The democracy deficit: Taming globalization through law reform

The Democracy Deficit: Taming Globalization Through Law Reform

Volumn , Issue , 2004, Pages 1-252

  Aman, Alfred C ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84900075051     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Book

References (302)

1. Matthew A. Crenson & Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy:How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2002).
2. See Jost Delbrück, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-A European Perspective, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 9 (1993);
3. see also Peter Dicken, Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity 1-8 (New York: Guilford Press 2d ed. 1992);
4. William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (New York: Simon & Schuster 1997);
5. Ken'ichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York: Harper Business 1990);
6. Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press 1994);
7. Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press 1991);
8. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Symposium: The Globalization of Law, Politics and Markets: Implications for Domestic Law Reform, 1 Ind. J. of Global Legal Stud. 1 (1993);
9. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic Regulation, 102 Yale L.J. 2107 (1993);
10. Saskia Sassen, Towards a Feminist Analytics of the Global Economy 4 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 7 (1997).
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
12. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1992, Canada-Mexico-U.S. 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
13. For an example of the transnational politics involved in global warming issues, see Gareth Porter & Janet Walsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics 74-78, 92-103 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1st ed. 1991);
14. see generally, Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 1st ed. 1991).
15. See generally, Global Prescriptions: The Production, Exportation, and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. Michigan Press 2002).
16. See Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 447 (2000).
17. See Martin A. Rogoff, The European Union, Germany, and the Länder:New Patterns of Political Relations in Europe, 5 Colum. J. Eur. L. 415, 416 (1999).
18. See Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 435 (2002).
19. Many nations are not even involved in the original decisions at the WTO. Steve Charnovitz, The Emergence of Democratic Participation in Global Governance (Paris, 1919), 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 45, 49 (2003) (describing the WTO practice in which "officials leading a negotiation will invite selected governments into a room to hammer out a deal that is later presented to the entire membership as a fait accompli.").
20. See, e.g., Tara L. Branum, President or King? The Use and Abuse of Executive Orders in Modern-Day America, 28 J. Legis. 1 (2002).
21. See, e.g., Jacqueline Peel, Giving the Public a Voice in the Protection of Global Environment: Avenues for Participation by NGOs in Dispute Resolution at the European Court of Justice and World Trade Organization, 12 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 47 (2001).
22. Jost Delbrück, Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects of Allocating Public Authority beyond the State, 11 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author).
23. For other analyses of the infiltration of globalization into the states, see Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press 1994);
24. Saskia Sassen, Transnational and Supranational Democracy: The Participation of States and Citizens in Global Governance, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 5 (2003);
25. see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1992);
26. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 769, 780-91 (1998).
27. Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional Theory, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 280, 295 (2002) (arguing that "government action necessarily displaces private action, and displacing voluntary initiatives to solve social problems has devastating consequences, including the twin evils of rampant corruption and governmental excess.");
28. Gregory S. Alexander, Playing with Fire, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 449, 449 (2002);
29. see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Greed, Chaos, and Governance: Using Public Choice to Improve Public Law 24-25 (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press 1997) ("Contemporary reanalysis of the mechanisms of collective choice by public choice theorists mocks our efforts at democratic governance. Majoritarianism is an illusion. Legislation and administrative regulation are little better than private contracts at public expense. The national government, all government, should be constrained radically. Our trust should be instead in the market, in voluntary associations, and in local, community-based governance.");
30. Paul Stephen Dempsey, Market Failure and Regulatory Failure as Catalysts for Political Change: The Choice between Imperfect Regulation and Imperfect Competition, 46 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 26 (1989) (stating that [p]roponents of the public choice theory embrace the normative conclusion that we would be better off with less regulation and less government. Because politicians respond to pressure groups and the desire to be reelected, politicians often employ the wheels of government to magnify rather than eliminate market imperfections. Blending schools of market economics and political science, public choice theorists adhere to a policy hostile to government and friendly to unconstrained competition. Public choice theory was the prevailing wisdom in the Reagan Administration. Consistent with public choice theory, Interior Secretary James Watt and Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Ann Gorsuch reduced enforcement of environmental regulation. It was the theory under which Federal Trade Commission Chairman James Miller III gutted the agency's antitrust regulatory staff. Pursuant to public choice theory Federal Communications Commission Chairman Mark Fowler repealed radio and TV programming and advertising regulations. It was the theory under which ICC Chairman Heather Gradison refused to regulate rail rates in monopoly markets. Adhering to the tenets of public choice theory the Department of Transportation under Secretary Elizabeth Dole approved every airline merger proposal submitted to the agency.).
31. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 73-88 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 1980) (arguing against an activist judiciary and instead for a judicial approach that reinforces the representative nature of the other, more democratic, branches).
32. An earlier version of this argument appeared in Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press 1992), some portions of which appear in chapter 1 in revised form.
33. Felix Frankfurter, Social Issues before the Supreme Court, 22 Yale Rev. 476 (1933).
34. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937);
35. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
36. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
37. Home Bdng. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaidsdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
38. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Second Inaugural Address (January 20, 1937), reprinted in 6 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1, 5 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., New York: Random House 1941).
39. See Martin M. Shapiro, The Constitution and Economic Rights, in Essays on the Constitution of the United States 74 (M. Judd Harmon ed., Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press 1978);
40. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1056-57, 1064-65 (1984).
41. See Ellis Wayne Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly:A Study in Economic Ambivalence 472-94 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press 1966);
42. see also Barry D. Karl, The Uneasy State: The United States from 1915 to 1945 153-54 (Chicago, IL: Univ. Chicago Press 1983);
43. Howard Zinn, New Deal Thought 398 (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs Merrill 1966).
44. See Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Beyond the New Deal:Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 Yale L.J. 1466 (1980).
45. See Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 1189, 1263 n.236 (1986).
46. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan L. Rev. 29, 47 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1952).
48. For a discussion of the Court's history of favoring the functional approach to separation-of-powers issues, John M. Burkoff, Appointment and Removal under the Federal Constitution: The Impact of Buckley v. Valeo, 22 Wayne L. Rev. 1335, 1358 n.108 (1976) (citing cases prior to Buckley that reflect the functional approach);
49. see also Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 516-22 (1987);
50. Phillip B. Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 592, 593 (1986) (discussing Madison's perception of "checks and balances" as a result, in part, of the indeterminacy of governmental functions);
51. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
52. For an illuminating discussion of the difficulties involved in repealing old statutes, see Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 1982).
53. S. P. Hays, The Politics of Environmental Administration, in The New American State: Bureaucracies and Policies since World War II 22-25 (Louis Galambos, ed., Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1987).
54. See, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. NRDC, 462 U.S. 84 (1983) (upholding a Nuclear Regulatory Commission rule, but only after a contextual approach that required an examination of a number of interrelated factors).
55. See William F. West & Joseph Cooper, The Rise of Administrative Clearance, in The Presidency and Public Policy Making 192, 207-8, (G. C. Edwards III, S. A. Shull, and N. C. Thomas, eds. Pittsburgh, PA: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1985).
56. See also Richard P. Nathan, The Plot That Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency (New York: Wiley 1975).
57. Theodore Lowi, The Constitution and Contemporary Political Discourse 115 (unpublished paper on file with Cornell Law Review) (listing the new statutes passed from 1969 to 1976).
58. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 155, 155 (1979) (stating that "[t]he most striking feature of this scheme is its absoluteness. ");
59. see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., 1 Environmental Law: Air and Water § 1.2 (St. Paul, MN: West Pub. Co. 1986).
60. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C. (2000));
61. Federal Water Pollution Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified at 12 U. S. C. sec. 24, 15 U.S.C. 633, 636 (2000);
62. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat. 91 (codified in various sections of 33 U.S.C. (2000));
63. See, e.g., Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst. V. Donovan, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (cotton dust);
64. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (free exercise of religion);
65. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation).
66. But see R. Shep Melnick, Regulation and the Courts: The Case of the Clean Air Act (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution 1983) (describing how the courts sometimes tempered these statutes through interpretation, allowing cost to be factored into the approach taken.)
67. Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified in various sections of 33 U.S.C. (2000)).
68. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (Brown II).
69. See William H. Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 191 (1980).
70. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'r of the United States Army, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974);
71. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973);
72. Conservation Council of N. Carolina v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973);
73. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'r of the United States Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973);
74. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
75. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
76. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 998 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (supp. opinion 1977), cert. den. sub nom, Velsicol Chemical Corp. v. EPA, 431 U.S. 925 (1977);
77. see also E. F. Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment:Progress along a Constitutional Avenue, in Law and the Environment 134 (Malcolm F. Baldwin & James K. Page, Jr., eds., New York: Walker 1970).
78. See, e.g., New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
79. See Jackson County v. Jones, 571 F.2d 1004, 1013 (8th Cir. 1978);
80. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'r of the United States Army, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139-40 (5th Cir. 1974);
81. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 953 (7th Cir. 1973);
82. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 628 F.2d 578, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1979);
83. United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1977);
84. H & H Tire Co. v. DOT, 471 F.2d 350, 355 (7th Cir. 1972);
85. see also William H. Rodgers, Jr., A Hard Look at Vermont Yankee Environmental Law under Close Scrutiny, 67 Geo. L.J. 699, 704-8 (1979). Note, The Least Adverse Alternative Approach to Substantive Review under NEPA, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 735 (1975), H. J. Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Generation of Cases under NEPA, 19 San Diego L. Rev. 279 (1974).
