메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 1, Issue , 2012, Pages 416-423

Efficient Nash equilibrium approximation through Monte Carlo counterfactual regret minimization

Author keywords

Economic paradigms:: Game theory (cooperative and non cooperative)

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS;

EID: 84899441138     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper
Times cited : (39)

References (10)
  • 2
    • 0000908510 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium
    • S. Hart and A. Mas-Colell. A simple adaptive procedure leading to correlated equilibrium. Econometrica, 68(5): 1127-1150, 2000.
    • (2000) Econometrica , vol.68 , Issue.5 , pp. 1127-1150
    • Hart, S.1    Mas-Colell, A.2
  • 3
    • 77953115320 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Smoothing techniques for computing nash equilibria of sequential games
    • S. Hoda, A. Gilpin, J. Pena, and T. Sandholm. Smoothing techniques for computing nash equilibria of sequential games. Mathematics of Operations Research, 35(2):494-512, 2010.
    • (2010) Mathematics of Operations Research , vol.35 , Issue.2 , pp. 494-512
    • Hoda, S.1    Gilpin, A.2    Pena, J.3    Sandholm, T.4


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.