A survey of state fetal homicide laws and their potential applicability to pregnant women who harm their own fetuses

Indiana Law Journal

Volumn 89, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 847-883

  Murphy, Andrew S ^a  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 84897753452     PISSN: 00196665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (102)

1. See John L. Mcintosh & Christopher W. Drapeau, U.S.A. Suicide: 2010 Official Final Data, AM. ASS'N SUICIDOLOGY (Sept. 20, 2012), http://www.suicidology.org/c/document-library/get-file?folderId=248&name= DLFE-618.pdf.
2. See Understanding Suicide, CDC.GOV (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/ ViolencePrevention/pdf/Suicide-FactSheet-2012-a.pdf.
3. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 774 n. 13 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring)
4. Thea E. Potanos, Note, Dueling Values: The Clash of Cyber Suicide Speech and the First Amendment, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 676-77 (2012).
5. See United States v. Caldwell, 70 M.J. 630 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2010) (affirming the conviction under 10 U.S.C. § 934 of a soldier who tried to commit suicide by slitting his wrists), rev 'd on other grounds, 72 M.J. 137 (C.A.A.F 2013) (finding it unnecessary to resolve the issue of whether a service member may incur criminal liability on the basis of a bona fide suicide attempt alone).
6. See John H. Derrick, Annotation, Criminal Liability for Death of Another as Result of Accused's Attempt to Kill Self or Assist Another's Suicide, 40 A.L.R. 4TH 702 (1985 & Supp. 2013).
7. Brief of Appellee at 3, Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 49A02-1106-CR-486) [hereinafter Shuai Appellee's Brief].
8. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 623 (citing Bozovichar v. State, 103 N.E.2d 680, 683 (Ind. 1952),
9. abrogated on other grounds by Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429 (Ind. 2013)).
10. Id. at 625. To be precise, Shuai spent 435 days in jail before she was allowed to post bail. Dave Stafford, The Case Against Bei Bei Shuai, IND. LAW., Aug. 17-30 2012, at 1, 1. Shuai's release predated a 2013 Indiana Supreme Court case that contradicted nearly a century and a half of case law by holding that the burden of proving that an individual accused of murder should be denied bail must be placed on the State. Fry, 990 N.E.2d at 433. Presumably, Shuai would have had an easier time obtaining bail had she been arrested after June 2013.
11. More than 100, 000 people ultimately signed a petition on Change.org to "Free Bei Bei!" See Protect Pregnant Women: Free Bei Bei!, CHANGE.ORG, http://www.change.org/petitions/protect-pregnant-women-free-bei-bei. In addition, dozens of medical, public health, civil liberties, and reproductive rights organizations have expressed support for her cause through amicus curiae briefs that were filed on her behalf in the Court of Appeals of Indiana. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
12. Diana Penner, Shuai Freed on Guilty Plea, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 3, 2012, at A1
13. See, e.g., Ada Calhoun, Mommy Had to Go Away for a While, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2012, at MM30
14. Ed Pilkington, Indiana Prosecutor Accused of Silencing Chinese Woman on Murder Charge, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2012, 10: 45 AM EDT), http://www.guardian.co. uk/world/2012/jul/15/indiana-abortion
15. Calhoun, supra note 18 (emphasis added); see also Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women's Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 299 (2013) (providing the first ever systematic survey of these sorts of cases). The Paltrow and Flavin article "report[s] on 413 cases from 1973 to 2005 in which a woman's pregnancy was a necessary factor leading to attempted and actual deprivations of a woman's physical liberty." Id. at 299. As the authors explain, however, the 413 cases they analyze represent a "substantial undercount" of all such cases. Id. at 303.
16. Cf. Lynn Paltrow, Exec. Dir., Nat'l Advocates for Pregnant Women, Reproductive Justice and the Indiana Case of Bei Bei Shuai, Address at Indiana University Maurer School of Law (Mar. 29, 2013), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-5NPldYYLic, at 33:55-35:56.
17. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 614-15 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Sandra L. Smith, Note, Fetal Homicide: Woman or Fetus as Victim? A Survey of Current State Approaches and Recommendations for Future State Application, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1845 (2000).
