What are the Contents of Experiences?

The Admissible Contents of Experience

Volumn , Issue , 2011, Pages 114-138

  Pautz, Adam ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Accuracy conception; Experiences; Perception; Phenomenal characters; Successful experience

Indexed keywords

EID: 84889422009     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1002/9781444343915.ch7     Document Type: Chapter

References (35)

1. M. Tye, Consciousness, Color and Content (MIT Press, 2000).
2. S. Siegel, Which Properties are Represented in Perception?, in T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience (Oxford UP, 2006), pp. 481-503.
3. C. Travis, The Silence of the Senses, Mind, 113 (2004), pp. 57-94.
4. T. Burge, Qualia and Intentional Content: Reply to Block, in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 405-17.
5. D. Chalmers, Perception and the Fall from Eden, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience, pp. 49-125, at p. 51.
6. A. Byrne, Intentionalism Defended, Philosophical Review, 110 (2001), pp. 199-240, at p. 201.
7. A. Byrne and D. Hilbert, Color Realism and Color Science, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, (2003), pp. 3-21, at p. 5.
8. B. Brewer, Perception and Content, European Journal of Philosophy, 14 (2006), pp. 165-81.
9. F. Jackson, Perception: a Representative Theory (Cambridge UP, 1977).
10. S. Siegel, Subject and Object in Visual Experience, Philosophical Review, 115 (2006), pp. 355-88, at p. 361.
11. A. Byrne and D. Hilbert, Colors and Reflectances, in A. Byrne and D. Hilbert (eds), Readings on Color, Vol. i: The Philosophy of Color (MIT Press, 1997), pp. 263-88, at p. 263.
12. Siegel, Subject and Object in Visual Experience, p. 362, fn. 4.
13. D. Chalmers, Perception and the Fall from Eden, p. 50.
14. A. Pautz, Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence, Philosophical Perspectives, 21 (2007), pp. 495-541, at p. 497.
15. M. Johnston, The Obscure Object of Hallucination, Philosophical Studies, 120 (2004), pp. 113-83, at p. 176.
16. D. Davidson, On Saying That, in his Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford UP, 1984), pp. 93-108.
17. B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Home University Library, 1912), pp. 124-30.
18. D.K. Lewis, How to Define Theoretical Terms, Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1970), pp. 427-46.
19. Alex Byrne formulated the claim that experiences have contents along these lines at the Glasgow conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience
20. W.P. Alston, Back to the Theory of Appearing, Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999), pp. 181-204.
21. Pautz, Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence. Cf. also Johnston, The Obscure Object of Hallucination, p. 130.
22. M. Martin, The Limits of Self-Awareness, Philosophical Studies, 120 (2004), pp. 37-89.
23. M. Soteriou, The Particularity of Visual Perception, European Journal of Philosophy, 8 (2000), pp. 173-89, at p. 187, fn. 3.
24. Pautz, Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence, p. 513, fn. 1. For instance, the intentionalist could agree with some anti-intentionalists that success must be analysed in terms of a primitive form of awareness of states of the world.
25. M. Thau, Consciousness and Cognition (Oxford UP, 2002)
26. S. Shoemaker, On the Way Things Appear, in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds), Perceptual Experience, pp. 461-80
27. D. Chalmers, Perception and the Fall from Eden.
28. W. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience (MIT Press, 1996)
29. C. McGinn, The Objects of Intentionality, in his Consciousness and its Objects (Oxford UP, 2004), pp. 220-48.
30. M. Tye, In Defense of Representationalism, in M. Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study (MIT Press, 2006), pp. 163-76, at p. 172
31. D. Hilbert, Color Constancy and the Complexity of Color, forthcoming in Philosophical Topics.
32. Lycan, Consciousness and Experience; McGinn, The Objects of Intentionality
33. Tye, Consciousness, Color and Content, p. 79.
34. Siegel, Which Properties are Represented in Experience?
35. My thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Thanks also to David Barnett, David Chalmers, Benj Hellie, Susanna Siegel and all those who took part in the Glasgow conference on the Admissible Contents of Experience.