflationary measures of 1952 which, Vargas boasted, 'freed [Brazil] from the chronic evil of continuous deficits '.
147. Lewis, Crisis of Argentine Capitalism, ch's 9, 10; Gary W. Wynia, Argentina in the Pestwar Era (Albuquerque, 1978), pp. 68-73.
148. Lewis, Crisis of Argentine Capitalism, ch's 9, 10; Gary W. Wynia, Argentina in the Pestwar Era (Albuquerque, 1978), pp. 68-73.
149. Average annual inflation for the (boom) years 1945-50 was 20%.
150. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 471-3; Stein, Populism in Peru, pp. 212-5; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 107; Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-1977. Growth and Policy in an Open Economy (London, 1978), pp. 201, 257.
151. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 471-3; Stein, Populism in Peru, pp. 212-5; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 107; Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-1977. Growth and Policy in an Open Economy (London, 1978), pp. 201, 257.
152. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 471-3; Stein, Populism in Peru, pp. 212-5; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 107; Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-1977. Growth and Policy in an Open Economy (London, 1978), pp. 201, 257.
153. Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 471-3; Stein, Populism in Peru, pp. 212-5; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 107; Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 1890-1977. Growth and Policy in an Open Economy (London, 1978), pp. 201, 257.
154. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', p. 2; Canovan, Populism, pp. 148, 150, 26off.
155. Cammack, 'What Populism Was', p. 2; Canovan, Populism, pp. 148, 150, 26off.
156. Gibson, 'The Populist Road to Market Reform', p. 358, refers to 'decades-long populist commitments to maintain employment and wage levels and to use state power to bolster labour's bargaining position in the labour market and political arena': a notion of 'populism' which, from a British perspective, would make Edward Heath much more of a populist than Margaret Thatcher (compare my pairing above). It could be objected, of course, that what goes for Europe does not go for Latin America: 'commitments to maintain employment and wage levels' are sound Keynesian policies in Europe (at least, they were for a generation), but irresponsible economic 'populism' in Latin America. This seems a dangerously partial argument; similarly partial arguments have been made concerning representative democracy.
157. Kurt Weyland, 'Neo-populism and Neo-liberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities', paper presented at the panel on 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America', nineteenth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994, was (to my knowledge) one of the first to question the supposed 'basic divergence between populism and economic liberalism' and to note 'unexpected affinities'; the latter have been further explored by Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism'; Kay, '"Fuji-populism"'; Catherine M. Conaghan, James M. Malloy and Luis A. Abugattas, 'Business and the "Boys": The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes', Latin American Research Review (25/2), 1990, pp. 3-30.
158. Kurt Weyland, 'Neo-populism and Neo-liberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities', paper presented at the panel on 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America', nineteenth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994, was (to my knowledge) one of the first to question the supposed 'basic divergence between populism and economic liberalism' and to note 'unexpected affinities'; the latter have been further explored by Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism'; Kay, '"Fuji-populism"'; Catherine M. Conaghan, James M. Malloy and Luis A. Abugattas, 'Business and the "Boys": The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes', Latin American Research Review (25/2), 1990, pp. 3-30.
159. Kurt Weyland, 'Neo-populism and Neo-liberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities', paper presented at the panel on 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America', nineteenth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994, was (to my knowledge) one of the first to question the supposed 'basic divergence between populism and economic liberalism' and to note 'unexpected affinities'; the latter have been further explored by Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism'; Kay, '"Fuji-populism"'; Catherine M. Conaghan, James M. Malloy and Luis A. Abugattas, 'Business and the "Boys": The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes', Latin American Research Review (25/2), 1990, pp. 3-30.
160. Kurt Weyland, 'Neo-populism and Neo-liberalism in Latin America: Unexpected Affinities', paper presented at the panel on 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin America', nineteenth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1994, was (to my knowledge) one of the first to question the supposed 'basic divergence between populism and economic liberalism' and to note 'unexpected affinities'; the latter have been further explored by Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism'; Kay, '"Fuji-populism"'; Catherine M. Conaghan, James M. Malloy and Luis A. Abugattas, 'Business and the "Boys": The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes', Latin American Research Review (25/2), 1990, pp. 3-30.
161. This argument is reinforced by considerations of, say, contemporary Russian, Eastern European, and United States populism, since in each case the economic correlates of populist - including nationalist, xenophobic and 'fundamentalist'- attitudes are hugely divergent. Populism may sometimes have an economic rationale - e.g., the free silver movement of the 1890s in the US - but, equally, it may not; an indeterminacy which is the logical consequence of a broad 'politico-stylistic' definition.
