Bureaucratic delay, local-level monitoring, and delivery of small infrastructure projects: Evidence from a field experiment in Bolivia

World Development

Volumn 59, Issue , 2014, Pages 394-407

  Yanez Pagans, Monica ^a   Machicado Salas, Gustavo ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b Institute for Advanced Development Studies   (Bolivia)

Author keywords

Accountability; Bolivia; Bureaucratic delay; Local level monitoring; Transparency

Indexed keywords

ACCOUNTABILITY; BUREAUCRACY; DECENTRALIZATION; DEVELOPING WORLD; GRASSROOTS LEVEL; INFRASTRUCTURE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; LOCAL PARTICIPATION; PUBLIC SERVICE;

BOLIVIA;

EID: 84896037013     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.02.004     Document Type: Article

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