86. UAW v. Brock, 783 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
87. see also Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction after Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653 (1985) (advocating judicial review of agency inaction);
88. Hon. Patricia M. Wald, The Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 Admin. L. Rev. 507, 522 (1988) (describing recent years as an era of "nonregulation" in which agencies have failed to enforce existing rules or to promulgate rules where the statute appears to contemplate rules).
89. See generally, Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The diffusion of Power in the World Economy 46 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 1996);
90. Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization 28 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press 1996);
91. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 769, 780-91 (1998) [hereinafter: Aman, The Globalizing State].
92. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 171 (1988).
93. Hon. Patricia M. Wald, Looking Forward to the Next Millennium: Social Previews for Legal Change, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 1085, 1098 (1997).
94. See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1611 (2001).
95. See Symposium: Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in the Era of Privatization, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1307 (2001).
96. Barbara Sturken Petersen & James Glah, Rapid Descent: Deregulation and the Shakeout in the Airlines 77 (New York: Simon & Schuster 1994). Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-904, 92 Stat. 1705-54 (1978) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1303-1552 (2000) [hereinafter ADA]. For a general discussion of the efforts to deregulate the airline industry, see Stephen G. Wood et al., Regulation, Deregulation and Re-Regulation: An American Perspective, 1987 B. Y. U. Rev. 381 (1987).
97. See, e.g., Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation v. Competition:Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 Yale L.J. 871 (1973) (discussing problems with unguided regulatory systems that lead to situations where "regulated industries are often in clear control of the regulatory process.");
98. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 769, 780-91 (1998).
99. But see Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1005, 1012 (1987) (stating that "[p]roponents of deregulation did not rest their case on likely deconcentration. They argued instead that competition, including potential competition, would force prices down and increase traveler choice, irrespective of whether the industry became more, or less, concentrated.").
100. For a discussion of how the bureaucracy actually grew during the Reagan years, see Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate 7-10 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
101. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 416-18, 425-27 (New York: Random House 1st ed. 1980).
102. Richard N. Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World 137-38 (New York: Basic Books 1986).
103. See Duane Chapman, Environmental Standards and International Trade in Automobiles and Copper: The Case for a Social Tariff, 31 Nat. Resources J. 449 (1991).
104. See, e.g., Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with Agency Rulemaking:The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1986);
105. Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1075 (1986).
106. See, e.g., Chevron v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
107. See, e.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
108. Compare Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assoc. v. State Farm Mutual, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (strong review of auto safety, deregulation) with Black Citizens for Fair Media v. F.C.C., 719 F.2d 407 (1983) (deferential reviews of F.C.C. regulations streamlining licensing procedures).
109. See Chevron v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
110. See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986);
111. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2596, 2625 (1988) (Scalia dissenting).
112. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Symposium: How Separation of Powers Protects Individual Liberties, Rutgers L. Rev. 41 796-805 (1989).
113. See Peter L. Strauss, Was There a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision, 1983 Duke L.J. 789 (1983), who addresses the Court's inability in Chadha to distinguish the use of the veto in political and regulatory contexts. For a study of legislative vetoes in general and their effect on the administrative process, see Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1977).
114. James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 11 (New Haven, CT:Yale Univ. Press 1938).
115. For a similar problem that arises when the First Amendment is arguably overextended to certain kinds of commercial or regulatory speech, see Thomas Jackson & John Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1979);
116. see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation and the First Amendment, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 93 (1985).
117. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
118. Remarks Accepting the Presidential Nomination for the Republican National Convention in Houston, 28 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Doc. 1462, 1466 (August 24, 1992).
119. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reforms:Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 429, 445-47 (1995).
120. See, e.g., takings legislation, risk-assessment legislation, and the twohouse veto. These provisions would make agency action difficult, if not practically impossible, but they seek to restrain rather than replace the federal regulation to which they apply. As has already been noted, some agencies have been singled out for abolition; see also Contract with America, available at http://www.townhall.com/documents/contract.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2003);
121. Vice President Al Gore, Report of the National Performance Review, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less (Sept. 7, 1993) [hereinafter National Performance Review]. For a discussion of this report, see Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 Duke L.J. 1165 (1994);
122. Daniel B. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 Duke L.J. 1180 (1994);
123. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 Duke L.J. 1206 (1994).
