Evolution of the judicial opinion: Institutional and individual styles

Evolution of the Judicial Opinion: Institutional and Individual Styles

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-301

  Popkin, William D ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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References (573)

1. See Henry Hallam, The Constitutional History of England, Vol. I, p. 335 n.* (Garland Pub. Co. 1978) (1846).
2. Richard A. Posner, "Blackstone and Bentham," 19 J. L. Econ. 569, 585 (1976).
3. Hans W. Baade, "The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy," 20 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Comm. 45, 90 (1994) (hereafter "Baade, Casus Omissus").
4. David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain, p. 55 (1989).
5. Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, pp. 30-31 n.65 (1986).
6. Quoted in Baade, Casus Omissus, p. 84.
7. This description comes from William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I, p. 69 (hereafter "Blackstone, Commentaries").
8. See D. B. Swinfen, Imperial Appeal: The Debate on the Appeal to the Privy Council, 1933-1986, p. 224 (1987) (hereafter "Swinfen, Imperial Appeal");
9. Karl L. ZoBell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration," 44 Cornell L.Q. 186, 188 (1959);
10. Edward McWhinney, "Judicial Concurrences and Dissents: A Comparative View of Opinion-Writing in Final Appellate Tribunals," 31 Canadian Bar Rev. 595, 596-99 (1953). Holdsworth notes three cases in which a dissent was published in the mid-19th Century.
11. William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. I, p. 519 n.11 (hereafter "Holdsworth, History").
12. Stewart Jay, "Servants of Monarchs and Lords: The Advisory Role of Early English Judges," 38 Am. J. Legal Hist. 117, 130 (1994) (citing, among others, multiple pages of Edward Turner, The Privy Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 1603-1784, Vols. I & II [1927 & 1928]). But see Swinfen, Imperial Appeal, pp. 4-8 (noting that Privy Council panels often failed to include trained judges, even though they were eligible to sit).
13. Holdsworth, History, Vol. I, p. 518;
14. W.F. Finlason, The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, p. 73 (1877).
15. Holdsworth, History, Vol. I, p. 519.
16. John William Wallace, The Reporters, p. 172 (1882) (hereafter "Wallace, Reporters").
17. Percy H. Winfield, The Chief Sources of English Legal History, p. 335 (1925) (hereafter "Winfield, Chief Sources").
18. John P. Dawson, The Oracles of the Law, p. 77 (1968) (hereafter "Dawson, Oracles");
19. James Oldham, English Common Law in the Age of Mansfield, p. 30 (2004) (hereafter "Oldham, English Common Law").
20. Richard J. Ross, "The Commoning of the Common Law: The Renaissance Debate over the Meaning of Printing English Law, 1520-1640," 146 U. Pa. L.Rev. 323 (1998).
21. Dawson, Oracles, pp. 73, 75.
22. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, pp. 10-11.
23. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law (1941).
24. Roscoe Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," 21 Harv. L.Rev. 383, 384 (1908) ("coming to be a science of legislation").
25. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, pp. 59-62, 87-92.
26. David Lieberman, "Blackstone's Science of Legislation," 27 J. of Brit. Studs. 117, 121 (1988).
27. See G.I.T. Ian Machin, The Rise of Democracy in Britain, 1830-1918 (2001) (hereafter "Machin, Democracy").
28. See also Lord Irvine of Lairg, "Sovereignty in Comparative Perspective: Constitutionalism in Britain and America," 76 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1, 12-13 (2001) (hereafter "Irvine, Sovereignty").
29. James Oldham, The Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. I, p. 197 (1992) (hereafter "Oldham, Manuscripts").
30. Louis Blom-Cooper & Gavin Drewry, Final Appeal: A Study of the House of Lords in Its Judicial Capacity, p. 80 (1972) (hereafter "Blom-Cooper, Final Appeal").
31. See also Oldham, Manuscripts, Vol. I, p. 47, where the author notes Burrow's comment that "the degree of unanimity was high" from 1756 to 1770, when only two cases evoked dissent, and adds that thereafter dissents were more common (perhaps 20 reported cases and some other unreported cases).
32. Holdsworth, History, Vol. XII, p. 111.
33. Holdsworth, History, Vol. XII, pp. 111, 494-503.
34. Wallace, Reporters, p. 29.
35. James Burrow, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of King's Bench, Vol. I, p. v (1756).
36. Holdsworth, History, Vol. XII, p. 116.
37. But see Wallace, Reporters, p. 446, where the author says that Burrow made the reports for the purpose of publishing them.
38. See Oldham, English Common Law, p. 33;
39. James Oldham, "Judicial Activism in Eighteenth-Century English Common Law in the Time of the Founders," 8 Greenbag 269, 273 (2005) (noting the objections of Lord Camden). See also Lord Ellenborough's opinion in DeHavilland v. Bowerbank, 1 Camp. 50, 50-51, 170 Eng. Rep. 872, 873 (1807) ("I want very much to lay down a certain rule respecting the payment of interest. . . . My great object is, to have a fixed rule, and to exclude discretion.").
40. Winfield, Chief Sources, p. 190.
41. See, for example, James Oldham, "Law Making at Nisi Prius in the Early 1800s," 25 J. Leg. Hist. 221, 223-24 (2004) (discussing Lord Campbell's reports of Lord Ellenborough's decisions).
42. William S. Holdsworth, "Law Reporting in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries," in Anglo-American Legal History Series, Series 1, Number 5, p. 1 (1941).
43. Daniel Duman, The English and Colonial Bars in the Nineteenth Century, pp. 6-8, 16-29 (1983) (figures show anywhere from a doubling to a tenfold increase in barristers during the 19th Century; changes in their social, occupational, and educational background are less clear).
44. "Report of a Special Committee on the Law Reporting System, 1849," in W.T.S. Daniel, The History and Origin of the Law Reports, p. 5 (1884) (hereafter "Daniel, History").
45. Daniel, History, pp. 16, 19.
46. Daniel, History, p. 30.
47. See also Lord Westbury speech, p. 782 ("But a judicial opinion is also a legislative enactment. It decides a particular case, and it sets a precedent for all future cases. Therefore the Judges become legislators.. . .").
48. Daniel, History, p. 31.
49. See also Lord Justice Lindley, "The History of the Law Reports," 1 L. Q. Rev. 137, 137 (1885).
50. Daniel, History, p. 24.
51. Irvine, Sovereignty, pp. 12-13;
52. Machin, Democracy, p. 152.
53. Material in this and the following paragraph relies on Robert Stevens, Law and Politics, pp. 29, 34, 47-67, 90-98, 191-282, 303-04, 325, 337 (1978) (hereafter "Stevens, Law and Politics").
54. Swinfen, Imperial Appeal, pp. 4-8.
55. Frederick N. Judson, "A Modern View of the Law Reforms of Jeremy Bentham," 10 Colum. L.Rev. 41, 45 (1910).
56. See generally Michael J. Klarman, "The Judges Versus the Unions: The Development of British Labor Law," 75 Va. L.Rev. 1487 (1989).
57. Steve Hedley, "Words, Words, Words: Making Sense of Legal Judgments, 1875-1940," in Law Reporting in Britain, p. 183 (Stebbings ed., 1995).
58. Stevens, Law and Politics, p. 304 (Lord Parker's view that stare decisis and literal interpretation tend to go together).
59. Frederic Reynold, The Judge as Lawmaker, p. 9 (1967) ("The orthodox, popular conception of the existing law . . . was [contrary to the majority's decision].").
60. See, for example, Rupert Cross, Precedent in English Law (2d ed. 1968) (hereafter "Cross, Precedent");
61. Gerald Dworkin, "Stare Decisis in the House of Lords," 25 Mod. L.Rev. 163 (1962);
62. Arthur L. Goodhart, "Precedents in the Court of Appeal," 9 Camb. L.J. 349 (1949);
63. Arthur L. Goodhart, "Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case," 40 Yale L.J. 161 (1930);
64. Julius Stone, "1966 and All That! Loosing the Chains of Precedent," 69 Colum. L.Rev. 1162 (1969).
65. Cross, Precedent, pp. 136-37;
66. Peter Wesley-Smith, "The Per Incuriam Doctrine," 15 J. Soc'y Public Teachers of Law 58 (1980);
67. D. G. Valentine, "The Meaning of 'Per Incuriam,'" 18 Mod. L.Rev. 602 (1955).
68. Some contemporary judges, who defend sticking to the text, argue that earlier examples of judicial literalism were cases in which the Law Lords did not really rely on the text, but instead invoked clear statement rules (that is, substantive canons of interpretation) grounded in a "Victorian Bill of Rights." See Lord Devlin, "Judges and Lawmakers," 39 Mod. L.Rev. 1, 14 (1976).
69. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (detailed tax rules dealing with corporate reorganizations interpreted in light of their purpose).
70. See Law Commission, pp. 3-4, para. 5.
71. Furniss v. Dawson [1984] 1 All E.R. 530, 533.
72. Brian Abel-Smith & Robert Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts: A Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750-1965, p. 294 (1967) (hereafter "Abel-Smith & Stevens, Lawyers").
73. Reid, Judge, p. 29.
74. Diplock, Courts, pp. 21, 23.
75. Stevens, Law and Politics, pp. 347-48 (Lord Simonds).
76. Diplock, Courts, pp. 5-6.
77. Abel-Smith & Stevens, Lawyers, pp. 285-89.
78. See also Stevens, Law and Politics, p. 415.
79. Blom-Cooper, Final Appeal, p. 15.
80. Alan Paterson, The Law Lords, p. 163 (1982) (hereafter "Paterson, Law Lords") (eight cases overruled in the period from 1966 to1980).
81. Law Commission, p. 6, para. 9.
82. Law Commission, pp. 7-8, para. 11, and pp. 48-49, para. 80.
83. Law Commission, pp. 19-20, para. 33, pp. 21-22, para. 35, and pp. 30-31, para. 52.
84. Law Commission, p. 5, para. 8.
85. Law Commission, p. 18, para. 31.
86. See Ensign Tankers (Leasing) Ltd. v. Stokes [1992] 2 All E.R. 275, 289.
87. Black-Clawson International Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg [1975] A.C. 591, 638 (H.L.).
88. See, for example, Note, "Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult Legislative History Today," 105 Harv. L.Rev. 1005 (1992).
89. The academic landmarks are: James Landis, "Statutes and the Source of Law," in Harvard Legal Essays, p. 213 (1934);
90. Roscoe Pound, "Common Law and Legislation," 21 Harv. L.Rev. 383 (1908);
91. Roscoe Pound, "Spurious Interpretation," 7 Colum. L.Rev. 379 (1907). The leading Supreme Court decision is: United States v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., 310 U.S. 534 (1940).
92. Abel-Smith & Stevens, Lawyers, pp. 26, 166.
93. Richard L. Abel, The Legal Profession in England and Wales, pp. 263, 265-66 (1988).
94. Peter Birks, "Adjudication and Interpretation in the Common Law: A Century of Change," 14 Legal Studs. 156, 166 (1994) (discussing Lord Goff);
95. Diplock, Courts, p. 1 ("It is, I think, one of the weaknesses of the law in England that here, more than in any other country, there seems to be a gulf between those who teach and study it in the Universities and those who practice and administer it in the Courts.").
96. Current Law, Statutes 1998-Vol. 3, c. 42 (Humans Rights Act 1998).
97. Scotland Act, 1998, c. 46 (Eng.);
98. Government of Wales Act, 1998, c. 38 (Eng.);
99. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, c. 47 (Eng.).
100. Robert Stevens, "A Loss of Innocence? Judicial Independence and the Separation of Powers," 19 Ox. J. L. Studs. 365, 375, 398 (1999).
101. Modernising Parliament: Reforming the House of Lords, Cmnd. 4183 (1999).
102. Paterson, Law Lords, pp. 98, 107.
103. Paterson, Law Lords, pp. 183-84.
104. Morris v. C.W. Martin & Sons [1966] 1 Q.B. 716, 730.
105. Robertson, Judicial Discretion, pp. 26, 77-78.
106. See Blom-Cooper, Final Appeal, pp. 93-95;
107. Stevens, Law and Politics, pp. 567-68.
108. See also Rupert Cross, "The Ratio Decidendi and the Plurality of Speeches in the House of Lords," 93 L. Q. Rev. 378 (1977).
109. This discussion of French law and practice relies primarily on the following secondary sources: John Dawson, Oracles of the Law (1968);
110. Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, "Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System," 104 Yale L.J. 1325 (1995);
111. Jean Louis Goutal, "Characteristics of Judicial Style in France, Britain, and the U.S.A.," 24 Am. J. Comp. L. 43 (1976);
112. F. H. Lawson, "Comparative Judicial Style," 25 Am. J. Comp. L. 364 (1977);
113. Vernon Valentine Palmer, "From Embrace to Banishment: A Study of Judicial Equity in France," 47 Am. J. Comp. L. 277 (1999) (hereafter "Palmer, France").
114. Palmer, France, p. 283.
115. Dawson, Oracles, pp. 413-14.
116. See generally, Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Papers # 79, pp. 403-04. All references to "Federalist Papers" are to Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987.
117. Madison, Federalist Papers # 47, p. 247;
118. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
119. Mark Kozlowski, The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary, Ch. 2 (2003).
120. Shannon Stimson, The American Revolution in the Law, pp. 133-36 (1990).
121. See Madison, Federalist Papers # 47, p. 246 (referring to Montesquieu as the "oracle" of separation of powers).
122. Cited in Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., "Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach," 81 Cornell L.Rev. 393, 400 n.22 (1996).
123. Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, p. 157 (Cohler, Miller, & Stone ed. & trans., 1989) (hereafter "Montesquieu, Spirit").
124. Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 157.
125. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I, p. 269 (hereafter "Blackstone, Commentaries").
126. John Henry Merryman, "The French Deviation," 44 Am. J. Comp. L. 109, 109-10 (1996).
127. Montesquieu, Spirit, pp. 158, 160
128. Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 163.
129. Montesquieu, Spirit, p. 158.
130. M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, pp. 103-05 (1963) (hereafter "Vile, Constitutionalism").
131. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, p. 267.
132. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. III, p. 327.
133. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, p. 269.
134. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, p. 69.
135. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, p. 61.
136. See generally Willi Adams, The First American Constitutions, pp. 266-71 (1980) (hereafter "Adams, First American").
137. See Adams, First American, Ch. VI, pp. 129-49.
138. "Maryland, 1776 Constitution, Declaration of Rights, Art. III," in The Federal and State Constitutions and Other Organic Laws of the United States (Benjamin Poore, 2d ed. 1878), p. 817 (hereafter "Poore, Constitutions").
139. Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement, p. 3 (1981).
140. See also Francis R. Aumann, "American Law Reports: Yesterday and Today," 4 Ohio St. L.J. 331, 334 (1938) (despite prohibitions against citing English cases, there was a need for English legal materials).
141. Madison, Federalist Papers # 47, p. 249.
142. Jackson Turner Main, The Sovereign States, 1775-1783, pp. 206-09 (1973).
143. Blackstone, Commentaries, Vol. I, p. 269.
144. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787, p. 301 (1969) (hereafter "Wood, Creation").
145. Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, p. 5 (1977).
146. See also Wood, Creation, p. 304 n.75 (Jefferson's concern about equitable construction).
147. Madison, Federalist Papers # 47, p. 248.
148. Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions, Vol. II, p. 438 (1836) (hereafter "Elliot's Debates").
149. Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution, p. 42 (1967) (hereafter "Warren, Making") (letter dated Feb. 21, 1787 to John Adams).
150. Warren, Making, p. 46 (letter dated Aug. 18, 1786 to Thomas Jefferson).
151. Gerhard Casper, "An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices," 30 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 211, 221 (1989) (hereafter "Casper, Essay").
152. Poore, Constitutions, p. 4.
153. Poore, Constitutions, pp. 378, 960, 1910.
154. Poore, Constitutions, pp. 960, 968.
155. Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the United States, pp. 3-4 (1913).
156. See also Hamilton, Federalist Papers # 22, p. 108 (noting the "want of a judiciary power" in the Articles of Confederation).