162. Cammack, 'What Was Populism', p. 6.
163. Rolando Cordera, 'Solidaridad y su problemática', in Solidaridad a debate (Mexico, 1991), p. 142.
164. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa? Una entrevista a Guillermo O'Donnell por Jorge Heine', LASA Forum, 23/2 (summer 1992), pp. 7-9, and O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy?', Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172 (1992). Compare Conniff, 'The National Elite', p. 41, on the populist tendency to 'vault ahead in politics without following the usual paths...ignoring the rules of the game'; or Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London, 1963), on the 'dangers to "due process" inherent in populist ideology' (dangers which, of course, will be differently perceived by those for whom 'due process' remains a legal fiction; as a Peronist worker responded to a (middle-class) questioner in 1945: 'freedom of speech is to do with you people. We have never had it': James, Resistance and Integration, p. 17). On the 'democratic deficit' of Menem's Argentina - which, the author points out, is common to many Latin American democracies - see Atilio A. Borón, 'El experimento neoliberal de Carlos Saul Menem', in Borón et al., Peronismoy menemismo. Avatares del populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 17ff.
165. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa? Una entrevista a Guillermo O'Donnell por Jorge Heine', LASA Forum, 23/2 (summer 1992), pp. 7-9, and O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy?', Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172 (1992). Compare Conniff, 'The National Elite', p. 41, on the populist tendency to 'vault ahead in politics without following the usual paths...ignoring the rules of the game'; or Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London, 1963), on the 'dangers to "due process" inherent in populist ideology' (dangers which, of course, will be differently perceived by those for whom 'due process' remains a legal fiction; as a Peronist worker responded to a (middle-class) questioner in 1945: 'freedom of speech is to do with you people. We have never had it': James, Resistance and Integration, p. 17). On the 'democratic deficit' of Menem's Argentina - which, the author points out, is common to many Latin American democracies - see Atilio A. Borón, 'El experimento neoliberal de Carlos Saul Menem', in Borón et al., Peronismoy menemismo. Avatares del populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 17ff.
166. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa? Una entrevista a Guillermo O'Donnell por Jorge Heine', LASA Forum, 23/2 (summer 1992), pp. 7-9, and O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy?', Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172 (1992). Compare Conniff, 'The National Elite', p. 41, on the populist tendency to 'vault ahead in politics without following the usual paths...ignoring the rules of the game'; or Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London, 1963), on the 'dangers to "due process" inherent in populist ideology' (dangers which, of course, will be differently perceived by those for whom 'due process' remains a legal fiction; as a Peronist worker responded to a (middle-class) questioner in 1945: 'freedom of speech is to do with you people. We have never had it': James, Resistance and Integration, p. 17). On the 'democratic deficit' of Menem's Argentina - which, the author points out, is common to many Latin American democracies - see Atilio A. Borón, 'El experimento neoliberal de Carlos Saul Menem', in Borón et al., Peronismoy menemismo. Avatares del populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 17ff.
167. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa? Una entrevista a Guillermo O'Donnell por Jorge Heine', LASA Forum, 23/2 (summer 1992), pp. 7-9, and O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy?', Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172 (1992). Compare Conniff, 'The National Elite', p. 41, on the populist tendency to 'vault ahead in politics without following the usual paths...ignoring the rules of the game'; or Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London, 1963), on the 'dangers to "due process" inherent in populist ideology' (dangers which, of course, will be differently perceived by those for whom 'due process' remains a legal fiction; as a Peronist worker responded to a (middle-class) questioner in 1945: 'freedom of speech is to do with you people. We have never had it': James, Resistance and Integration, p. 17). On the 'democratic deficit' of Menem's Argentina - which, the author points out, is common to many Latin American democracies - see Atilio A. Borón, 'El experimento neoliberal de Carlos Saul Menem', in Borón et al., Peronismoy menemismo. Avatares del populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 17ff.
168. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa? Una entrevista a Guillermo O'Donnell por Jorge Heine', LASA Forum, 23/2 (summer 1992), pp. 7-9, and O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy?', Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172 (1992). Compare Conniff, 'The National Elite', p. 41, on the populist tendency to 'vault ahead in politics without following the usual paths...ignoring the rules of the game'; or Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London, 1963), on the 'dangers to "due process" inherent in populist ideology' (dangers which, of course, will be differently perceived by those for whom 'due process' remains a legal fiction; as a Peronist worker responded to a (middle-class) questioner in 1945: 'freedom of speech is to do with you people. We have never had it': James, Resistance and Integration, p. 17). On the 'democratic deficit' of Menem's Argentina - which, the author points out, is common to many Latin American democracies - see Atilio A. Borón, 'El experimento neoliberal de Carlos Saul Menem', in Borón et al., Peronismoy menemismo. Avatares del populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 17ff.
169. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa? Una entrevista a Guillermo O'Donnell por Jorge Heine', LASA Forum, 23/2 (summer 1992), pp. 7-9, and O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy?', Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172 (1992). Compare Conniff, 'The National Elite', p. 41, on the populist tendency to 'vault ahead in politics without following the usual paths...ignoring the rules of the game'; or Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (London, 1963), on the 'dangers to "due process" inherent in populist ideology' (dangers which, of course, will be differently perceived by those for whom 'due process' remains a legal fiction; as a Peronist worker responded to a (middle-class) questioner in 1945: 'freedom of speech is to do with you people. We have never had it': James, Resistance and Integration, p. 17). On the 'democratic deficit' of Menem's Argentina - which, the author points out, is common to many Latin American democracies - see Atilio A. Borón, 'El experimento neoliberal de Carlos Saul Menem', in Borón et al., Peronismoy menemismo. Avatares del populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 17ff.
170. Jesús Velasco, 'Selling Ideas, Buying Influence: Mexico and American Think Tanks in the Promotion of NAFTA', in Rodolfo O. de la Garza and Jesús Velasco, Bridging the Border. Transforming Mexico-U.S. Relations (Lanham, 1997), pp. 125-48 (especially pp. 134-9) is a revealing analysis of orchestrated research-cum-lobbying.
171. Juan Molinar Horcasitas and Jeffrey A. Welcon, 'Electoral Determinants and Consequences of National Solidarity', in Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig and Jonathan Fox, (eds.), Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico (San Diego, Center for US-Mexican Studies, 1994), pp. 123-42.
172. Alan Knight, 'Solidarity: Historical Continuities and Contemporary Implications', in Cornelius, Craig and Fox, (eds.), Transforming State-Society Relations, pp. 29-46.
173. Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 104.
174. The 1988 election was highly contentious; probably Salinas won; but his formal 'victory' did not confer an unqualified legitimacy. In 1994, in contrast, levels of fraud were certainly lower; hence Zedillo's victory was less disputed, more legitimate. It does not appear to have helped him much.
175. Of course, politics and economics cannot be neatly separated. The Chiapas revolt - a political problem which had deep economic roots - heightened the regime's vulnerability to financial crisis. So did the political assassinations of 1994. However, these political vicissitudes appeared to have been weathered by the autumn of 1994, hence the (PRIísta) euphoria which surrounded Zedillo's inauguration in December. The subsequent crash, it would seem, was an economic rather than political verdict.
176. Denise Dresser, Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National Solidarity Program (San Diego, 1991).
177. At least in its centalised, presidential-populist form. Now decentralised and reduced in scope, the programme has acquired a range of institutional personae, depending on local (state) political alignments: see the perceptive analysis of Robert R. Kaufman and Guillermo Trejo, 'Regionalism, Regime Transformation and PRONASOL: The Politics of the National Solidarity Programme in Four Mexican States', Journal of Latin American Studies, 29/3 (Oct. 1997), pp. 717-46.
178. The potential of PANista populism may be inhibited by two factors: first, the lack of material resources enjoyed by PANista state or municipal governments, especially in times of austerity (a constraint now shared by regente Cárdenas in Mexico City); and, secondly, the reactionary, moralistic tone of some (conservative Catholic) PANistas who, though they may appeal to a particular constituency, are unlikely to broaden the party's regionally limited base. Banning mini-skirts for public employees does not strike me as good populist politics.
179. Knight, 'El abrigo de Arturo Alessandri'.
180. Knight, 'El abrigo de Arturo Alessandri', p. 71.
181. Jean Grugel, 'Populism and the Political System in Chile - Ibañismo (1952-1958)', Bulletin of Latin American Research, 11/2 (May 1992), p. 183.
182. O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa?' and 'Delegative Democracy?'
183. Drake, 'Comment', p. 36, coined the 'bait-and-switch' term;
184. Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', pp. 104-5;
185. Kay, '"Fuji-populism"', pp. 78-80.
186. Gibson, 'Populist Road to Market Reform', pp. 357-9, 363-6. The success of the opposition in the November 1997 elections casts some doubt on the longer term electoral viability of the Menemista 'project'; but the opposition itself involves some odd bedfellows and contradictory policies.
187. These 'traditional populisms' are what, I think, Cammack refers to as 'neopopulism' - whence our semantic disagreement.
188. And where economic populism has also been historically weak: Miguel Urrutia, 'On the Absence of Economic Populism in Colombia', in Dornbusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism, pp. 369-387.