19. See, e.g., Fetal Homicide Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 2013), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/fetal-homicide-state-laws. aspx#resources
20. State Homicide Laws That Recognize Unborn Victims, NAT'L RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE (May 24, 2013), http://www.nrlc.org/federal/unbornvictims/ statehomicidelaws092302/.
21. See, e.g., Marka B. Fleming, Feticide Laws: Contemporary Legal Applications and Constitutional Inquiries, 29 PACE L. REV. 43, 72-73 (2008) (containing a page-and-a-half discussion about "The Difficulty of Feticide Legislation that Protects the Fetus from Its Mother")
22. Carolyn B. Ramsey, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws, Restructuring the Debate over Fetal Homicide Laws OHIO ST. L.J. 721, 734-37 (2006) (containing a three page discussion on "Abortion and Maternal Liability Exceptions").
23. Exodus 2 1: 22-23 (King James) ("If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished, according as the woman's husband will lay upon him; and he shall pay as the judges determine. And if any mischief follow, then thou shalt give life for life."). These two verses have traditionally been interpreted as demonstrating that "the fetus did not have the same status as the mother in ancient Hebrew law." Roy Bowen Ward, The Use of the Bible in the Abortion Debate, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 391, 396 (1993)
24. (citing JOHN R. CONNERY, ABORTION: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CATHOLIC PERSPECTIVE 11 (1977)).
25. In the aftermath of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), some conservative Protestants have interpreted these verses as requiring fines for causing premature birth and the death penalty for causing either miscarriage or the death of the mother.
26. See, e.g., H. Wayne House, Miscarriage or Premature Birth: Additional Thoughts on Exodus 21: 22-25, 41 WESTMINSTER THEOLOGICAL J. 108, 112 (1978).
27. However, this alternative interpretation seems to have been unconvincing to most of those outside the pro-life community. See, e.g., Carlton W. Veazey & Marjorie Brahms Signer, Religious Perspectives on the Abortion Decision: The Sacredness of Women's Lives, Morality and Values, and Social Justice, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 281, 296 (2011)
28. See, e.g., Charles F. Home, Introduction to THE CODE OF HAMMURABI, supra note 31, at 1 ("[A]ll the heavier crimes [were] made punishable with death."); Exodus 21: 12 (King James) ("He that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall be surely put to death.").
29. See Cyril C. Means, Jr., The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335, 338 (1971),
30. cited with approval in Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1328 (Mass. 1984).
31. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: CONCERNING HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER PLEAS OF THE CROWN, AND CRIMINAL CAUSES 50 (1680).
32. For the definition of in rerum natura, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 865 (9th ed. 2009).
33. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-33 (1973). The Roe Court was most interested in the common law's approach to abortion regulations, but its explanation of why the common law did not criminalize the abortion of fetuses before quickening is pertinent to an understanding of the common law's approach to other types of fetal injuries as well.
34. Unborn Victims of Violence Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 1841, 10 U.S.C. § 919a (2012).
35. See, e.g., The So-Called "Unborn Victims of Violence Act" Does Not Protect Women or Children, NAT'L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN (Mar. 5, 2004), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/issues/unborn-victirns-of-violence- act/the-socalled-unborn-victims-of-violence-act-does-not-protect-women-or- children-l.php
36. see also Joanne Pedone, Note, Filling the Void: Model Legislation for Fetal Homicide Crimes, 43 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 77, 95 (2009)("Opponents also feared that laws like the UWA would promote the concept of a fetus having its own right to life and health, and, even if they did not directly undermine abortion rights, they would at least create situations where the government would increasingly interfere with the woman's freedom to assure the well-being of her fetus.").
37. Legislation that would presumably close this exception has been proposed from time to time. See, e.g., Sanctity of Human Life Act, H.R. 212, 112th Cong. (2011).
38. This is a reference to the much-discussed 2004 case in which Scott Peterson was convicted in California of murdering his wife, Laci, and her viable fetus. People v. Peterson, No. 1056770 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004). Peterson was convicted on two counts of violating section 187 of the California Penal Code, which defined murder as "the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought."
39. Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
40. Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (second alteration in original).
41. Id. at 623 (footnote omitted). Shuai contested the reliability of the coroner's conclusion that Angel died of maternal rat poison ingestion and succeeded in convincing the judge hearing the case that the coroner's report should not be admitted at trial. See Charles Wilson, Bei Bei Shuai Trial: Rat Poison Link to Newborn's Death 'Unreliable, 'Judge Rules, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan 23, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/24/bei-bei-shuai-pregnant-rat- poison-unreliable-n-2541222.html.
