Tort law in the age of statutes

Iowa Law Review

Volumn 99, Issue 3, 2014, Pages 967-1020

  Geistfeld, Mark A ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 84897584566     PISSN: 00210552     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (150)

1. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
2. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, at 28 (1982).
3. Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 335 (1985) (using this characterization to justify reforming the regulatory compliance defense).
4. Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J. TORT L., Dec. 2006, at 3, available at http://www.degruyter.com/view/j/jtl.
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Federal Preemption of State Tort Law: A Snapshot of the Ongoing Debate, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1127-1275 (2010);
6. Symposium, Ordering State-Federal Relations Through Federal Preemption Doctrine, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 503-902 (2008).
7. See Robert F. Blomquist, The Trouble with Negligence Per Se, 61 S.C. L. REV. 221, 224 n.11 (2009) (observing that "only a few legal scholars in a smattering of articles have touched on the efficacy of the negligence per se doctrine" and then providing citations to eighteen articles that discuss the doctrine).
8. See, e.g., Symposium, Regulatory Compliance as a Defense to Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000).
9. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 319 (2000).
10. Edward F. Sherman, Federal Preemption of State Tort Law: Policies, Procedures, and Proposals of the ABA Task Force, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1127, 1128-29 (2010).
11. See Pliva, Inc. V. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (holding that federal law impliedly preempts state laws imposing a duty on manufacturers to change the warning label on generic drugs);
12. Am. Elec. Power Co. V. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011) (holding that federal environmental law displaces any federal common-law right to abate carbon dioxide emissions and leaving for consideration on remand the issue of whether federal law preempts related tort claims based on state nuisance law);
13. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011) (holding that a federal regulation permitting manufacturers to choose between two seatbelt options does not impliedly preempt state tort liability for defective design involving one of those options);
14. Breusewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068 (2011) (holding that the National Vaccine Act expressly preempts all state tort claims alleging that a vaccine is defectively designed).
15. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 232 (2000).
16. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Quasi-Preemption: Nervous Breakdown in Our Constitutional System, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1143 (2010).
17. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. Of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 345 (Cal. 1976)
18. superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013)
19. as recognized in Pedeferri v. Seidner Enters., 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013).
20. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006) (permitting individuals to recover tort damages for the physical harms caused by the negligent or wrongful act of a government employee "while acting within the scope of his office or employment"), with id. § 2680(a) (stating that the provisions of § 1346(b) do not apply to negligence claims "based upon . . . The failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government").
21. Cf. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 810 (1984) (observing that Congress adopted the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act even though "[i]t was believed that claims of the kind embraced by the discretionary function exception would have been exempted from the waiver of sovereign immunity by judicial construction").
22. See N.Y. JUD. CT. ACTS LAW § 8 (McKinney 1963) ("The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same rules of law as applied to actions in the supreme court against individuals or corporations, provided the claimant complies with the limitations of this article.").
23. Weiss v. Fote, 167 N.E.2d 63, 65-66 (N.Y. 1960) (citations omitted);
24. see also Friedman v. State, 493 N.E.2d 893, 898-900 (N.Y. 1986) (applying this rule in a case filed against the New York State Department of Transportation).
25. Clinkscales v. Carver, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (Cal. 1943) (citations omitted).
26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. C (2010).
27. For example, some state statutes have codified the common-law tort rules of products liability, in which case the plaintiff sues under the statute and not the common law of torts. E.g., IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-2-29 to 34-20-9-1 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012) (specifying the rules governing all actions brought by a user or consumer against a manufacturer or seller for physical harm caused by a product).
28. Blomquist, supra note 9, at 223; see also, e.g., Henry H. Drummonds, The Dance of Statutes and the Common Law: Employment, Alcohol, and Other Torts, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 939, 939 (2000) ("Doctrinal confusion plagues the efforts of lawyers, judges, and law professors to elucidate consistent rules and analyses affecting the private liability of persons who breach statutory commands." (footnote omitted));
29. Michael Traynor, Public Sanctions, Private Liability, and Judicial Responsibility, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 787, 792 (2000) ("Courts . . . have not developed any systematic theory for dealing with the challenging problem of . . . When and for what reasons courts should provide civil remedies for statutory wrongs.").
30. Gorris v. Scott, [1874] 9 L.R. Exch. 125 (Eng.).
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14.
32. See, e.g., Clarence Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability, 46 HARV. L. REV. 453, 476-77 (1933). Prior to Gorris, these limitations had been recognized in the United States.
