Land-use planning and the question of unintended consequences

Advances in Austrian Economics

Volumn 16, Issue , 2011, Pages 265-288

  Moroni, Stefano ^a  

^a POLITECNICO DI MILANO   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84896944396     PISSN: 15292134     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1108/S1529-2134(2012)0000016013     Document Type: Article

References (95)

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