Supplier-induced demand for newborn treatment: Evidence from Japan

Journal of Health Economics

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 162-178

  Shigeoka, Hitoshi ^a   Fushimi, Kiyohide ^b  

^a SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b TOKYO MEDICAL AND DENTAL UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Birth weight manipulation; H51; Hospital gaming; I10; L20; Neonatal intensive care unit; Prospective payment system; Supplier induced demand

Indexed keywords

CHILD CARE; DEMAND ANALYSIS; HOSPITAL SECTOR; NEONATE;

ARTICLE; BIRTH WEIGHT; FEMALE; HEALTH CARE NEED; HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION; HUMAN; INSURANCE; JAPAN; LENGTH OF STAY; MALE; NEWBORN; NEWBORN CARE; NEWBORN INTENSIVE CARE; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT; REIMBURSEMENT; ECONOMICS; FRAUD; HEALTH ECONOMICS; HEALTH SERVICE; LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE; REGRESSION ANALYSIS; STATISTICS AND NUMERICAL DATA; TRENDS; UTILIZATION;

JAPAN;

BIRTH WEIGHT; ECONOMICS, HOSPITAL; FRAUD; HEALTH SERVICES MISUSE; HEALTH SERVICES NEEDS AND DEMAND; HUMANS; INFANT, NEWBORN; INSURANCE CLAIM REVIEW; INTENSIVE CARE UNITS, NEONATAL; JAPAN; LENGTH OF STAY; PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM; REGRESSION ANALYSIS;

EID: 84897495539     PISSN: 01676296     EISSN: 18791646     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2014.03.003     Document Type: Article

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