Genetic therapy, person-regarding reasons and the determination of identity

Bioethics

Volumn 11, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 151-160

  Elliot, Robert ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; ANALYTICAL APPROACH; ARTICLE; BENEFICENCE; BRAIN DISEASE; BRAIN INJURY; ETHICS; FETUS; FETUS DISEASE; GENE THERAPY; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; NEWBORN; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; PSYCHOLOGY; QUALITY OF LIFE; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY; SOCIOECONOMICS;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH;

ALTRUISM; BENEFICENCE; BRAIN DISEASES; BRAIN INJURIES; ETHICS; FETAL DISEASES; FETUS; GENE THERAPY; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; INFANT, NEWBORN; PERSONHOOD; PSYCHOLOGY; QUALITY OF LIFE; SOCIAL VALUES; VALUE OF LIFE;

EID: 0347769069     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8519.00051     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Ingmar Persson, 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person Regarding Reasons', Bioethics, 9:1, 1995, p. 17.
2. Persson distinguishes between a conceptus, a human being and a person. He thinks that the conceptus is not a human being. He thinks that a human being comes into existence only after the possibility of twinning has lapsed and only when the human organism satisfies certain morphological requirements. Persson allows that CT might impact on the identity of the human being just as it might impact on personal identity. Although I am disinclined to draw these distinctions in quite the way Persson does, I simply grant that in those cases where I think CT disrupts personal identity it does not likewise disrupt the identity of the human being - the animal.
3. 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person Regarding Reasons', pp. 18-19.
4. Persson's paper is in part a response to my, 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy', Bioethics, 7:1, 1993, pp. 27-40, in which I argue that CT does not alter the identity of the organism to which it is applied. So, I claim that while personal identity is altered, organismic identity is not altered.
5. Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person Regarding Reasons', p. 16.
6. Ibid., p. 22.
7. Ibid., p. 22.
8. Ibid., p. 23.
9. Ibid., p. 23.
10. Ibid., p. 23.
11. I would like to thank Nils Holtug for pointing out that such cases need to be considered.
12. Although, as Persson notes, not all would agree. See David Lewis, 'Survival and Identity', in his Philosophical Papers, vol. I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983, where it is argued that the slightest change in a life-history brings into existence a distinct person. There may be views that fall between Lewis' view and Persson's view that undermine the example involving Huntingdon's disease, but the response afforded by such views is not pursued here.
13. Thanks again to Nils Holtug for suggesting this defence of PC.
14. For a discussion of this distinction see Tyler Burge, 'Individualism and Psychology', Philosophical Review, 95:1, 1986, pp. 3-45, Frances Egan, 'Must Psychology be Individualistic?', Philosophical Review, 100:2, 1991, pp. 179-204. It is not feasible to provide an extended discussion of this response here but what I have said is, I hope, sufficient to enable readers to understand the line of argument involved.
15. For a discussion of this distinction see Tyler Burge, 'Individualism and Psychology', Philosophical Review, 95:1, 1986, pp. 3-45, Frances Egan, 'Must Psychology be Individualistic?', Philosophical Review, 100:2, 1991, pp. 179-204. It is not feasible to provide an extended discussion of this response here but what I have said is, I hope, sufficient to enable readers to understand the line of argument involved.
16. 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person Regarding Reasons', p. 23.
17. Ibid., p. 24.
18. Ibid., p. 28.
19. Ibid., p. 27.
20. Ibid., p. 29.