42. See Stafford, supra note 12. Shuai was also required to wear an electronic ankle monitor while awaiting trial. See Diana Penner, Shuai Freed on Guilty Plea, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 3, 2013, at A1.
43. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 630. The primary authority the court cited for the proposition that "[o]ther states have advanced this common law immunity for pregnant women" was the Florida Supreme Court's State v. Ashley opinion. Id; see infra Part II.B.
44. Bei Bei Shuai Pleads Guilty in Baby's Death, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 2, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/02/bei-bei-shuai-guilty-n-3698383. html.
45. Shuai had previously filed a petition for transfer to the Supreme Court of Indiana to further challenge the legality of the prosecution against her, but the court unanimously denied the petition on May 11, 2012. See Shuai v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1035 (table).
46. State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 339 (Fla. 1997) (per curiam).
47. Id. at 340 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Carey, 56 A. 632, 636 (Conn. 1904)).
48. See id. at 341 (citing Gaines v. Wolcott, 167 S.E.2d 366, 370 (Ga. Ct. App. 1969)).
49. See id. at 343 (Harding, J., specially concurring). Historically, some American jurisdictions did criminalize attempts to obtain an illegal abortion. For example, during the nineteenth century, "the legislatures of fifteen states declared that a woman who solicited or submitted to an abortion had committed a criminal act. However no reported cases reflect the actual enforcement of these provisions against women." Samuel W. Buell, Note, Criminal Abortion Revisited, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1774, 1785 (1991) (footnote omitted).
50. Generally speaking, to the extent that the various states criminalized abortion, they focused on the culpability of the abortion provider, not the woman receiving the abortion. See id. at 1783-95. In part, this is because, as a practical matter, "it was a nearly impossible task to convict an abortionist without the testimony of the woman." Ashley Gorski, Note, The Author of Her Trouble: Abortion in Nineteenth- and Early Twentieth-Century Judicial Discourses, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 431, 443 (2009). Although Roe v. Wade and its progeny have significantly limited the extent to which states may criminalize abortion prior to viability, criminal abortion statutes may be constitutional as applied to pregnant women who illegally abort their viable fetuses, provided that such criminal statutes do not impose an undue burden on women seeking legal abortions. See infra Part III.C.
51. Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 381, 382 (2008)
52. see also, e.g., Dawn Johnsen, Front Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 214-15 (1989)
53. Lynn M. Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Roe v. Wade, 62 ALB. L. REV. 999, 1044-54(1999).
54. For example, as early as 1988, Charleston obstetrics patients suspected of using drugs were routinely subjected to urine tests without their knowledge or consent pursuant to a policy developed by a local hospital in collaboration with local law enforcement. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70-73 (2001). Those women who tested positive for drugs were referred to the authorities for prosecution. Id. at 72-73. The Ferguson Court found this practice a violation of the patients' Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches. Id. at 84-86.
55. See State Policies in Brief: Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, GUTTMACHER INST. (Dec. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-SADP. pdf.
56. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003). To be specific, "McKnight was sentenced to twenty years, suspended to service of twelve years." Id. at 171.
57. Cf. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971).
58. See McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354 (S.C. 2008).
59. See Lynn Paltrow & Kathrine Jack, Pregnant Women, Junk Science, and Zealous Defense, CHAMPION, May 2010, at 30, 30-31.
60. See, e.g., State v. Aiwohi, 123 P. 3d 1210, 1225 (Haw. 2005) (manslaughter)
61. Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Ky. 1993) (child abuse)
62. State v. Stegall, 828 N.W.2d 526, 533 (N.D. 2013) (child endangerment)
63. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710, 713 (Ohio 1992) (child endangerment).
64. See Gibbs v. State, 2010-IA-00819-SCT (Miss. 2011) (dismissing Rennie Gibbs's interlocutory appeal as improvidently granted); Calhoun, supra note 18. The Supreme Court of Mississippi recently affirmed the dismissal of a "fatally flawed" indictment of a woman named Nina Buckhalter who was charged with similar conduct as Rennie Gibbs.
