The philosophy and psychology of hallucination: An introduction

Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 1-38

  Macpherson, Fiona ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84902575345     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

References (29)

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