Genetically based handicap

Journal of Applied Philosophy

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 119-132

  Holland, Alan ^a  

^a LANCASTER UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

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EID: 84895172513     PISSN: 02643758     EISSN: 14685930     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-5930.00080     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. N. J. Zohar (1991) Prospects for ‘genetic therapy’- can a person benefit from being altered?, Bioethics 5 pp. 275-288
2. J. P. Kahn (1991) Genetic harm: bitten by the body that keeps you?, Bioethics 5 pp. 289-308
3. R. Elliot (1993) Identity and the ethics of gene therapy, Bioethics 7 pp. 29-40.
4. Sir C. Clothier (1992) Report of the Committee on the Ethics of Gene Therapy - the ‘Clothier Report’ (London, HMSO, Cm. 1788) p. 13, 4.3
5. Nuffield Council on Bioethics (1993) Genetic Screening: Ethical Issues (London, Nuffield Council on Bioethics) pp. 17-18, 3.10.
6. Quoted in J. K. Mason & R. A. McCall Smith (1994) Law and Medical Ethics 4th edn. (London, Butterworths) pp. 150, 151.
7. Discussed in R. Gillon (1986) Philosophical Medical Ethics, ch. 1.
8. Mason & McCall Smith op. cit., p. 153 (cf. p. 154).
9. Mason & McCall Smith op. cit. p. 161.
10. And in the US courts, at least, damages have been awarded following the births of infants with both Tay- Sachs and Down’s, implying legal approval of pre-natal termination (Mason & McCall Smith, op. cit., pp. 134-135).
11. Op. cit., p. 25, 3.42.
12. E. Schroedinger (1992) What is Life? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) pp. 20-22.
13. Evelyn Fox Keller (1995) Refiguring Life (New York, Columbia University Press) p. 81.
14. R. Dawkins (1988) The Blind Watchmaker (Harmondsworth, Penguin), ch. 5, p. 111.
15. Clothier, (1988) The Blind Watchmaker (Harmondsworth, Penguin), ch. 5, p. 1.
16. Gould, (1988) The Blind Watchmaker (Harmondsworth, Penguin), ch. 5, p. 133.
17. Dawkins, (1988) The Blind Watchmaker (Harmondsworth, Penguin), ch. 5, p. 130.
18. See K. Sterelny, K. C. Smith and M. Dickison (1996) The Extended Replicator, Biology and Philosophy, 11, p. 396.
19. See further A. Holland (1998) Species are dead. Long live genes! in A. Holland and A. Johnson (eds.) Animal Biotechnology and Ethics (London, Chapman & Hall).
20. B. Steinbock and R. McClamrock (1994) When is Birth Unfair to the Child?, Hastings Center Report, 24, no. 6, pp. 15-21.
21. B. Steinbock and R. McClamrock (1994) When is Birth Unfair to the Child?, Hastings Center Report, 24, no. 6, p. 17.
22. They cite as one example an imagined case where someone who is framed by a District Attorney goes on to become ‘rich and famous’ by writing a book about the episode (p. 19).
23. J. R. Botkin (1995) Fetal privacy and confidentiality, Hastings Center Report 25, no. 5, pp. 32-39.
24. J. Glover (1989) Fertility and the Family (London, Fourth Estate Ltd.) p. 130.
25. J. Glover (1989) Fertility and the Family (London, Fourth Estate Ltd.), pp. 127-128.
26. See the discussion in Mason & McCall Smith, pp. 140-145.
27. Glover, op. cit., p. 131.
28. A similar principle of justification is provided by Parfit’s principle ‘Q’ - D. Parfit (1984) Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Oxford University Press), p. 360.
29. D. Parfit (1984) op. cit., Part 4, especially pp. 358-359.
30. Glover, op. cit., p. 131.
31. These responses to Glover complement arguments advanced against Parfit by James Woodward (1986) The Non-Identity Problem, Ethics 96, pp. 804-831
32. Matthew Hanser (1990) Harming Future People, Philosophy & Public Affairs 19, pp. 47-70.
33. R. Elliot (1997) Genetic therapy, person-regarding reasons and the determination of identity, Bioethics 11 pp. 151-160
34. I. Persson (1997) Genetic therapy, personregarding reasons and the determination of identity - a reply to Robert Elliot, Bioethics 11 pp. 161-169.
35. I. Persson (1997) Genetic therapy, personregarding reasons and the determination of identity - a reply to Robert Elliot, Bioethics 11, p. 133.
36. Parfit, too (1986 Comments on Woodward, Ethics 96, p. 861) clearly thinks that the decision would be less objectionable, at any rate, in the case where there is no alternative.
37. See A. Holland (1990) A fortnight of my life is missing, Journal of Applied Philosophy 7 pp. 25-37.