124. See Vice President Dan Quayle, Remarks to the Food and Drug Law Institute Conference Regarding the President's Council on Competitiveness, Fed. News Service, Dec. 11, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
125. Paul C. Light, The True Size of Government 1 (Washington, DC:Brookings Institution 1999) (noting that there are almost 11 million employees of private companies performing contracted-out public tasks).
126. Henry Cowell & Sidney Cowell, Charles Ives and His Music 144-45 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1969).
127. See, e.g., Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization under Challenge:Democracy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25 Harv. Envtl L. Rev. 1 (2001).
128. See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 435 (2002).
129. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic Regulation 102 Yale L.J. 2107, 2117 (1993).
130. See Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy 102-34 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press 1998).
131. Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism (New York: Knopf 1991).
132. P. Maria Joseph Christie & Reuven Levary, Virtual Corporations: Recipe for Success, Industrial Management, July 1, 1998, at 7.
133. For an analysis of welfare devolution, see Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121 (2000).
134. See Phillip Kurland, The Role of the Supreme Court in American History:A Lawyer's Interpretation 14 Bucknell Review 16 (Fall 1966).
135. See, e.g., Richard C. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992).
136. But see Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1495 (1999).
137. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 769 (1998). Portions of chapters 2 and 3 are based on arguments made in this article and appear here in a revised and expanded form. See also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reforms:Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 429, 435-37 (1995). For an argument that much of what courts claim are rationales for federalism are, in reality, an argument for decentralized management instead, see Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 903, 914 (1994).
138. See Richard Elliot Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions, in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 1st ed. 1991).
139. See Robert Perrucci, Japanese Auto Transplants in the Heartland:Corporatism and Community 41-76 (New York: de Gruyter 1994).
140. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century, in The Province of Administrative Law 101 (Michael Taggart ed., Oxford, UK:Hart Pub. 1997).
141. Matthew A. Crenson & Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2002).
142. Diane P. Wood, United States Antitrust Law in the Global Market, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 409 (1994).
143. See Daniel C. Esty, Stepping Up to the Global Environmental Challenge, Fordham Envtl. L.J. 103, 108-11 (1996);
144. see also J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors under U.S. Securities Laws: The Impact of International Regulatory Competition, 1 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 431 (1994).
145. Strange, Casino Capitalism (New York: Blackwell 1986).
146. See Group of Lisbon Report, Limits to Competition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995).
147. See generally, Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly: A Study in Economic Ambivalence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1966).
148. See also Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin 1987).
149. See Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International Relations Theory, 87 Am. J. Int'l L. 205 (1995).
150. See generally, Joseph A. Camilleri & Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Brookfield, VT: Elgar 1992);
151. See Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political and Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations, in State Sovereignty as Social Construct 81, 81-93, 100-102 (Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
152. See, e.g., Dennis Conway, Are There New Complexities in Global Migration Systems of Consequence for the United States "Nation-State"?, 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 31, 35-43 (1994) (discussing international mobility, the world as an interconnected community, and the way individuals relate to and identify with more than one country at a time).
153. See generally, Gary Teeple, Globalization and the Decline of Social Reform 69-74 (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press 1st ed. 1995);
154. see also William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Magic Logic of Global Capitalism 360-87 (New York: Simon & Schuster 1997).
155. See generally, Saskia Sassen, Cities in a World Economy (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press 1994).
156. See Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570, 627-38 (1996).
157. Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1516 (1995).
158. Varamon Ramangkura, Thai Shrimp, Sea Turtles, Mangrove Forests and the WTO: Innovative Environmental Protection under the International Trade Regime, 15 Geo. Int'l Envtl. L. Rev. 677, 682 (2003).
159. Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization 143-45 (Washington, DC: AEI Press 2000) (proposing the creation of a bipartisan congressional commission to "inform [Congress] not only of individual actions, policies, or cases but also of the overall trends within international organizations that will have an impact on the normal workings of the U.S. political system").
160. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 511 (2000).
161. But see Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 Am. J. Int'l L. 596 (1999).
162. See Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-self Execution, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1557 (2003).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 654 (2000)
164. (Souter, J., dissenting) ("It is, then, not the least irony of these cases that the states will be forced to enjoy the new federalism whether they want it or not. For with the Court's decision today, Antonio Morrison, like Carter Coal's James Carter before him, has 'won the states' rights plea against the states themselves.'") (citation omitted).
165. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Rd. 527 U.S. 666, 703 (1999).
