Capitol investments: The marketability of political skills

Capitol Investments: The Marketability of Political Skills

Volumn , Issue , 2008, Pages 1-199

  Parker, Glenn R ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84898359188     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
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