157. Hamilton, Federalist Papers ## 78-81, pp. 395-420; # 78, p. 396 ("least dangerous").
158. Jonathan Elliott, The Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, Vol. 4, pp. 257-58 (2d ed. 1859) (hereafter "Elliott's Debates").
159. Madison, Federalist Papers ## 47, 48, pp. 245-56.
160. Madison, Federalist Papers # 47 (discussing New York, p. 249, Pennsylvania, p. 250, South Carolina, p. 251, and New Jersey, p. 250).
161. Documentary History, Vol. XV, pp. 512, 515 (Jan. 31); Vol. XVI, p. 120 (Feb. 14).
162. Warren, Making, pp. 739-40.
163. Abram Chayes, "How Does the Constitution Establish Justice?" 101 Harv. L.Rev. 1026, 1026, 1028 (1988).
164. Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 85 (1809).
165. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 329 (1816) (Story, J.).
166. U.S. v. Hudson and Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32, 33 (1812) (Johnson, J.). See also Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 398 (1798) (Iredell, J.).
167. Vile, Constitutionalism, p. 173.
168. See Charles M. Cook, The American Codification Movement (1981).
169. Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Papers # 78, p. 396 (Max Beloff ed., 2d ed. 1987).
170. John P. Kelsh, "The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court, 1790-1945," 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 137 (1999) (hereafter "Kelsh, Opinion").
171. See also Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, Vol. I, p. 653 (rev. ed. 1926).
172. The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, Vol. I, Part I (Appointments and Proceedings), pp. 117-18 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1985) (hereafter "History, Supreme Court").
173. William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic, p. 110 (1995) (hereafter "Casto, Supreme Court").
174. Erwin Surrency, A History of American Law Publishing, pp. 44-45 (1990) (hereafter "Surrency, History").
175. Farmers' Bank v. Burchard, 33 Vt. 346, 393-94 (1860).
176. Kelsh, Opinion, p. 139.
177. Francis Hopkinson's Judgements in Admiralty in Pennsylvania is sometimes said to be the first of the state law reports (in 1789), beating out Kirby's Connecticut Reports by one month, but Hopkinson's volume contained only six cases. Frederick Hicks, Materials and Methods of Legal Research, p. 132 n.4 (3d ed. 1942).
178. Kirby's Reports, pp. 118, 119, 139, 150.
179. Kirby's Reports, pp. 22, 27, 127, 134.
180. Casto, Supreme Court, p. 110.
181. See Johnson, Reports (cases beginning on pp. 17, 169, 310).
182. See Johnson, Reports (cases beginning on pp. 142, 153, 163).
183. N. Chipman, Reports of Cases Determined in the Supreme Court, Book I, pp. 4-5 (1792) (hereafter "Chipman, Reports").
184. See, for example, Chipman, Reports, pp. 19, 58.
185. See Chipman, Reports, pp. 86-87.
186. Leonard Baker, John Marshall, A Life in Law, pp. 414-15 (1974) (Marshall experienced Pendleton's use of a single opinion of the court while arguing before the Virginia court).
187. David Mays, Edmund Pendleton, 1721-1803, p. 263 (1952).
188. See especially, Kelsh, "The Opinion Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court, 1790-1945," 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 137 (1999);
189. G. Edward White, "The Working Life of the Marshall Court, 1815-1835," 70 Va. L.Rev. 1 (1984) (hereafter "White, Working Life");
190. Karl L. ZoBell, "Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration," 44 Cornell L.Rev. 186 (1959) (hereafter "ZoBell, Division").
191. ZoBell, Division, p. 194.
192. Talbot v. Seaman, 5 U.S. 1, 26 (1801).
193. Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. 45, 87 (1801) (the second opinion of the court after Marshall became Chief Justice).
194. The first full opinion in Volume 6 of the U.S. Reports began "Marshall, C.J. after stating the facts of the case, delivered the opinion of the court"; Faw v. Marsteller, 6 U.S. 10, 22 (1804).
195. Kelsh, Opinion, p. 144;
196. ZoBell, Division, p. 194.
197. White, Working Life, pp. 38-39.
198. ZoBell, Division, p. 193 n.41;
199. Kelsh, Opinion, p. 149.
200. ZoBell, Division, p. 194.
201. Kelsh, Opinion, pp. 146-47.
202. McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. 504, 505 (1813).
203. Kelsh, Opinion, p. 148.
204. White, Working Life, p. 40.
205. Jefferson, Works, Vol. XII, p. 248 (Jefferson letter to William Johnson, Oct. 27, 1822) (divided judgment has less weight as precedent).
206. Morgan, Johnson, p. 171 n.11.
207. Talbot v. Seaman, 5 U.S. 1, 43 (1801).
208. Briscoe v. Commonwealth's Bank, 33 U.S. 118, 121 (1834) (two justices absent).
209. See also Mayor v. Miln, 34 U.S. 85, 85 (1835) (Supreme Court will not take up cases involving constitutional issues unless the Court is at full strength).
210. U.S. v. Gooding, 25 U.S. 460, 478 (1827).
211. See www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboard/shop/gowerse/complete/chap904.htm; www.alt-usage-english.org/groupnames.html.
212. See Norman Blake, A History of the English Language, Ch. 9 (1996);
213. Manfred Gorlach, English in Nineteenth-Century England (1999);
214. George Krapp, Modern English: Its Growth and Present Use, pp. 243, 257-59 (Marckwardt rev. ed., 1969);
215. Sterling Leonard, The Doctrine of Correctness in English Usage, 1700-1800, Ch. 12 (1929).
216. G. H. McKnight, Modern English in the Making, pp. 527-30 (1928).
217. Henry Wheaton, "Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States, February Term, 1818," 8 N. Am. Rev. 63 (1818).
218. Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton, p. 289 (2004).
219. See John H. Langbein, "Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature," 93 Colum. L.Rev. 547 (1993).
220. Cohen & O'Connor, Guide, pp. 84-85 (discussing the reporter Howard, who succeeded Peters in 1843).
221. Wagner, Role, p. 16. The last report of an opinion to include lawyers' arguments was 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
222. Wagner, Role, pp. 9-10.
223. Wagner, Role, pp. 12-13. The duties of the U.S. Reporter are described in 28 U.S.C. sec. 673.
224. History, Supreme Court, Vol. V, p. xxiv.
225. Joyce, Rise, p. 1310 n.110.
226. Joyce, Rise, pp. 1374, 1378.
227. Joyce, Rise, pp. 1357-58.
228. R. Kirkland Corzine, "The Emergence of Written Appellate Briefs in the Nineteenth-Century United States," 38 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 482, 485-98 (1994).
229. See generally Denis P. Duffy, "Genre and Authority: The Rise of Case Reporting in the Early United States," 74 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 263 (1998) (hereafter "Duffy, Genre").
230. Henry Wheaton, William Johnson, & Dudley Atkins Tyng, "Law Reports," 18 N. Am. Rev. 371, 372-73 (1824) (hereafter "1824 NAR") (U.S. Supreme Court not successor to another court; appears in "naked simplicity" and encounters "immense obstacles").
231. Vermont v. New Hampshire, 289 U.S. 593, 608 (1933).
232. Francis R. Aumann, "American Law Reports: Yesterday and Today," 4 Ohio St. L.J. 331, 341 n.39 (1938).
233. Anton-Hermann Chroust, "The Dilemma of the American Lawyer in the Post-Revolutionary Era," 35 Notre Dame L.Rev. 48, 48-50, 66-68 (1959) (hereafter "Chroust, Dilemma").
234. See, for example, the discussion of state struggles over judicial authority in North Carolina and Massachusetts in the following articles: Walter F. Pratt, Jr., "The Struggle for Judicial Independence in Antebellum North Carolina: A Tale of Two Judges," 4 L. & Hist. Rev. 129 (1986);
235. Samuel Shapiro, "The Conservative Dilemma: The Massachusetts Constitutional Convention of 1853," 33 New Eng. Q. 207 (1960).
236. Alexis de Toqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. I, p. 298 (Barnes & Co. 1858).
237. E. Lee Shepard, "Lawyers Look at Themselves: Professional Consciousness and the Virginia Bar, 1770-1850," 25 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 1, 19 (1981) (reports give lawyers material for argument and "sense of professionalism").
238. Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution, p. 47 (1991). See also Lawyers and the Rise of Western Political Liberalism, p. 2 (Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 1997) (lawyers secure their own class position and serve modern capitalist economy).
239. Clark v. Herring, 5 Binn. 33, 38 (1812) (Pennsylvania);
240. Lawrence M. Friedman, A History of American Law, pp. 111-15 (2d ed. 1985) (mentioning New Jersey and Kentucky; New Jersey repealed its prohibition in 1819);
241. John H. Langbein, "Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature," 93 Colum. L.Rev. 547, 568 n.106 (1993) (New York).
242. Chroust, Dilemma, p. 63;
243. "Law Reporting," 8 Alb. L.J. 1, 2 (1873-74).
244. "The Boston Review" (March 1806), located at http://www.sjchs-history .org/review1806.html.
245. See Dale A. Oesterle, "Formative Contributions to American Corporate Law by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court from 1806 to 1810" in The History of the Law in Massachusetts: The Supreme Judicial Court, 1692-1992 (Russell Osgood ed., 1992).
246. Note, "American Reports and Reporters," 22 Am. Jurist 108, 108 (1839) (hereafter "1839 AMJUR"). See also 1824 NAR, p. 377 (by 1824, 15 states had published law reports, eight of which were "adopted and commissioned by the public authority"). One observer even argued that the law reports were worthy of study by "scholars of taste and general literature"; 1828 NAR, p. 183. Another commentator says that official reports became universal after the 1840s and 1850s;
247. Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., "Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years, 1800 to 1850," 3 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 28, 35-36 (1959) (hereafter "Kempin, Precedent").
248. Frederick C. Hicks, Materials and Methods of Legal Research, p. 137 (3d ed. 1942) (hereafter "Hicks, Materials");
249. Michael Swygert & Jon Bruce, "The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews," 36 Hastings L.J. 739, 748-51 (1985);
250. Erwin Surrency, A History of American Law Publishing, p. 39 (1990) (hereafter "Surrency, History") ("With independence, American lawyers strove to create a distinctively American body of law.").
251. See also Wilfred J. Ritz, American Judicial Proceedings First Printed before 1801: An Analytical Bibliography (1984).
252. See William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law, Ch. 9, pp. 165-74 (1975);
253. Renee B. Lettow, "New Trial for Verdict against the Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early Nineteenth-Century America," 71 Notre Dame L.Rev. 505, 508, 518-19 (1996);
254. Note, "The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century," 74 Yale L.J. 170 (1964).
255. Surrency, History, p. 92 (all but Pennsylvania).
256. Surrency, History, pp. 82-89.
257. Surrency, History, p. 41.
258. See generally Thomas J. Young, Jr., "A Look at American Reporting in the 19th Century," 68 Law Library J. 294, 298-99, 303 (1975) (hereafter "Young, Look").
259. William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic, p. 110 (1995) (Connecticut's 1784 requirement not followed, with judges instead writing majority and dissenting opinions).
260. Similarly, Louisiana required seriatim votes by statute in 1821, commencing with the junior member, but this requirement was repealed one year later and was, in any event, satisfied in form by the statement "I concur in the opinion for the reasons adduced." Joe W. Sanders, "The Role of Dissenting Opinions in Louisiana," 23 La. L.Rev. 673, 677 (1963).
261. See Robert C. Berring & Elizabeth A. Edinger, Finding the Law, pp. 23-24 (11th ed. 1999) (hereafter "Berring & Edinger, Finding"); 1828 NAR, pp. 179-80.
262. Caleb Nelson, " A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America," 37 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 190 (1993).
263. See George Lee Flint, Jr., " Secured Transactions History: The Northern Struggle to Defeat the Judgment Lien in the Pre-Chattel Mortgage Act Era," 20 N. Ill. L.Rev. 1, 7 n.24 (2000).
264. See also Lewis L. Laska, Tennessee Legal Research Handbook, p. 81 (1977) (since 1829, Tennessee Supreme Court required to write opinions, whether or not opinions reported).
265. Evan Haynes, The Selection and Tenure of Judges, pp. 99-100 (1944) (hereafter " Haynes, Selection" ).
266. Max Radin, " The Requirement of Written Opinions," 18 Calif. L.Rev. 486 (1930) (hereafter " Radin, Requirement" ).
267. Frederick Judson, " The Procedure in Our American Judicial System," 46 Am. L.Rev. 865, 874 (1912).
268. Radin, Requirement, p. 491 n.15 (Florida, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, West Virginia).
269. Andrew A. Bruce, " Judicial Buncombe in North Dakota and Other States," 88 Central L.J. 136, 137 (1919).
270. Haynes, Selection, pp. 112, 115, 124, 127.
271. Duffy, Genre, p. 273.
272. Richard Priest Dietzman, " The Kentucky Law Reports and Reporters," 16 Ky. L.J. 16, 25 (1927) (hereafter " Dietzman, Kentucky" ).
273. Kempin, Precedent, p. 35.
274. Morris L. Cohen & Paul C. Seeman, " A Man without Qualities: Ephraim Williams, First Reporter of the Supreme Court," 9 Mass. Leg. Hist. 137, 147 (2003);
275. John H. Moore, " One Hundred Fifty Years of Official New York Reporting and the Courts in New York," 6 Syr. L.Rev. 273, 275 (1955).
276. See Duffy, Genre, pp. 273-75 (rise of written opinion crowding out lawyers' arguments).
277. John B. West, " A Symposium of Law Publishers," 23 Am. L.Rev. 396, 400, 403-05 (1889) (hereafter " West 1889" ).
278. West 1889, p. 404 (" The opinions are printed from compared and certified copies of the original, furnished in most cases by the clerk himself, or other custodian. . . ." ).
279. Hicks, Materials, p. 154.
280. Surrency, History, p. 49.
281. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253 (1888). See generally Patterson & Joyce, " Monopolizing the Law: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Law Reports and Statutory Compilations," 36 UCLA L.Rev. 719 (1989).
282. Hicks, Materials, p. 151.
283. Young, Look, pp. 305-06. The contemporary debate over whether to publish all opinions is consistent with the demise of the reporter's discretion, because the publication decision rests with the court.
284. Berring & Edinger, Finding, pp. 24-25;
285. Robert C. Berring, " Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance," 75 Cal. L.Rev. 15, 21 (1987) (hereafter " Berring, Research" ).
286. West's commitment to completeness did not go unchallenged. See James E. Briggs, " A Symposium of Law Publishers," 23 Am. L.Rev. 407 (1889), for a defense of selective publication of judicial opinions.
287. " The National Reporter System," 1 Docket 648, 649 (1912).
288. Report of the Committee on Law Reporting," 18 A.B.A. Rep. 343 (1895) (hereafter " 1895 ABA Report" ). See also John F. Dillon, " Paper Prepared at Request of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure," 9 A.B.A. Rep. 257 (1886) (entitled " Law Reports and Law Reporting" ).
289. Alden I. Rosbrook, " The Art of Judicial Reporting," 10 Cornell L.Q. 103, 106 (1925).
290. Berring, Research, pp. 18-19, 20.
291. Dietzman, Kentucky, p. 27.
292. See The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation, tbl T.1 (Columbia Law Review Ass'n et al., eds., 18th ed. 2005);
293. John William Wallace, The Reporters, pp. 570-91 (1882).
294. Leah F. Chanin, Pamela J. Gregory, & Sarah K. Wiant, Legal Research in the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia, p. 379 (Virginia section) (2d ed. 2000);
295. Surrency, History, p. 45.
296. See also Berring & Edinger, Finding, p. 24.
297. " Law Reports," 9 Alb. L.J. 230, 230 (1874).
298. See, for example, the brief biographical sketches of Kentucky reporters in Dietzman, Kentucky, p. 27.
299. See J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century (1987).
300. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol. I, p. 84.
301. David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in Eighteenth-Century Britain, pp. 232-35 (1989).
302. See also Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (1986) (hereafter " Postema, Bentham" ).
303. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, pp. 94-95, 100-10 (2d ed. 1994).