166. See, e.g., Larry A. DiMatteo et al., The Doha Declaration and Beyond:Giving a Voice to Non-Trade Concerns within the WTO Trade Regime, 36 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 95 (2003);
167. Steve Charnovitz, WTO Cosmopolitics, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 299 (2002);
168. Jeffery Atik, Democratizing the WTO, 33 Geo.Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 451 (2001).
169. See, e.g., Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 2 Chi. J. Int'l L. 403, 408 (2001) (arguing that "alternatives should be pursued that will reintroduce some of the former elements of 'diplomatic' flexibility that characterized the earlier GATT regime.").
170. See, e.g., Eric L. Richards & Martin A. McCrory, The Sea Turtle Dispute:Implications for Sovereignty, the Environment, and International Trade Law, 71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 295 (2000) (discussing the difficulties of conforming regulations enforcing section 609 of Public Law 101-162 with the statute and WTO appellate body decision).
171. Philippe C. Schmitter, What Is There to Legitimize in the European Union. and How Might This Be Accomplished?, at http://www.iue.it/SPS/People/ Faculty/CurrentProfessors/bioSchmitter.shtml (last updated Sept. 30, 2003).
172. Though nationalization is rare in the United States, there are some exceptions. The Tennessee Valley Authority was created as a government corporation to undertake the building and operation of dams. See Richard Wirtz, The Legal Framework of the Tennessee Valley Authority, 43 Tenn. L. Rev. 573 (1976).
173. Airline Deregulation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978).
174. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1333, 1341 (1985).
175. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
176. Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action:An Introduction, in The Tools of Government: A Guide to the New Governance 1, 1-2 (Lester M. Salamon ed., New York: Oxford Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter cited as Salamon, The Tools of Government].
177. For an interesting discussion of the differences between privatization and deregulation in the United States and Europe, see Giandomenico Majone, Paradoxes of Privatization and Deregulation, J. Eur. Pub. Pol'y 4 (1994).
178. See Shymeka L. Hunter, More Than Just a Private Affair: Is the Practice of Incarcerating Alaska Prisoners in Private Out-of-State Prisons Unconstitutional?, 17 Alaska L. Rev. 319, 327-28 (2000).
179. Lewis D. Solomon, Reflections on the Future of Business Organizations, 20 Cardozo L. Rev. 1213, 1216 (1999). ("Virtually any asset or service that a local government owns or provides has been privatized somewhere in the United States in some manner, including fire protection, police protection, waste water treatment, street lighting, tree trimming, snow removal, parking structures, railroads, hospitals, jails, and even cemeteries.")
180. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1121 (2000).
181. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and The Alden Trilogy, 109 Yale L.J. 1927, 1957-62 (2000).
182. For a discussion of the various ways that competition in a global economy can affect state entities, politics, and the law they apply see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 769, 780-91 (1998). Portions of chapter 3 represent a revised and expanded form of the arguments that first appeared in this article.
183. See, e.g., David J. Kennedy, Due Process in a Privatized Welfare System, 64 Brook. L. Rev. 231, 259-61 (1998) (arguing that welfare reform often results in higher costs).
184. See, e.g., Mark A. Hofman, Nader Faults EPA as Lax on Enforcement, 29 Bus. Ins., May 1, 1995, at 47.
185. A prime example is Vice President Al Gore, Report of the National Performance Review, From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs Less (1993) [hereinafter National Performance Review]. For a discussion of this report, see Jeffery S. Lubbers, Better Regulations: The National Performance Review's Regulatory Reform Recommendations, 43 Duke L.J. 1165 (1994);
186. Daniel P. Rodriguez, Management, Control, and the Dilemmas of Presidential Leadership in the Modern Administrative State, 43 Duke L.J. 1180 (1994);
187. Paul R. Verkuil, Is Efficient Government an Oxymoron?, 43 Duke L.J. 1221 (1994).
188. Hindy Lauer Schacter, Reinventing Government or Reinventing Ourselves: The Role of Citizen Owners in Making a Better Government (Albany, NY: SUNY Press 1997).
189. See also Mark Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
190. See Saskia Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International Investment and Labor Flow (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
191. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era 42-62 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press 1992).
192. See, e.g., Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation vs. Competition:Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 Yale L.J. 871 (1973).
193. See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, American Health Care and the Law, in The Privatization of Health Care Reform: Legal and Regulatory Perspectives (M. Gregg Bloche ed., New York: Oxford Univ. Press 2003) (promoting market privatization in health care provision).
194. See Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track: From Trade to Beyond, 29 Geo.Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 687 (1996).
195. See, e.g., Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 Comp. Pol. Stud. 147 (1999) (discussing the effect of private entities on rule making at the international level as a result of private litigation in international forums).