65. See State v. Buckhalter, 2012-CA-00725-SCT (⊥⊥ 1, 16) (Miss. 2013), 119 So. 3d 1015, 1019. However, the court declined to address the merits of Ms. Buckhalter's constitutional arguments against the prosecution. See id.
66. See April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarceration of Pregnant Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 154 (2007)("[T]he nation's leading medical associations, including the American Medical Association, the American Academy of Pediatrics, and the American Public Health Association, have all opposed punitive measures against pregnant women who use drugs. Their opposition is due in part to their understanding that such measures will deter women from accessing much needed prenatal care and that the absence of such care certainly will have deleterious consequences for both maternal and fetal health.").
67. Recall that the prosecution against Bei Bei Shuai represents "the first time in Indiana's history⋯ [that] the State decided to prosecute a woman for murder of her child based on her conduct during her pregnancy." Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)(Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
68. Cf. Kilmon v. State, 905 A.2d 306, 311-12 (Md. 2006)(finding that, in seeking to determine whether a woman could be charged with reckless endangerment of a child for ingesting cocaine during a pregnancy, "criminal liability would depend almost entirely on how aggressive, inventive, and persuasive any particular prosecutor might be").
69. See, e.g., State v. Cotton, 5 P. 3d 918, 925 (Ariz. 2000)
70. People v. Taylor, 86 P. 3d 881, 886 (Cal. 2004)
71. Brinkley v. State, 322 S.E.2d 49, 53 (Ga. 1984).
72. See generally Douglas S. Curran, Note, Abandonment and Reconciliation: Addressing Political and Common Law Objections to Fetal Homicide Laws, 58 DUKE L.J. 1107, 1139-41 (2009).
73. See, e.g., Mary Beth Hickcox-Howard, Note, The Case for Pro-Choice Participation in Drafting Fetal Homicide Laws, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 317, 338-39 (2008)(discussing a Texas case in which a man claimed his girlfriend asked him to assault her to end her pregnancy after she had been told that her pregnancy was too far advanced for her to be able to obtain a legal abortion).
74. People v. Davis, 872 P. 2d 591 (Cal. 1994). Although the plain language of the Virginia statute seems to indicate that it only applies during the postembryonic stage of development, the statute has not yet been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
75. *2 In. 17 (Ala. Jan. 11, 2013).
76. See TRENT H. BAGGET, LEGISLATIVE UPDATE 2006, at 10-11, available at http://www.digitalprairie.ok.gov/cdm/compoundobject/collection/stgovpub/id/1621/ rec/229.
77. See generally Valena Elizabeth Beety, Mississippi Initiative 26: Personhood and the Criminalization of Intentional and Unintentional Acts by Pregnant Women, 81 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 55 (2011).
78. See Maya Manian, Lessons from Personhood's Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on Women's Health, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 75, 79-81 (2013)
79. Grace Wyler, Personhood Movement Continues to Divide Pro-Life Activists, TIME (July 24, 2013), http://www.nation.time.com/2013/07/24/personhood- rnovernent-continues-to-divide-pro-life-activists/.
80. See Manian, supra note 166, at 86-89. Although it is true that the Supreme Court upheld personhood-type language in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), the relevant statute did not actually impose any practical obstacles to a woman's exercise of her right to obtain a legal abortion. Id. at 505-06.
81. See In re Initiative Petition No. 395, State Question No. 761, 286 P. 3d 637, 637-38 (Okla. 2012)
82. (holding that a proposed personhood initiative was "clearly unconstitutional pursuant to Planned Parenthood v. Casey"), cert, denied, Personhood Okla.v. Barber, 133 S. Ct. 528 (2012) (mem.).
83. In March 2013, several news outlets reported, somewhat misleadingly, that North Dakota had become the first state to enact a fetal personhood amendment. See, e.g., Laura Bassett, North Dakota Personhood Measure Passes State House, HUFFTNGTON POST (Mar. 22, 2013, 4:02 PM EDT), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 2013/03/22/north-dakota-personhood-n-2934503.html. However, the amendment is currently pending voter approval in November 2014. See id. If approved, it would be the first such amendment successfully enacted into law. See id.
84. See NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. & NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., WHO DECIDES?: THE STATUS OF WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 66 (22d ed. 2013), available at http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/assets/download-files/2013- who-decides.pdf (giving New York a grade of "A-" in its 2013 Report Card on Women's Reproductive Rights).
