The law as it could be

The Law as it Could Be

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-284

  Fiss, Owen ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 84900635232     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (107)

1. See Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, ed. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977);
2. Erving Goffman, Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1961), 3-124.
3. See, generally,William A. Niskanen Jr., Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago: Atherton, 1971);
4. William A. Niskanen, "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics 18 (December 1975): 617-43;
5. Julius Margolis, "Comment," Journal of Law and Economics 18 (December 1975): 645-59;
6. see also Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
7. See Ronald Dworkin,"No Right Answer?" in Law,Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart, ed. P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 58;
8. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).
9. See Herbert Wechsler, "Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law," Harvard Law Review 73 (November 1959): 1-35.
10. Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 187-98.
11. Abram Chayes, "The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation," Harvard Law Review 89 (May 1976): 1290.
12. See Derrick A. Bell Jr., "Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation," Yale Law Journal 85 (March 1976): 470-516;
13. cf. Stephen C. Yeazell, "Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History of the Class Action," Columbia Law Review 77 (October 1977): 866-96 (describing the origins of class-action suits in terms of more cohesive social groups).
14. See, generally,Marc Galanter, "Why the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change," Law and Society Review 9 (fall 1974): 95-160;
15. Christopher D. Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects," Southern California Law Review 45 (spring 1972): 450-501.
16. See, generally, Owen Fiss, The Civil Rights Injunction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978). Other factors, such as the insensitivity of state bureaucracies to market incentives and the decentralized system of initiation, might also help to explain the preeminence of the injunction in structural reform. It should be noted that some other remedies (e.g., declaratory judgments, conditional habeas corpus) have many of the same qualities as the injunction, for example, its prospectivity, and such remedies could be expected to be found in structural suits.
17. See Geoffrey E. Aronow, "The Special Master in School Desegregation Cases: The Evolution of Roles in the Reformation of Public Institutions Through Litigation,"Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 7 (spring 1980): 742.
18. See Theodore Eisenberg and Stephen C. Yeazell, "The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation," Harvard Law Review 93 (January 1980): 465-517.
19. For a sympathetic use of the town meeting metaphor, using it as a predicate for expanding the possibilities of intervention, see Stephen C. Yeazell, "Intervention and the Idea of Litigation: A Commentary on the Los Angeles School Case," UCLA Law Review 25 (August 1977): 244-60.
20. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, "A Theory of Negligence," Journal of Legal Studies 1 (January 1972): 29-96;
21. Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
22. See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "Adjudication as a Private Good," Journal of Legal Studies 8 (March 1979): 235-84.When a court acts as a background institution, it is giving expression to the public value favoring the peaceful resolution of disputes, which is quite different from resolving the dispute itself.
23. Mediation is also a dispute resolution process but is distinguished from arbitration or adjudication by its subjective quality: The correct result is defined as that which the parties accept. See, generally, Martin P. Golding, Philosophy of Law (Paramus, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1975), 106-25;
24. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, "Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking," Harvard Law Review 89 (February 1976): 637-81.
25. See Julius G. Getman, "Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution," Yale Law Journal 88 (April 1979): 916, 920-22 (describing the incipient departures from this established practice).
26. Lon L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication," Harvard Law Review 92 (December 1978): 353-409.
27. Michael Polanyi, The Logic of Liberty: Reflections and Rejoinders (London: Routledge, 1951).
28. But compare Melvin Aron Eisenberg, "Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller," Harvard Law Review 92 (December 1978): 427.
29. See, generally,Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons, trans. A. M. Henderson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 329-41;Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies.
30. Lon L. Fuller, "The Forms and Limits of Adjudication," Harvard Law Review 92 (December 1978): 353-409.
31. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
32. Donald L. Horowitz, "The Judiciary: Umpire or Empire?" Law and Human Behavior 6, no. 2 (September 1982): 140-41.
33. For a description of the incident, see generally William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 132.
34. For a discussion of the impact of committee-like relationships on the judicial process, see Owen Fiss,"Dombrowski," Yale Law Journal 86 (May 1977): 1103-64.
35. See Michel Crozier, The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 145-74 (identifying dynamics leading to divergence of real and formal power).
36. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, "Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary," Alabama Law Review 31 (winter 1980): 6-72.
37. Derek Bok, "A Flawed System," Harvard Magazine 85, no. 5 (May-June 1983): 38-45, reprinted in New York State Bar Journal 55, no. 6 (October 1983): 8-16, and New York State Bar Journal 55, no. 7 (November 1983): 31-36; excerpted in Journal of Legal Education 33 (December 1983): 570-85.