196. For an excellent, thorough analysis of harmonization in the environmental area, see Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness, and Harmonization: Environmental Protection in Regional Trade Agreements, 21 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 265 (1997).
197. Ian Harden, The Contracting State (Philadelphia, PA: Open Univ. Press 1992).
198. See Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1185 (1996).
199. See generally, Richard W. Harding, Private Prisons and Public Accountability (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 1997).
200. See, e.g., Note, Limits of Competition, Accountability in Government Contracting, 112 Yale L.J. 2465 (2003).
201. See Douglas W. Dunham, Inmates' Rights and the Privatization of Prisons, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 1475 (1986);
202. see also Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of America's Prison Privatization Statutes, 21 Seton Hall Legis. J. 371 (1997).
203. Mark Aronson, A Public Lawyer's Responses to Privatization and Outsourcing, in The Province of Administrative Law 40, 62 (Michael Taggart ed., Oxford, UK: Hart Pub. 1997).
204. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 1980).
205. But see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press 2001).
206. See generally, Susan Marks, The End of History? Reflections on Some International Legal Theses, 8 Eur. J. Int'l. Law 449 (1997).
207. See generally, Daniel C. Esty, Greening the GATT: Trade, Environment, and the Future 108-11 (Washington, DC: Inst. for International Economics 1994).
208. See, e.g., Lewis Rosman, Note, Public Participation in International Pesticide Regulation: When the Codex Commission Decides, Who Will Listen?, 12 Va. Envtl. L.J. 329 (1993).
209. Various mixtures of public and private power, and the constitutional problems some of them can cause, of course, long predate the rise of the global state. See, e.g., Note, Law Making by Private Groups, 51 Harv. L. Rev. 201 (1937).
210. More recently, commentators have discussed a variety of potential constitutional problems that could arise when law-making power is delegated to private groups. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent, Fragmenting the Unitary Executive: Congressional Delegations of Administrative Authority outside the Federal Government, 85 Nw. U. L. Rev. 62 (1990);
211. Harold I. Abramson, A Fifth Branch of Government: The Private Regulators and Their Constitutionality, 16 Hastings Const. L.Q. 165 (1989);
212. David M. Lawrence, Private Exercise of Governmental Power, 61 Ind. L.J. 647 (1986).
213. See William Winslow Crosskey, 1 Politics and the Constitution in the History of the United States 93 (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press 1953).
214. See generally, Jean Drèze & Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity 13-16 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
215. See generally, Joseph A. Camilleri & Jim Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World 166-67 (Brookfield, VT: Elgar 1992);
216. see also Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy 21-23 (New York:Cambridge Univ. Press 1996).
217. See generally, John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1997).
218. See, e.g., William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism 172 (New York: Simon & Schuster 1997).
219. See also Paul R. Krugman, Pop Internationalism 15-21 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1996).
220. See Philip G. Cerny, What Next for the State?, in Globalization: Theory and Practice 123, 132-33 (Eleonore Kofman & Gillian Youngs eds., New York: Pinter 1996).
221. For a discussion of how state regulatory approaches often borrow from private forms and structures, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth as Eggshell Victim:A Global Perspective on Domestic Regulation, 102 Yale L.J. 2107 (1993);
222. see also Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law for a New Century, in The Province of Administrative Law 90, 90-91 (Michael Taggart ed., Oxford, UK: Hart Pub. 1997).
223. See Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism 301-15 (New York: Knopf 1991) (asking the question "who is us?" in light of an increasingly denationalized global economy).
224. see also Peter Dicken, Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity 13-14 (New York: Guilford Press 2d ed. 1992).
225. The state, despite its diversity, has a distinct role to play. See, e.g., Bringing the State Back In (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 1985);
226. see also States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (Robert Boyer & Daniel Drache eds., New York: Routledge 1996).
227. But see Peter Self, Government by the Market? The Politics of Public Choice 4-20 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1993).
228. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985).
229. For a discussion of corporatist theory, see Paul P. Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of America 148-53 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1990);
230. see also Alan Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory 22-46 (New York: Blackwell 1986), at 22-46.
231. Robert Perrucci, Japanese Auto Transplants in the Heartland:Corporatism and Community 81 (New York: de Gruyter 1994).
232. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Federal, State Officials Spar over Welfare Spending, L.A. Daily News, Dec. 29, 1996, at B22.
233. See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press 1987);
234. see also Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York:Basic Books 1990).
235. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974).