304. Charles Fried, " Revolutions?" 109 Harv. L.Rev. 13, 26 n.66 (1995).
305. See Morton J. Horwitz, " The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality without Fundamentalism," 107 Harv. L.Rev. 30, 57-65 (1993).
306. See Laurence H. Tribe, " The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories," 59 Yale L.J. 1063 (1980) (critiquing John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) for failing to develop a theory of substantive rights).
307. See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982) (legal landscape);
308. William D. Popkin, Statutes in Court (1999) (hereafter " Popkin, Statutes" ) (background considerations).
309. See John F. Manning, " The Absurdity Doctrine," 116 Harv. L.Rev. 2387, 2389 (2003).
310. Popkin, Statutes, pp. 49-50, 73-80.
311. Philip P. Frickey, " Marshalling Past and Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law," 107 Harv. L.Rev. 381, 409 (1993);
312. William Michael Treanor, " The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process," 95 Colum. L.Rev. 782, 857-58 (1995).
313. Antonin Scalia, " Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis," 40 Case W. Res. L.Rev. 581, 594-96 (1989-1990), lists the misunderstanding of McCulloch v. Maryland as one of the canards of modern judging.
314. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, " Chevron's Domain," 89 Geo. L.J. 833 (2001).
315. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921).
316. See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (6th ed. 2003).
317. For a recent discussion of institutional style in Australian courts, see Matthew Groves & Russell Smyth, A Century of Judicial Style: Changing Patterns in Judgment Writing on the High Court, 1903-2001, pp. 255, 275-78 (2004).
318. Karl L. ZoBell, " Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration," 44 Cornell L.Q. 186, 203 (1959) (hereafter " Zo-Bell, Division" ).
319. John P. Kelsh, " The Opinion Delivery Practice of the United States Supreme Court, 1790-1945," 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 137, 175-77 (1999).
320. See also David O'Brien, " Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Reconsidering the Rise of Individual Opinions," in Supreme Court Decision-Making (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (discussing history of shift away from consensus norms);
321. Kevin M. Stack, " The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court," 105 Yale L.J. 2235 (1996). The practice of writing majority opinions with layers of sections and subsections was originally intended to simplify understanding of complex decisions, but it has enhanced the Justices' ability to write separately because it is now easy to disagree with a portion of the majority opinion without refusing to join most of what a majority has to say;
322. B. Rudolph Delson, " Typography in the U.S. Reports and Supreme Court Voting Protocols," 76 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 1203 (2001).
323. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Foundations, Methods, and Achievements, p. 68 (1928).
324. Posner provides data on separate opinions as a percentage of total opinions (rather than cases with separate opinions as a percentage of total cases). See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, pp. 357-59 (1996) (hereafter " Posner, Federal Courts" ). His data show the following percentages of separate opinions: 8.7% in 1895 (18 out of 206, all dissents); 5.6% in 1915 (16 out of 288, 14 dissents and two concurrences); and 10.3% in 1935 (18 out of 174, 14 dissents and four concurrences). As late as 1935 only 10% of U.S. Supreme Court opinions were separate opinions, but the number rose to 43% in 1955, and 57% in 1995. The increase in concurring opinions is very large-2% (1935), 11% (1960), 24% (1982), 35% (1994), 25% (1995).
325. Robert Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government, p. 16 (1955).
326. Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960, p. 169 (1992) (hereafter " Horwitz, Transformation" ).
327. The most notable dispute occurred in an exchange between Pound and Llewellyn about whether Pound should be admitted into the Legal Realist pantheon. See Karl. N. Llewellyn, " A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step," 30 Colum. L.Rev. 431 (1930);
328. Roscoe Pound, " The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence," 44 Harv. L.Rev. 697 (1931);
329. Karl N. Llewellyn, " Some Realism about Realism-Responding to Dean Pound," 44 Harv. L.Rev. 1222 (1931). Horwitz discusses this dispute at Horwitz, Transformation, pp. 170-80.
330. See also Thomas C. Grey, " Modern American Legal Thought," 106 Yale L.J. 493, 499, 501 (1996) (review of Neil Duxbury, Patterns of American Jurisprudence (1995) (drawing a sharp distinction between Progressives and Realists)).
331. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, p.1 (1881).
332. John F. Dillon, " Paper Prepared at Request of the Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Procedure," 9 A.B.A. Rep. 257, 260 (1886).
333. Roscoe Pound, " The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence," 31 A.B.A. Rep. 911 (1907).
334. See Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-1960 (1986).
335. Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (1930).
336. Thomas G. Walker, Lee J. Epstein, & W.J. Dixon, " On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual Norms in the United States Supreme Court," 50 J. Pol. 361, 364-66 (1988) (hereafter " Walker, Mysterious" ).
337. See also Stacia L. Haynie, " Leadership and Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court," 54 J. Pol. 1158 (1992);
338. Lee J. Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal, & Harold J. Spaeth, " The Norm of Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court," 45 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 362 (2001).
339. Walker, Mysterious, pp. 366-68.
340. Walker, Mysterious, pp. 378-84.
341. But see Louis Lusky, " Fragmentation of the Supreme Court: An Inquiry into Causes," 10 Hofstra L.Rev. 1137 (1982).
342. Alpheus Thomas Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law, pp. 589, 789 (1956) (hereafter " Mason, Stone" ).
343. William O. Douglas, " Chief Justice Stone," 46 Colum. L.Rev. 693, 695 (1946).
344. Mason, Stone, pp. 790-91.
345. Mason, Stone, pp. 575, 639.
346. Mason, Stone, pp. 574, 580.
347. Mason, Stone, p. 606. One observer suggested that decision day resembled congressional debates;
348. Mason, Stone, p. 794.
349. Mason, Stone, p. 483.
350. Mason, Stone, pp. 639, 793-94.
351. Mason, Stone, p. 939 n.†.
352. Gregory A. Caldeira & Christopher J.W. Zorn, " Of Time and Consensual Norms in the Supreme Court," 42 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 874, 900 (1998) (hereafter " Caldeira & Zorn, Norms" ).
353. Mason, Stone, pp. 98, 133, 135.
354. See also Young B. Smith, " Harlan Fiske Stone: Teacher, Scholar, and Dean," 46 Colum. L.Rev. 700, 705-06 (1946).
355. Mason, Stone, pp. 121-22;
356. Herbert F. Goodrich, " The Story of the American Law Institute," 3 Wash. U. L.Q. 283, 283-84 (1951).
357. Mason, Stone, pp. 120, 123-24, 209, 302, 364, 434-35.
358. Mason, Stone, pp. 120 (evolving), 629 (nonformulaic), 799 (candor).
359. Mason, Stone, pp. 303, 446, 591, 796-97.
360. Harlan F. Stone, " Dissenting Opinions Are Not without Value," 26 J. Am. Judicature Society 78 (1942).
361. Mason, Stone, pp. 251-61, 464, 550.
362. Mason, Stone, p. 783 (quoting Konefsky).
363. Steven A. Peterson, " Dissent in American Courts," 43 J. Pol. 412, 430 (1981).
364. See also Caldeira & Zorn, Norms, p. 875 (norms not directly observable).
365. Scott D. Gerber & Keeok Park, " The Quixotic Search for Consensus on the U.S. Supreme Court," 91 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 390, 405 (1997).
366. Quoted in Lisa L. Milord, The Development of the ABA Judicial Code, p. 137 (1992).
367. Mason, Stone, pp. 589, 607-09, 797.
368. See Learned Hand, The Bill of Rights, p. 72 (1958) (" disunity cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench so largely depends" );
369. ZoBell, Division, p. 209 (" respect for, and willing obedience to, the dictates of the Court will be more easily earned" if there are fewer cases with disagreement).
370. See also Charles Johnson & Bradley Canon, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, pp. 168-71 (2d ed. 1999) (hereafter " Johnson, Judicial" ) (suggesting that the size of the judicial majority can affect the public response to judicial decisions but citing studies that question whether that is true).
371. See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, " Remarks on Writing Separately," 65 Wash. L.Rev. 133 (1990).