38. See, generally, Robert G. Bone, "Rethinking the 'Day in Court' Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion," New York University Law Review 67 (May 1992): 193-295.
39. See also Owen Fiss, "Justice Chicago Style," University of Chicago Legal Forum (1987): 1-17.
40. Judith Resnik, Dennis E. Curtis, and Deborah R. Hensler, "Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees," New York University Law Review 71 (April/May 1996): 296-391.
41. See, generally, Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band of Lawyers Fought for the Civil Rights Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1994);
42. Samuel Walker, In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1999).
43. Harry Kalven Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield, "The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit," University of Chicago Law Review 8 (June 1941): 713.
44. Susan Wolf, "The Legal and Moral Responsibility of Organizations," in NOMOS XXVII: Criminal Justice, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, 267-86 (New York: New York University Press, 1985).
45. See Paul Gewirtz, "Remedies and Resistance," Yale Law Journal 92 (March 1983): 585-681.
46. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, rev. and enlarged ed. (New York: Viking, 1963).
47. Michael R. Belknap, Federal Law and Southern Order (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1987).
48. See Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" Review of Metaphysics 25 (September 1971): 3-51;
49. see also Charles Taylor, "Understanding in Human Science," Review of Metaphysics 34 (September 1980): 25-38.
50. Clifford Geertz, Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980);
51. see also Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," in The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 412-53.
52. See, for example, Paul Brest, "The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship," Yale Law Journal 90 (April 1981): 1063-1109;
53. Sanford Levinson, "Law as Literature," Texas Law Review 60 (March 1982): 373-403;
54. see also Michael Walzer, "Philosophy and Democracy," Political Theory 9 (August 1981): 379-99.
55. See, for example,Harold Bloom et al., Deconstructionism and Criticism (New York: Seabury, 1979). For a spirited review of this book, revealing the many strands within the Deconstruction Movement, see Denis Donoghue, "Deconstructing Deconstruction," New York Review of Books, 12 June 1980, 37-41. For the more philosophic aspirations of deconstructionism, see Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, trans. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976). See also J. M. Balkin, "Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory," Yale Law Journal 96 (March 1987): 743-86.
56. Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 118-72.
57. See Thomas Kuhn, The Essential Tension, enlarged 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977);
58. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, enlarged 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
59. Stanley Fish, "Fish v. Fiss," Stanford Law Review 36 (July 1984): 1325-47; all quotes by Fish, unless otherwise indicated, are to this article in the Stanford Law Review. See also Stanley Fish, "Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision," Texas Law Review 60 (March 1982): 495-505; Stanley Fish, "Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature," Texas Law Review 60 (March 1982): 551-67.
60. John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), 1-41.
61. See Michael Perry, The Constitution, the Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
62. Ronald Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle," New York University Law Review 56 (May/June 1981): 499-500.
63. Stephen R. Munzer and James W. Nickel, "Does the Constitution Mean What It Always Meant?" Columbia Law Review 77 (November 1977): 1037-41.
64. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), 16-23.
65. See Sanford Levinson, "Law as Literature," Texas Law Review 60 (March 1982): 373-403.
66. Paul D. Carrington, "Of Law and the River," Journal of Legal Education 34 (June 1984): 222-28.
67. For correspondence addressing the article by Carrington, see Peter W.Martin, "'Of Law and the River,' and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom," Journal of Legal Education 35 (March 1985): 1-26.
68. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).
69. Richard A. Posner, "A Theory of Negligence," Journal of Legal Studies 1 (January 1972): 29-96.
70. George L. Priest, "The New Scientism in Legal Scholarship: A Comment on Clark and Posner," Yale Law Journal 90 (April 1981): 1291-92.
71. Richard A. Posner, "Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making," International Review of Law and Economics 4 (December 1984): 131-32.
72. Richard A. Posner, "The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication," Hofstra Law Review 8 (spring 1980): 505.
73. R. H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics 3 (October 1960): 1-44.
74. Harold Demsetz, "When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?" Journal of Legal Studies 1 (January 1972): 13-28.
75. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement," Harvard Law Review 96 (January 1983): 561-675; published as a book by Harvard University Press in 1986. For two general collections of material on Critical Legal Studies, see David Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (New York: Pantheon, 1982); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, Stanford Law Review 36 (January 1984): 1-673.