236. See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago, IL: Univ. Chicago Press 1962).
237. For example, many strong-state laissez-faire advocates in the economic sphere often support state intervention on social issues. See, e.g., Andrew Gamble, The Free Economy and the Strong State: The Politics of Thatcherism 35 (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1st ed. 1988);
238. see also School Prayer Delayed by GOP Squabbles, 54 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 2529 (Sept. 7, 1996) (discussing social conservatives' proposed constitutional amendment to protect school prayer).
239. See generally, Philip G. Cerny, The Changing Architecture of Politics:Structure, Agency, and the Future of the State 227-29 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications 1990).
240. See James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 10-12 (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press 1938).
241. See generally, Symposium, The New Public Law, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 707 (1991).
242. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement:Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 707, 742, 749 (1991).
243. See Peter M. Shane, Structure, Relationship, Ideology; or, How Would We Know a "New Public Law" If We Saw It?, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 837, 844-45 (1991).
244. See Tun Myint, Democracy in Global Environmental Governance: Issues, Interests, and Actors in the Mekong and the Rhine, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 287 (2003).
245. For a discussion of schools, see Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: Progressive Possibilities of the New Private Law, 73 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1001 (1996).
246. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reform:Rejection, Relocation, or Reinvention?, 2 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 429, 454-62 (1995).
247. For critiques of the substitution of the market for the government, see Robert Kuttner, Everything for Sale: The Virtues and Limits of Markets 328-61 (New York: Knopf 1997);
248. States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization (Robert Boyer & Daniel Drache eds., New York: Routledge 1996);
249. The Group of Lisbon, Limits to Competition xi-xii (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1995).
250. Richard L. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 Geo. L.J. 2225 (1997).
251. Jost Delbruck, Exercising Public Authority beyond the State: Transnational Democracy and/or Alternative Legitimation Strategies, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 29 (2003).
252. For an excellent analysis of the state-actor doctrine and some of its ambiguities, see Ronald J. Krotszynaski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 302 (1995).
253. For an excellent discussion of these theories and their relationship to U.S. and U.K. constitutional and administrative law, see generally, P. P. Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and the United States of America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1990).
254. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29, 31 (1985);
255. see also Christine B. Harrington, Regulatory Reform: Creating Gaps and Making Markets, 10 J. L. & Pol'y 293 (1988) (arguing that regulatory negotiation substitutes an informal process for meaningful political debate over the values of regulation and that the silence of the state in such negotiation is actually "an expression of state power and an aspect of the minimalist state").
256. See, e.g., J. H. H. Weiler et al., European Democracy and Its Critique, in The Crisis of Representation in Europe 4, 32-33 (Jack Hayward ed., London, UK: Frank Cass 1995).
257. See generally, Peter Dicken, Global Shift: The Internationalization of Economic Activity (New York: Guilford Press 2d ed. 1992).
258. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 711 (2001).
259. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1687 (2002);
260. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Proposals for Reforming the Administrative Procedure Act: Globalization, Democracy and the Furtherance of a Global Public Interest, 6 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 397 (1999) [hereinafter Aman, Proposals];
261. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public/Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 769, 816-19 (1998) [hereinafter Aman, Globalizing State].
262. Many of the proposals for reform in this chapter are based on the reforms advocated in these articles. For perspectives on democracy and administrative law in Eastern Europe, see Paul H. Brietzke, Democratization and Administrative Law, 52 Okla. L. Rev. 1 (1999) (stressing that a well-structured administrative state is crucial to the democratization process).
263. Enron had much to do with GATT rules involving energy. See Paul Krugman, In Broad Daylight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 2002, at A31;
264. see also Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons from a Perfect Storm of Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance, and Ethical Cultural Failures, 39 Cal. W. L. Rev. 163 (2003);
265. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., U.S. Regulators Are Requiring Full Details of Energy Sales, N.Y. Times, May 15, 2002, at Cl.
266. See Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 Hofstra L. Rev. 649, 662-63 (1987) ("The presence of a profit motive results in private prisons substituting the goal of the general welfare of society with the goal of profit maximization. In this manner, cost considerations may hamper, if not totally override, society's interest in correctional policy.").
267. See e.g., Bonsor v. Musicians' Union, 1 Ch 479 (1954); R. V. Monopolies and Mergers Comm. Ex. P. Argyll Group Plc 2 All E.R. 257 (Court of Appeal 1986).
268. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization:Making Markets More Accountable through Administrative Law, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1477, 1502 (2001).
269. Robert L. Fischman, Stumbling to Johannesburg: The United States' Haphazard Progress toward Sustainable Forestry Law, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. 10, 291 10, 304 (2002).
270. Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons: III. A Tale of Two Sys- tems: Cost, Quality, and Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1868, 1869 (2002).