372. E. Wayne Thode, Reporter's Notes to Code of Judicial Conduct, p. 50 (1973).
373. John Hart Ely, " Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures," 77 Va. L.Rev. 833, 842-54 (1991).
374. See Gregory A. Caldeira, " Neither the Purse nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public Confidence in the Supreme Court," 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1209 (1986);
375. Dean Jaros & Robert Roper, " The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, Specific Support, and Legitimacy," 8 Am. Pol. Q. 85 (1980);
376. Walter F. Murphy & Joseph Tanenhaus, " Explaining Diffuse Support for the United States Supreme Court: An Assessment of Four Models," 49 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1037 (1974).
377. See Deborah R. Hensler, " Do We Need an Empirical Research Agenda on Judicial Independence?" 72 S. Cal. L.Rev. 707, 711-12 (1999).
378. Herbert Kritzer, " The Impact of Bush v. Gore on Public Perceptions and Knowledge of the Supreme Court," 85 Judicature 32 (2001). The article cautions that its data do not measure long-term effects.
379. Vincent Price & Anca Romantan, " Confidence in Institutions before, during, and after 'Indecision 2000,' " 66 J. Pol. 939 (2004).
380. James L. Gibson, Gregory A. Caldeira, & Lester Kenyatta Spence, " Measuring Attitudes toward the United States Supreme Court," 47 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 354 (2003).
381. See Valerie J. Hoekstra, Public Reaction to Supreme Court Decisions, pp. 113-24, 145-46, 154-55 (2003).
382. Lucas A. Powe, The Warren Court and American Politics, p. 45 (2000). Some observers thought Nixon meant a unanimous decision;
383. Earl M. Maltz, The Chief Justiceship of Warren Burger, 1969-1986, p. 42 (2000).
384. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, J.J., dissenting).
385. See, for example, KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Improvement I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 113 n* (2004) (joining majority opinion except for two footnotes);
386. Intel Corp. v. Advance Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 267 (2004) (concurring in judgment).
387. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 2004 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (2005).
388. Frank I. Michelman, " Traces of Self-Government," 100 Harv. L.Rev. 4 (1986).
389. I am aware of a few state-specific studies that compiled state court data on nonunanimity rates. (1) California-Uelmen, http: //itrs.scu.edu/instructors/ uelmen/research.htm;
390. Indiana-Kevin W. Betz et al., " An Examination of the Indiana Supreme Court Docket," in Volumes 26-36 of the Indiana Law Rev. (1992-2003);
391. Delaware-Randy J. Holland & David A Skeel, " Deciding Cases without Controversy," 5 Del. L.Rev. 115 (2002) (hereafter " Holland, Deciding" );
392. Washington-Charles H. Sheldon, " The Incidence and Structure of Dissensus on a State Supreme Court" in Supreme Court Decision-Making (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (hereafter " Sheldon, Incidence" );
393. Tennessee-Note, " Judicial Decision Making: A Statistical Analysis of the Tennessee Supreme Court-1992 Term," 24 Memphis St. U. L.Rev. 325 (1994) (hereafter " Tennessee" ).
394. The remaining six states were Delaware, Iowa, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, and Rhode Island. A minor indicator of a tilt toward separate opinions is repeal of a prior prohibition on publication of dissents. I am aware of two states where this occurred: Pennsylvania-Act of Apr. 11, 1845, 1845 Pa. Laws 374, sec. 2 (repealed 1951);
395. Louisiana-see Joe W. Sanders, " The Role of Dissenting Opinions in Louisiana," 23 La. L.Rev. 673, 678 (1963) (1898 prohibition of official publication of dissents revoked in 1921).
396. See G. Alan Tarr, " Rethinking the Selection of State Supreme Court Justices," 39 Willamette L.Rev. 1445, 1446-60 (2003).
397. See also Frances Kahn Zemans, " The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial Independence," 72 S. Cal. L.Rev. 625 (1999);
398. " Symposium on Judicial Election, Selection, and Accountability," 61 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1555-2073 (1988).
399. Glick & Pruet, Dissent, pp. 203, 208-12 (presence of an intermediate appellate court was the most significant factor influencing dissent rates for 1980-81).
400. See also Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, " Neo-Institutionalism and Dissent in State Supreme Courts," 52 J. Pol. 54, 65 (1990) (hereafter " Brace & Hall, Dissent" );
401. Sheldon, Incidence, pp. 118-20 (separate opinions increased in the Washington Supreme Court after the establishment of an intermediate court of appeals in 1969, at which time all cases became subject to discretionary review in the Supreme Court, except for mandatory review of all death cases);
402. Holland, Deciding, pp. 123-24 (suggesting that mandatory appeals produces less dissent).
403. For example, in Tennessee, ten of 11 dissenting votes in criminal cases in the 1992 term were in death penalty cases; Tennessee, p. 340.
404. Brace & Hall, Dissent, p. 65.
405. Sheldon, Incidence, p. 118 (separate opinions increased in Washington after shift to en banc nine-member review instead of two five-member panels);
406. Holland, Deciding, pp. 120-21 (smaller panels might help to explain fewer dissents).
407. Brace & Hall, Dissent, pp. 57-58.
408. See Johnson, Judicial, pp. 168-71;
409. Laura Langer, Jody McMullen, Nick Ray, & Dan Stratton, " Recruitment of Chief Justices on State Supreme Courts: A Choice between Institutional and Personal Goals," 65 J. Pol. 656, 656 (2003).
410. see " Court of Appeals' Key Rulings Still Show Unity, Collegiality," New York Law Journal, July 30, 2003, p. 1.
411. Kevin W. Betz & P. Jason Stephenson, " An Examination of the Supreme Court Docket, Dispositions, and Voting in 2001," 35 Ind. L.Rev. 1117, 1118 (2002). As Appendix 3A indicates, several states had dramatic changes in workload unrelated to the introduction of an intermediate appellate court that could have been the result of jurisdictional changes-for example, New Mexico, Oklahoma (criminal), Louisiana, and New York.
412. An increase in the nonunanimity rate occurred after temporary adop-tion of an IAC in 1990, as compared to the prior four years in the study, but there was a drop to one-third of the 1990 rate in 2000 when there was no longer an IAC.
413. Richard A. Posner, " Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?)," 62 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1421, 1422 (1995) (hereafter " Posner, Writing Styles" ).
414. See Francis-Noel Thomas & Mark Turner, Clear and Simple as the Truth, pp. 3, 10 (1994).
415. 12 Coke's Reports 63, 65.
416. Quoted in Hans W. Baade, " The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy," 20 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Comm. 45, 84 (1994).
417. 218 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1914). See also Learned Hand's observations in Commissioner v. Ickelheimer, 132 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1943) (Hand, J., dissenting) (" [T]he colloquial words of a statute have not the fixed and artificial content of scientific symbols; they have a penumbra, a dim fringe, a connotation, for they express an attitude of will, into which it is our duty to penetrate. . . ." ).
418. 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
419. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 11 (1921) (hereafter " Cardozo, Nature" ).
420. See also Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation, p. 290 (1988) (hereafter " Posner, Law/Lit" ) (Marshall as magisterial).
421. Cardozo, Nature, p. 11.
422. Cardozo, Nature, pp. 25-26.
423. See, for example, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798)
424. (Chase, J.) (" An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority." );
425. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 133 (1810)
426. (Johnson, J., concurring) (" [T]here are certain great principles of justice, whose authority is universally recognized, that ought not to be entirely disregarded." ).
427. 25 U.S. 213, 344-47 (1827) (Marshall, C. J., dissenting).
428. 17 U.S. 316, 403-04 (1819) (Marshall, C.J., for the Court).
429. 5 U.S. 137, 177-78 (1803).
430. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
431. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1984) (Stewart, J., concurring). For a discussion of Stewart's opinion
432. see Paul Gewirtz, " On 'I Know It When I See It,' " 105 Yale L.J. 1023 (1996).
433. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
434. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
435. Richard A. Posner, " The Jurisprudence of Skepticism," 86 Mich. L.Rev. 827, 874 (1988) (hereafter " Posner, Skepticism" ).
436. Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 278 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
437. Albertson's Inc. v. Commissioner, 42 F.3d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1994).
438. 815 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987).
439. See, for example, Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490 (1945), where a predominantly textualist majority opinion asserts that legislative intent is a shaky basis for interpreting a statute, but then ends the opinion with a statement that the policy implications of a contrary decision are so adverse for the economy and the nation that the legislature is unlikely to have intended such a result.
440. Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, p. 130 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1977) (hereafter " Hand, Spirit of Liberty" ).
441. Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand: The Man and the Judge, p. 592 (1994) (hereafter " Gunther, Hand" ).
442. Gunther, Hand, p. 592.
443. 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1946).
444. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1937).
445. Frederick Schauer, " Opinions as Rules," 62 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1455 (1995).
446. See, for example, Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 1999) (" like many other multi-factor tests, [this one is] redundant, incomplete, and unclear." ).
447. See also Prussner v. United States, 896 F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1990) (" Multifactored tests can be difficult to apply." ). Rules that sound clear but give little guidance come in for similar criticism;
448. Donovan v. Fall River Foundry Co., Inc., 696 F.2d 524, 526 (7th Cir. 1982) (" [W]e are unwilling to decide [the issue] simply by reference to a maxim of statutory construction," quoting Rehnquist's statement that " generalities about statutory construction help us little." ). Posner is also dubious about using dictionaries;
449. Joy v. Hay Group, Inc., 403 F.3d 875, 877 (7th Cir. 2005) (" Dictionaries give a range of linguistic possibilities; rarely do they help a court decide which one the drafter of the contract or statute in question intended. . . ." ).
450. Patricia M. Wald, " A Reply to Judge Posner," 62 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1451, 1453 (1995).
451. Weisberg argues that bad judicial style correlates with an opinion's fragility; Richard Weisberg, Poethics: and Other Strategies of Law and Literature, pp. 7-33 (1992) (badly crafted opinion will lose its future power). But it seems hard to demonstrate that fragile opinions are more heavily represented in the category of badly crafted rather than well-crafted opinions.
452. Posner, Skepticism, pp. 879-80.
453. Posner, Writing Styles, p. 1432.
454. Cardozo, Nature, pp. 18, 19, 21.
455. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
456. Abner J. Mikva, " For Whom Judges Write," 61 S. Cal. L.Rev. 1357, 1363-69 (1988) (" In our age of legal complexity . . . a purely Holmesian approach is untenable" ; but the author pleads for a return to his brevity and focus.).
457. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
458. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 721 (1999).
459. Morton J. Horwitz, " The Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality without Fundamentalism," 107 Harv. L.Rev. 30, 61-65 (1993).
460. Laura Krugman Ray, " Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme Court Opinions," 59 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 197, 199-201 (2002) (hereafter " Ray, Rhetoric" ).
461. Ray, Rhetoric, pp. 227-29.
462. See, for example, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 857 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
463. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
464. For an argument against judges attempting to replicate Chief Justice Marshall's magisterial (or prophetic) style, see Lewis Henry LaRue, " How Not to Imitate John Marshall," 56 Wash. & Lee L.Rev. 819 (1999).
465. Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy (2003);
466. Richard A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation, pp. 33-57, 125-43 (1990);
467. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, pp. 107-15, 230-36 (1985);
468. Richard A. Posner, " A Political Court," 119 Harv. L.Rev. 31 (2005);
469. Richard A. Posner, " Judges' Writing Styles (And Do They Matter?)," 62 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1421 (1995);
470. Richard A. Posner, " Goodbye to the Bluebook," 53 U. Chi. L.Rev. 1343 (1986).
471. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, " Playing on Words: Judge Richard A. Posner's Appellate Opinions, 1981-82-Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion Style during an Extraordinary Rookie Season," 68 U. Cinc. L.Rev. 651 (2000);
472. Robert F. Blomquist, " Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner's First Decade of Dissenting Opinions, 1981-1991-Toward an Aesthetic of Judicial Dissenting Style," 69 Mo. L.Rev. 73 (2004).
473. Milner v. Apfel, 148 F.3d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 1998) (laws dealing with masturbation, fornication, sodomy, etc.).
474. 680 F.2d 42, 45.
475. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
476. Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform, pp. 352-53 (1996) (hereafter " Posner, Federal Courts" ). Others have expressed a similar aversion to footnotes:
477. Abner J. Mikva, " Goodbye to Footnotes," 56 U. Colo. L.Rev. 647 (1985);
478. " A Footnote Has No Place," N.Y. Times, July 28, 1995, at B18 (explaining why Justice Breyer does not employ footnotes in his opinions).
479. See also Gunther, Hand, pp. 528-29 (Learned Hand's objection to Judge Frank's use of footnotes because it converted judicial opinions into mini-treatises).
480. Posner, Federal Courts, pp. 352-53.
481. 249 F.3d 667,672 (discussing " moral hazard" );
482. 174 F.3d 862, 867 (discussing " economic loss" doctrine).
483. " The place to start in rethinking the proper standard is with the purpose, so far as it can be discerned, of exempting tiny employers from the antidiscrimination laws." -166 F.3d 937, 940;
484. " This interpretation is more sensible than National's because it tracks the purpose of [the law]. . . ." -144 F.3d 1125, 1128;
485. " We should think about the purpose of the home office deduction and why it is so limited. . . . With the purpose behind the home office deduction and its limitations in mind, we examine the application [of the statute to the facts]." -919 F.2d 1273, 1274-75;
486. " Words are not plain in themselves. They are plain only by virtue of a context that includes not only minimum cultural and linguistic competence but also, in the case of words that are intended to convey a command . . ., any other clues to the speaker's or writer's intentions. . . . The Tax Court's interpretation is both consistent with the purposes of Congress in enacting the statute (so far as those purposes can be reconstructed) and unlikely to cost the Treasury substantial revenue." -842 F.2d 180, 183-84;
487. " Our suggested interpretation [of the tax law] may not be inevitable as a textual matter, but considerations of legislative purpose reinforce it." -692 F.2d 1129, 1132;
488. " But we cannot stop here. Having regard to the purpose and not merely the language of section 16(b), we must consider whether the [statutory] words . . . should be read more broadly. . . ." -682 F.2d 643, 645;
489. " The issue does not lend itself to decision by verbal talismans. The intelligent decision of particular cases requires instead a sensitivity to the purposes of both the 30-day limitation and its judicially engrafted exception." -668 F.2d 962, 966.
490. West Virginia U. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 101 (1991).
491. Richard A. Posner, " 'What Am I, a Potted Plant?' The Case against Strict Constructionism," in Judges on Judging, p. 182 (David M. O'Brien ed., 1997). Posner first used this phrase in the New Republic, Sept. 28, 1987, p. 23.
492. 471 U.S. 84 (1985), discussed in Posner, Law/Lit, p. 256.
493. For state court judges, see: Shirley S. Abrahamson, " Judging in the Quiet of the Storm," 24 St. Mary's L.J. 965 (1993) (Wisconsin);
494. Judith S. Kaye, " The Human Dimension in Appellate Judging: A Brief Reflection on a Timeless Concern," 73 Cornell L.Rev. 1004 (1988) (New York);
495. Robert A. Leflar, " Some Observations Concerning Judicial Opinions," 61 Colum. L.Rev. 810 (1961) (Arkansas);
496. Stewart G. Pollock, " The Art of Judging," 71 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 591 (1996) (New Jersey);
497. Walter V. Schaefer, " Precedent and Policy," 34 U. Chi. L.Rev. 3 (1966) (Illinois);
498. Albert Tate, Jr., " The Law-Making Function of the Judge," 28 La. L.Rev. 211 (1968) (Louisiana);
499. Roger J. Traynor, " Reasoning in a Circle of Law," 56 Va. L.Rev. 739 (1970) (California).
500. For federal judges, see: Ruggero J. Aldisert, " The Role of Courts in Contemporary Society," 38 U. Pitt. L.Rev. 437 (1977) (3d Cir.);
501. Charles E. Clark, " The Limits of Judicial Objectivity," 12 Am. U. L.Rev. 1 (1963) (2d Cir.);
502. Frank N. Coffin, " Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice," 63 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 16 (1988) (1st Cir.);
503. Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., " The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the 'Hunch' in Judicial Decision," 14 Cornell L.Q. 274 (1928) (S.D. Tex.);
504. Irving R. Kaufman, " The Anatomy of Decisionmaking," 53 Fordham L.Rev. 1 (1984) (2d Cir.).
505. See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson et al., " Judges on Judging: A Bibliography," 24 St. Mary's L.J. 995 (1993).
