Land acquisition for industrialization and compensation of displaced farmers

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 110, Issue , 2014, Pages 303-312

  Ghatak, Maitreesh ^a   Mookherjee, Dilip ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Compensation; Industrialization; Land acquisition; Land reform; Property rights

Indexed keywords

AGRICULTURAL LAND; AGRICULTURAL WORKER; COMPENSATION; INDUSTRIALIZATION; INVESTMENT; LAND REFORM; PROPERTY RIGHTS;

EID: 84899891081     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2013.01.001     Document Type: Article

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