JCAT: A platform for the TAC market design competition

Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS

Volumn 3, Issue , 2008, Pages 1603-1604

  Niu, Jinzhong ^a   Cai, Kai ^a   Parsons, Simon ^a   Gerding, Enrico ^b   McBurney, Peter ^c   Moyaux, Thierry ^c   Phelps, Steve ^c   Shield, David ^c  

^a CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Double auctions; Mechanism design; Trading agent competition; Trading strategies

Indexed keywords

EID: 84899900965     PISSN: 15488403     EISSN: 15582914     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (10)

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