506. The characterization of the judge as Hercules comes from Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986).
507. Frederick Schauer, " Giving Reasons," 47 Stan. L.Rev. 633 (1995).
508. PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 620.
509. See generally Michael Taggart, " Should Canadian Judges Be Legally Required to Give Reasoned Decisions in Civil Cases?" 33 U. Toronto L.J. 1 (1983).
510. Frank I. Michelman, " Traces of Self-Government," 100 Harv. L.Rev. 4, 23, 29, 33 (1986).
511. See also Christopher J. Peters, " Adjudication as Representation," 97 Colum. L.Rev. 312 (1997).
512. See G. Edward White, " The Chancellor's Ghost," 74 Chi-Kent L.Rev. 229, 236 (1998).
513. 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (1768).
514. 98 Eng. Rep. at pp. 222, 248.
515. 98 Eng. Rep. at pp. 250-51.
516. Fyodor Dostoevsky, Brothers Karamazov, Part II, Book V, Ch. V, p. 301 (Modern Library College 1950) (hereafter " Dostoevsky, Brothers" ).
517. See also id. at pp. 303, 305 (people want " miracle, mystery and authority" ).
518. See U.S. v. Vasen, 222 F.2d 3, 11 (7th Cir. 1955) (" Laymen everywhere quickly discern differences between actions and words. Our theory of government and law will quickly rot and wither planted among shallow applications of basic tenets in empty ceremonies." );
519. Christopher E. Smith, " Law and Symbolism," 1997 Mich. St. L.Rev. 935, 948 (disappointed public can lead to loss of faith in the law).
520. See Tony Mauro, " 'In Other News . . .': Developments at the Supreme Court in the 2002-2003 Term That You Won't Read About in the U.S. Reports," 39 Tulsa L.Rev. 11, 13-15, 24-25 (2003).
521. See Bradley C. Canon & Charles A. Johnson, Judicial Policies: Implementation and Impact, pp. 168-71 (2d ed. 1999) (questioning whether even size of majority affects implementation of opinion by lower courts; clarity and persuasiveness of opinions are even harder to correlate with the decision's impact);
522. Posner, Skepticism, pp. 874-75 (judges remembered for exercise of power, not style).
523. See Valerie J. Hoekstra, Public Reaction to Supreme Court Decisions (2003);
524. and materials cited in William D. Popkin, " An 'Internal' Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation," 76 Minn. L.Rev. 1133, 1179-80 (1992).
525. Will Durant, Epilogue to Caesar and Christ: A History of Roman Civilization and of Christianity from Their Beginnings to A.D. 325, p. 665 (1944).
526. Dostoevsky, Brothers, pp. 308, 310.
527. Compare Scott Altman, " Beyond Candor," 89 Mich. L.Rev. 296 (1990) (awareness of discretion loosens bounds)
528. with Richard A. Posner, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, p. 96 (2003) (hereafter " Posner, Pragmatism" ) (judges less power hungry if they know that they are exercising discretion).
529. See also Nicholas S. Zeppos, " Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation," 78 Geo. L.Rev. 353 (1989).
530. Posner, Pragmatism, pp. 351-52.
531. See Posner, Skepticism, pp. 865, 873 (need to maintain judicial authority may explain why a pretense of certainty in judicial opinions prevails over uncertain judicial reasoning).
532. Posner, Pragmatism, pp. 91-92 (suggesting that the bulk of the legal academy would have applauded a decision citing such criteria as reasons for upholding separate but equal schools).
533. See also What Brown v. Board of Education Should Have Said (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2002), containing nine opinions by legal scholars, rewriting the Brown opinion.
534. Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution, p. 58 (1992).
535. See Robert A. Ferguson, " The Judicial Opinion as Literary Genre," 2 Yale J. L. & Human. 201, 206-07 (1990) (" The one thing a judge never admits in the moment of decision is freedom of choice." );
536. Hand, Spirit of Liberty, p. 131 (judicial opinion sweeps all the chessmen off the board);
537. Walter V. Schaefer, " Precedent and Policy," 34 U. Chi. L.Rev. 3, 9 (1966) (judge becomes an advocate when writing an opinion);
538. Dan Simon, " The Double-Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo," 79 Or. L.Rev. 1033, 1070-71 (hereafter " Simon, Cardozo" ) (collecting recent authorities);
539. Charles M. Yablon, " Are Judges Liars? A Wittgensteinian Critique of Law's Empire" in Wittgenstein and Legal Theory, p. 261 (Patterson ed., 1992) (judges do not describe internal thought processes, they make arguments).
540. See generally Jan Gillis Wetter, The Styles of Appellate Judicial Decisions (1960).
541. See Ray, Rhetoric, pp. 194, 222;
542. Posner, Federal Courts, pp. 145-51;
543. Richard A. Posner, " What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)," 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 1 (1993) (hereafter " Posner, Maximize" ) (most judges cede opinion writing to law clerks because they believe that the core judicial function is deciding, not articulating, grounds of decision).
544. But see Richard A. Posner, " Legal Writing Today," 8 Scribes J. Legal Writing 35, 38 (2002) (urging judges to write their own opinions).
545. Simon, Cardozo, p. 1065.
546. See generally Dan Simon, " A Psychological Model of Judicial Decision Making," 30 Rutgers L.J. 1, 8-11 (1998) (noting the Realist attacks on certainty in judicial opinions and the persistence of certainty despite the attacks);
547. id at p.12 n.58 (also noting that an expression of uncertainty by Justice Breyer evoked a reaction that it was " disturbing" );
548. Dan Simon, " Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Look through the Lens of Cognitive Psychology," 67 Brook. L.Rev. 1097, 1136 nn. 95-96 (2002) (example of concern about judge expressing doubt in Delaware case).
549. Purpose-Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 132 (1998);
550. Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160 (1998);
551. Legislative history-F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163 (2004). Breyer has authored one of the leading articles on judicial use of legislative history;
552. Stephen Breyer, " On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes," 65 S. Cal. L.Rev. 845 (1992).
553. New York Times, July 28, 1995, at B18.
554. Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. F.C.C., 518 U.S. 727, 750, 757 (1996).
555. Linda Greenhouse, New York Times, Week in Review, July 14, 1966, at p. 5, col. 1.
556. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 242 (1996).
557. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 436 (1997).
558. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. v. U.S., 530 U.S. 604, 607 (2000).
559. Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 628-29 (2003).
560. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 923 (2000).
561. Sometimes a judge will adopt an authoritative tone in his or her opinions but a personal voice in his or her extrajudicial writings. See Elizabeth Roth, " The Two Voices of Roger Traynor," 27 Am. J. Leg. Hist. 269, 300 (1983) (" official style is severe, orderly, and persuasive . . . [lacking] the playful . . . passages which ornament his extrajudicial writing. . . ." ).
562. Posner, Maximize, pp. 29-30.
563. See generally Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (2003).
564. See R.P. Anand, " The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication," 14 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 788, 788-89, 796 (1965) (hereafter " Anand, Role" ) (providing data and referring to Article 57 of the Statute creating the International Court of Justice, permitting separate opinions).
565. Anand, Role, p. 706.
566. Harold Hongju Koh, " On American Exceptionalism," 55 Stan. L.Rev. 1479, 1506 (2003).
567. John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, " Constitutional Adjudication: Lessons from Europe," 82 Tex. L.Rev. 1671, 1692-1700 (2004).
568. Donald P. Kommers, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, pp. 21, 26 (1997).
569. See generally Carl Baudenbacher, " Judicialization: Can the European Model Be Exported to Other Parts of the World?" 39 Tex. Int'l L.J. 381 (2004);
570. Gerda Kleijkamp, " Comparing the Application and Interpretation of the United States Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights," 12 Transnational L. & Cont. Prob. 307 (2002).
571. P. van Dijk & G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights, App. VI, p. 832 (3d ed. 1998).
572. Collected Edition of the " Travaux Preparatoires" of the European Convention on Human Rights, Vol. IV, p. 154 (1977).
573. See generally Kurt H. Nadelman, " Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy," 8 Am. J. Comp. L. 415 (1959).