33. See Langlois v. Buffalo & Rochester R.R. Co., 19 Barb. 364, 370 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1854) (holding that the violation of a railroad fencing statute intended to protect animals such as cattle or horses did not constitute negligence per se in a claim involving human death or injury). Referring to these requirements as the "Gorris rule" instead reflects the case's authoritative statement of the rule.
34. Cf. 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 17.6, at 722 (3d ed. 2007) (describing Gorris v. Scott as "the leading case" for the rule "that the court in adopting the legislative judgment as to the standard [of reasonable care] should also adopt the legislature's judgment as to the limits" of the rule).
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. f.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(a) (1998).
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. D. (observing that "the conduct of motorists is extensively dealt with by statutes and regulations; accordingly, in most highway-accident cases, findings of negligence depend on ascertaining which party has violated the relevant provisions of the state's motor-vehicle code"). Motor-vehicle regulations in the United States, therefore, create a duty to the private classes of motorists and pedestrians.
38. Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co., [1923] 1 K.B. 539 at 547 (Eng.).
39. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 cmt. E ("[W]hen a court finds that permitting tort actions would be inconsistent with the statute's design or purpose, imposing a tort duty is improper.").
40. Recognizing this problem, Professor Ezra Thayer in his classic article on negligence per se argued that the doctrine is limited to statutes that forbid objectionable conduct, unlike statutes that require affirmative acts (such as the removal of snow) for the protection of others. Ezra Ripley Thayer, Public Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317, 329 (1914). Thayer's reasoning, however, is problematic because courts have relied on safety statutes or regulations to create affirmative tort duties. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 ("When a statute requires an actor to act for the protection of another, the court may rely on the statute to decide that an affirmative duty exists and to determine the scope of the duty.").
41. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (5th ed. 1984).
42. Harned v. Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5, 6 (Alaska 1983).
43. See Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189, 204 (1952) ("When a legislature displays no specially restrictive interest in condemning dangerous conduct in a criminal statute, the statutory purpose rule is a foreseeability requirement.");
44. Ariel Porat, Expanding Liability for Negligence Per Se, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 979, 990-91 (2009) (developing this argument further).
45. An actor's failure to comply with customary safety practices "is evidence of the actor's negligence but does not require a finding of negligence." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 13(b) (2010). In Harned, by contrast, the court concluded as a matter of law that the safety standard defined "the relevant standard of care."
46. Harned, 665 P.2d at 14.
47. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. f.
48. R. V. Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 S.C.R. 205, 211 (Can.) (emphasis added).
49. Cf. Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. V. Milk Mktg. Bd., [1984] A.C. 130 (Eng.) (concluding that a tortious action for breach of statutory duty is available for claims alleging a violation of competition law under article 86 of the Treaty of Rome).
50. Id. At 211-12 (emphasis added) (quoting London Passenger Transp. Bd. V. Upson, [1949] A.C. 155 at 168 (Eng.)).
51. B.S. MARKESINIS & S.F. DEAKIN, TORT LAW 337 (4th ed. 1999).
52. See generally Caroline Forell, Statutes and Torts: Comparing the United States to Australia, Canada, and England, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 865 (2000) (analyzing the interrelationships between statutory and tort law in England and the United States).
53. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. V. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979) (discussing the various factors that courts use to determine whether a federal statute creates an implied cause of action while recognizing that "[t]he question of the existence of a statutory cause of action is, of course, one of statutory construction").
54. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 reporters' note cmt. D (2010).
55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 14 cmt. i (explaining that the violation of a statute is relevant to duty analysis and can lead courts to recognize a duty that they would not otherwise recognize absent the statute).
56. See id. § 7 (defining the general duty of reasonable care); Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment: Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 148-56 (2011) (explaining why the element of duty defines the category of risks governed by the standard of reasonable care).
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29 (defining scope of liability or proximate cause to limit "[a]n actor's liability . . . To those harms that result from the risks that made the actor's conduct tortious").
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 reporters' note cmt. E.
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 38 cmt. C.
60. Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Reshaping the Traditional Limits of Affirmative Duties Under the Third Restatement of Torts, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 319, 331 (2011).
61. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW: THE ESSENTIALS 152-79 (2008) (discussing the factors that determine the existence of the tort duty).
62. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Social Value as a Policy-Based Limitation of the Ordinary Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 899, 917 (2009) (showing how courts will limit duty out of the concern that the uncertainty in application is likely to have an overly negative impact on socially valuable forms of behavior).
63. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. Of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-47 (Cal. 1976)
64. superseded by statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West 2007 & Supp. 2013)
65. as recognized in Pedeferri v. Seidner Enters., 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); See also supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (discussing the case).
66. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 347.
67. See, e.g., Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959) (holding that the common-law bar to recovery for drunk-driving accident caused by the inebriated patron of defendant's tavern did not bar recovery for negligence liability based on violation of state's dram shop statute and providing extensive discussion of cases from other jurisdictions reaching the same conclusion).
68. See, e.g., Cuyler v. United States, 362 F.3d 949, 952 (7th Cir. 2004) ("A conventional principle of tort law . . . is that if a statute defines what is due care in some activity, the violation of the statute either conclusively or . . . Presumptively establishes that the violator failed to exercise due care. But the statutory definition does not come into play unless the tort plaintiff establishes that the defendant owes a duty of care to the person he injured . . . because tort liability depends on the violation of a duty of care to the person injured by the defendant's wrongful conduct." (citations omitted)).
69. City of Norwalk v. Tuttle, 76 N.E. 617, 618 (Ohio 1906).
70. Lopatkovich v. City of Tiffin, 503 N.E.2d 154, 157 (Ohio 1986).
71. City of Norwalk, 76 N.E. At 618.
72. Perry v. S.N., 973 S.W.2d 301, 306 (Tex. 1998).
73. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (2010).
74. Thoma v. Kettler Bros., 632 A.2d 725, 730 (D.C. 1993).
75. "The actor's conduct is . . . Negligent if the magnitude of the risk outweighs the burden of risk prevention." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmt.
76. Harned v. Dura Corp., 665 P.2d 5, 13-14 (Alaska 1983).
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
78. Harned, 665 P.2d at 13-14.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 15 cmt. A (2010) (also observing that the "concept of 'excuse' includes what the criminal law would refer to as a combination of excuses and 'justifications'").
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 15 cmt. f;
81. See generally Barbara Kritchevsky, Tort Law Is State Law: Why Courts Should Distinguish State and Federal Law in Negligence-Per-Se Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 71 (2010) (discussing cases in which courts apply negligence per se by relying on violations of municipal ordinances and federal statutes).
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
83. Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2147, 2150-52 (2000) (describing "the historical origins of the asymmetrical judicial treatment of compliance and noncompliance").
84. - 2 AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY: ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY (1991) [hereinafter ALI STUDY].
85. For arguments that rely on the relative institutional competence of administrative regulators to justify greater judicial reliance on the regulatory compliance defense, see Richard C. Ausness et al., Providing a Safe Harbor for Those Who Play by the Rules: The Case for a Strong Regulatory Compliance Defense, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 115, 132 (2008) (arguing that "[t]he first, and most powerful, argument for greater judicial deference to regulatory standards is that legislative bodies and regulatory agencies are better equipped than courts to formulate effective safety standards"); Noah, supra note 124, at 2153-57 (challenging the claim that failures in the administrative process justify rejection of regulatory compliance as a defense);
86. Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual-Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167 (2000) (supporting arguments advanced by the ALI Study).
87. For arguments that administrative regulations do not necessarily have a clear institutional advantage in regulating risks, thereby leaving an important role for tort liability, see Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1027, 1064-70 (1990) (relying on flaws in the regulatory process as an objection to the regulatory compliance defense);
88. Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 508 (1997) (identifying limitations of the federal regulatory scheme for drug safety and concluding that "complete immunity from suit based on FDA approval or even compliance with FDA regulations seems ill-advised");
89. Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049 (2000) (relying on flaws in the regulatory process as an objection to the regulatory compliance defense);
90. Carl Tobias, FDA Regulatory Compliance Reconsidered, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1003 (2008) (same).
91. Grand Trunk Ry. Co. V. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 427 (1892).
92. See Paul Dueffert, Note, The Role of Regulatory Compliance in Tort Actions, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 175, 180-88 (1989) (discussing the historical development of the regulatory compliance defense).
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
94. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(b) (1998).
95. See id. § 2(b)-(c) (defining design and warning defects in terms of the risk-utility test). Although most jurisdictions rely on the consumer expectations test, this inquiry reduces to the risk-utility test for evaluating products that do not malfunction. See MARK A. GEISTFELD, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 90-103 (2012).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965).
97. Gigliotti v. N.Y., Chi. & St. Louis R.R. Co., 157 N.E.2d 447, 451 (Ohio Ct. App. 1958);
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C.