271. Charles W. Thomas & Sherril Gautreaux, The Present Status of State and Federal Privatization Law, available at http://web.crime.ufl.edu/pcp/html/statelaw.html (last updated Mar. 19, 2000).
272. Alfred C. Aman Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in Globalization:Making Markets More Accountable through Administrative Law, 28 Fordham Urban L.J. 1477, 1481 (2001).
273. See Robert B. Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st-Century Capitalism 301-15 (New York: Knopf 1991).
274. See generally, Katherine Cox, The Inevitability of Nimble Fingers? Law, Development, and Child Labor, 32 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 115, 128-29 (1999).
275. See generally, Jean Dreze & Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity 13-16 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
276. See Saskia Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study of International Investment and Labor Flow (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
277. James Austin & Garry Coventry, Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons 4 (Bureau of Justice Assistance 2001).
278. Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector:Theory, Evidence, Prospects, Oxford Rev. Econ. Pol'y, Winter 1997, at 67, 68.
279. Robert Pollin & Stephanie Luce, The Living Wage: Building a Fair Economy (New York: New Press 1998).
280. See, e.g., Robert B. Reich, Working Principles, in Making Work Pay vii, x (Robert Kutter ed., New York: New Press 2002) (stating that before passage of the last minimum wage increase 80-85 percent of Americans supported the raise).
281. Scott Adams & David Neumark, Living Wage Effects: New and Improved Evidence 1 (NBER Working Paper no. 9702, May 2003).
282. See, e.g., Georgiana Vines, Candidates for Mayor Differ over Living Wage, Knoxville News-Sentinel, Aug. 17, 2003, at B1 (discussing mayoral candidates' views on living-wage proposal rejected the previous year by the city council); Bloomington to Consider Mandatory Living Wage (Assoc. Press, Sept. 16, 2003) (discussing living-wage campaign in Bloomington, Indianapolis, Lafayette, and South Bend, Indiana).
283. Rachel Gordon, Survey Gives Impetus to Raise Minimum Wage; Few Businesses in S.F. Would Be Affected, San Francisco Chronicle, May 8, 2003, at A25.
284. Lane Kensworthy, Stewart Macaulay & Joel Rogers, "The More Things Change ": Business Litigation and Governance in the American Automobile Industry, 21 Law & Soc. Inquiry 631, 674 (1996).
285. Note, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World's Water Resources, 19 Conn. J. Int'l L. 183, 185 (2003).
286. Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of Globalization:The WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of Standards, 50 Kan. L. Rev. 823 (2002).
287. See Sidney A. Shapiro, International Trade Agreements, Regulatory Protection, and Public Accountability, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 435, 444-45 (2002);
288. see also Am. Bar Ass'n. House of Delegates Recommendation No. 107C, Harmonization Recommendation (Aug. 2001), available at htpp://www.abanet.org/leadership/2001/107c.pdf.
289. Cindy Skrzycki, Now, You May Never Know Where That Broccoli Has Been, Wash. Post, Feb. 3, 2004, at E1.
290. Where Your Food Comes From, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 2004, at A22.
291. Gardiner Harris, Pfizer Moves to Stem Canadian Drug Imports, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 2003, at C1.
292. Sarah Gay Stolberg & Gardiner Harris, Industry Fights to Put Imprint on Drug Bill, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2003, at A1.
293. Chart, N.Y. Times, available at www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2003/09/04/business/05MEDI.chart.jpg.html (posted Sept. 4, 2003).
294. Ceci Connolly, An Unlikely Pair Fights for Cheaper Medications; Congressmen Support Drug Reimportation Plan, Wash. Post, Sept. 5, 2003, at A3.
295. Elizabeth Becker, Drug Industry Seeks to Sway Prices Oversees, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 2003, at A1.
296. Elizabeth Mehren, Boston Looking to Canada for Drugs, L.A. Times, Dec. 10, 2003, at 21.
297. Christopher Rowland, Canadian Pharmacy Group Warns of Supply Problems, Boston Globe, Dec. 18, 2003, at C3.
298. Monica Davey, Illinois to Seek Exemption to Buy Drugs from Canada, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 2003, at A27.
299. Claire Kittredge, Seniors See Hope in Limiting Drug Prices, Boston Globe, Dec. 18, 2003, at A3.
300. Katharine Seelye, Study Confirms "Stakeholders" Gave Advice to Energy Panel, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 203, at A16.
301. Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 183, 184 (2002).
302. Stuart Auerbach, 46-Year-Old CAB Goes Out of Existence; Chairman Bangs Final Gavel at Bittersweet Session, Wash. Post, Jan. 1, 1985, at D1.