85. William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, in N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.40, at 59, 60 (McKinney 2009)(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
86. See Anemona Hartocollis, After Fetus Is Found in Trash, a Rare Charge of Self-Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2011, at A32 (indicating that between 1980 and 2011 only five women had been charged for violating one of the statutes).
87. See id. Those charges were ultimately dropped, but not until the woman's name - and the circumstances of her alleged self-abortion - had been widely reported in the mainstream media, severely undermining any right to privacy the woman may have had in choosing to abort what was likely a previable fetus. See DA Drops Self-Abortion Case Vs. NYC Woman, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 31, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/04/da-drops-self-abortion-ca-n-1183152. html.
88. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 IND. L.J. 667, 696 (2006).
89. NARAL PRO-CHOICE AM. FOUND., supra note 169, at 10. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. Although most of these criminal bans were enacted before Roe v. Wade, Louisiana's criminal abortion ban was not enacted until 1991. Id. Other criminal bans enacted after Roe have been struck down on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1996)(per curiam) (holding that the unconstitutional portion of a Utah statute purporting to ban abortions prior to twenty weeks of gestation in all but five enumerated circumstances was severable from a similar constitutional provision that applied to abortions after twenty weeks of gestation).
90. See Suzanne M. Alford, Note, Is Self-Abortion a Fundamental Right?, 52 DUKE L.J. 1011, 1012 (2003).
91. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. V. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992)(O'Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
92. Cf. Dawn Johnsen, Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 580-81 (1992) ("Traditionally, the law did not treat the fetus as a separate entity in contexts that would create an adversarial relationship between a pregnant woman and the fetus within her. Rather, the law recognized the fetus as a legal entity only for carefully defined purposes, with a view toward protecting and promoting the interests of women as well as their children.").
93. See, e.g., Brief Submitted in Support of Appellant Bei Bei Shuai by Amici Curiae Am. Ass'n of Suicidology et al. at 18-22, Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (No. 49A02-1106-CR-486), 2011 WL 3892890 [hereinafter Shuai AAS Brief].
94. See Eleanor J. Bader, Criminalizing Pregnancy: How Feticide Laws Made Common Ground for Pro- and Anti-Choice Groups, TRUTHOUT (June 14, 2012, 11:18 AM), http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/9772-criminalizing-pregnancy-how- feticide-laws-made-common-ground-for-pro-and-anti-choice-groups.
95. See Miscarriage, MEDLINEPLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/ article/001488.htm (last updated Oct. 31, 2013). "A miscarriage is the spontaneous loss of a fetus before the 20th week," while the loss of a pregnancy after that point is a "preterm delivery." Id. Accordingly, the statistic above describes losses of preterm fetuses only.
96. In one influential study, "[20%] of the patients who had miscarried showed a grief reaction, 12% showed a depressive reaction, and 20% responded with a combined depressive and grief reaction." Manfred Beutel, Rainer Deckardt, Michael von Rad & Herbert Weiner, Grief and Depression After Miscarriage: Their Separation, Antecedents, and Course, 57 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 517, 517 (1995).
97. Alison Tsao, Note, Fetal Homicide Laws: Shield Against Domestic Violence or Sword to Pierce Abortion Rights?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 459 (1998).
98. State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 343 (Fla. 1997)(Harding, J., specially concurring).
99. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics, Comm. Op. No. 321, Maternal Decision Making, Ethics, and the Law, 106 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1127, 1134 (1995). See generally text accompanying supra notes 109-11 (describing Whitner).
100. See Shuai AAS Brief, supra note 199 (citing AMA Bd. of Tr., Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667 (1990)).
101. See Johnsen, supra note 198, at 600 ("In the Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, the court described the level of governmental intrusion into a woman's life entailed by such a prosecution: 'In order to prosecute Ms. Pellegrini, the commonwealth must intrude into her most private areas, her inner body.' It also noted that 'the level of state intervention and control over a woman's body required by the prosecution' would set a dangerous precedent for numerous other pregnancy related restrictions on women.") (footnotes omitted) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pellegrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 6, 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990), rev'd, 608 N.E.2d 717 (Mass. 1993)).
102. Dave Stafford, Shuai Case Resolved, Thorny Legal Issues Remain, IND. LAW., Aug. 14-27, 2013, at 1.