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. E (1998) (emphasis added).
100. Because the Restatement (Third) does not expressly justify its formulation of the regulatory compliance defense with the principle of deference, a jurisdiction can reject the Restatement (Third) rule without necessarily rejecting the formulation of the rule based on deference. To date, the highest court in only one state has expressly rejected the Restatement (Third) rule, doing so because it "conflicts with the core principles of Montana's strict products liability law." Malcolm v. Evenflo Co., 217 P.3d 514, 522 (Mont. 2009).
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(a).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. E.
103. FDA SUBCOMM. ON SCI. & TECH., FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK 1 (2007).
104. Cf. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 493 F. Supp. 2d 571, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("[L]awyers and their clients often find themselves serving as drug safety researchers of last resort."
105. Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jerry Avorn, The Role of Litigation in Defining Drug Risks, 297 JAMA 308, 311 (2007))).
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. E (1998).
107. e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(1)(b) (2005) (creating a rebuttable presumption that a product is not defective if it complied with a federal or Colorado state statute or administrative regulation).
108. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 345 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
109. Cf. Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1013, 1019 (2007) (finding that "state courts, which by and large have previously rejected any absolute regulatory compliance defense. . . . Are now willing to entertain preemption arguments").
110. Robert L. Rabin, Territorial Claims in the Domain of Accidental Harm: Conflicting Conceptions of Tort Preemption, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 987, 989 (2009).
111. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.020(1) (2008) ("The previous existing applicable law of this state on product liability is modified only to the extent set forth in this chapter.").
112. U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2. "The Supreme Court has repeatedly identified the Supremacy Clause as the source of its authority to declare state law displaced (preempted)." Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 733 (2008).
113. Altria Grp., Inc. V. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)
114. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. V. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
115. Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The Normalization of Product Preemption Doctrine, 57 ALA. L. REV. 725, 725-26 (2006) (paragraph structure added and footnotes omitted).
116. Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 450 (2008).
117. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 768 (1994).
118. David A. Dana, Democratizing the Law of Federal Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 507, 509 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
119. Peter H. Schuck, FDA Preemption of State Tort Law in Drug Regulation: Finding the Sweet Spot, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 73, 79 (2008) (footnotes omitted).
120. Samuel Issacharoff, Federalized America: Reflections on Erie v. Tompkins and State-Based Regulation 23 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Working Paper No. 324, 2012), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1328&context=nyu-lewp.
121. William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1549 (2007).
122. Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theory, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 206 (2008).
123. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (citation omitted) (discussing other instances of preemption as well, none of which matter for present purposes).
124. For insightful discussion of these issues, see Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism Accountability: "Agency-Forcing" Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125 (2009);
125. Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, 110 MICH. L. REV. 521 (2012).
126. Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 397 (2012) (citations omitted) (describing these executive orders).
127. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131 (2011).
128. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874-75 (2000).
129. Williamson, 131 S. Ct. At 1134 (describing the regulation in Geier).
130. Id. (citing Geier, 529 U.S. At 874-75).
131. Id. At 1136 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998). Other than the occupants of the vehicle, no one else is foreseeably affected by the presence or absence of an airbag.
133. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 877-78 (2000) (citations omitted).
134. Geier, 529 U.S. At 879 (citations omitted).
135. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. E;
136. Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1131, 1139 (2011) (citations omitted).
137. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 cmt. E.
138. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (alterations in original)
139. (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Mary J. Davis, The "New" Presumption Against Preemption, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1217, 1252 (2010).
141. Rules for resolving textual ambiguities that favor one plausible interpretation over a competing plausible interpretation are commonly applied by courts. In insurance law, for example, "[t]he most frequently employed principle of interpretation . . . is contra proferentem ("against the drafter")-the rule that an ambiguous provision in an insurance policy is interpreted against the drafter. . . . Literally thousands of reported decisions have applied this rule." KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 36 (4th ed. 2005).
142. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 345 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
143. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 16(a)
144. Pliva, Inc. V. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2573 (2011).
145. (quoting Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000)).
146. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009)
147. (quoting Medtronic, Inc. V. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
148. So formulated, the presumption against preemption is not affected by Mensing's interpretation of the Supremacy Clause, which "suggests that courts should not strain to find ways to reconcile federal law with seemingly conflicting state law." Mensing, 131 S. Ct. At 2580.
149. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 132 (2004).
150. ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 205 (1999) (footnote omitted).