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Volumn 2, Issue , 2008, Pages 885-892

Solving two-person zero-sum repeated games of incomplete information

Author keywords

Computational game theory; Equilibrium finding; Non convex optimization; Two person zero sum incomplete information repeated games

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; CONVEX OPTIMIZATION; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; OPTIMAL SYSTEMS;

EID: 84899991152     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (15)

References (26)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.