76. See, generally, Owen Fiss, "What Is Feminism?" Arizona State Law Journal 26 (summer 1994): 413-28.
77. Duncan Kennedy, "Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power," Maryland Law Review 41, no. 4 (1982): 638-49. For a fuller and more recent account of Kennedy's views on adjudication, see his A Critique of Adjudication: Fin De Siecle (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997).
78. Marc Granetz, "Duncan the Doughnut," The New Republic, 17 March 1986, 22.
79. Sanford Levinson, "Law as Literature," Texas Law Review 60 (March 1982): 373-403.
80. For the response, see Stanley Fish, "Interpretation and the Pluralist Vision," Texas Law Review 60 (March 1982): 495-505.
81. See also Richard H.Weisberg, "Text into Theory: A Literary Approach to the Constitution," Georgia Law Review 20 (summer 1986): 939-94.
82. Frank I. Michelman, "The Meanings of Legal Equality," in Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, The Cambridge Lectures 1985, ed. Frank E. McArdle, 85-102 (Montreal: Les Editions Yvon Blais, 1987).
83. Robert H. Bork, "Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems," Indiana Law Journal 47 (fall 1971): 10.
84. Owen Fiss, "What Is Feminism?" Arizona State Law Journal 26 (summer 1994): 413-28.
85. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, one vol. edition (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 185.
86. Ronald Dworkin, "The Forum of Principle," New York University Law Review 56 (May/June 1981): 469-518.
87. Richard A. Posner, "An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration," Journal of Legal Studies 2 (June 1973): 441-42.
88. Jerry L. Mashaw, "The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value," University of Chicago Law Review 44 (fall 1976): 48.
89. William J. Brennan Jr., "Reason, Passion, and 'The Progress of the Law,'" The Forty-Second Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 42 (1987): 948-77, reprinted in Cardozo Law Review 10 (October/November 1988): 3-23.
90. See, for example, Martha L. Minow and Elizabeth V. Spelman, "Passion for Justice," Cardozo Law Review 10 (October/November 1988): 37-76. Some read Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), in these terms, but I do not. She has been meticulous in presenting her position as an enrichment of reason.
91. See, for example, Paul Gewirtz, "Aeschylus' Law," Harvard Law Review 101 (March 1988): 1043-55.
92. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Passion: An Essay on Personality (New York: Free Press, 1984). Duncan Kennedy's "fundamental contradiction" had been framed in terms of passions-the love of others and the fear of others. See Duncan Kennedy, "The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries," Buffalo Law Review 28 (spring 1979): 205-382.
93. Edward de Grazia, "Humane Law and Humanistic Justice," Cardozo Law Review 10 (October/November 1988): 29.
94. See, for instance, Stuart Hampshire, "A New Philosophy of the Just Society," review of A Theory of Justice by John Rawls, New York Review of Books, 24 February 1972, 34-39.
95. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986).
96. See, generally, Julia Annas,"MacIntyre on Traditions," Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (autumn 1989): 388-404.
97. For a criticism of the relativism in MacIntyre, see Thomas Nagel, "Agreeing in Principle," review of Whose Justice? Which Rationality? by Alasdair MacIntyre, Times Literary Supplement, 8-14 July 1988, 747-48. For a general statement of Nagel's views, see Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
98. Martha Nussbaum, "Emotions as Judgments of Value," Yale Journal of Criticism 5 (spring 1992): 201-12.
99. See Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution, and the Courts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).
100. See, generally, Brian K. Landsberg, Enforcing Civil Rights: Race Discrimination and the Department of Justice (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997).
101. See Archibald Cox, "Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights," Harvard Law Review 80 (November 1966): 91-122.
102. See William N. Eskridge Jr., "Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game," California Law Review 79 (May 1991): 613-84.
103. See Owen Fiss and Charles Krauthammer, "The Rehnquist Court: A Return to the Antebellum Constitution," The New Republic, 10 March 1982, 14-21.
104. See Jack M. Balkin, "History Lesson," Legal Affairs 1 (July/August 2002): 44-49.
105. See, generally, Larry D. Kramer, "We the Court," Harvard Law Review 115 (November 2001): 4-169.
106. See Richard A. Posner, Breaking the Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution, and the Courts (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001), 145.
107. See, generally, Robert C. Post and Reva B. Siegel, "Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation after Morrison and Kimel," Yale Law Journal 110 (December 2000): 441-260.