Pragmatism as post-postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey

Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism: Lessons from John Dewey

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-284

  Hickman, Larry ^a  

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References (172)

1. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), xviii.
2. Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father's House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992);
3. James Livingston, Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 214ff.
4. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, Sequel to History: Postmodernism and the Crisis of Representational Time (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
5. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, "Postmodernism," in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1998).
6. Appiah, In My Father's House, 143.
7. Ermarth, "Postmodernism."
8. Appiah, In My Father's House, 145.
9. See, for example, Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).
10. John Dewey, The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-1952, ed. Larry A. Hickman, rev. ed., vol. 1 (1871-1918) (Charlottesville, Va.: Intelex, 2005), 1893.05.10 (00478).
11. Dewey, Correspondence, 1891.05.31 (00069).
12. Metaphysics as system, of course, takes many forms. One interesting interpretation of what this might mean can be found in the essay on the subject by W. H. Walsh, "Metaphysics, Nature of," in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (Macmillan, 1967), 5: 302. According to Walsh, there are "three main features in the projected science of metaphysics. It claims to tell us what really exists or what the real nature of things is, it claims to be fundamental and comprehensive in a way in which no individual science is, and it claims to reach conclusions which are intellectually impregnable and thus possess a unique kind of certainty."
13. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 94.
14. T. Hugh Crawford, "An Interview with Bruno Latour," in Configurations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 254, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/configurations/v001/1.2crawford.html.
15. Ermarth, "Postmodernism."
16. Dewey, Correspondence, 1939.03.05 (08613).
17. Dewey, Correspondence, 1940.07.10 (14016).
18. Dewey, Correspondence, 1940.07.18 (14017).
19. Earlier versions of this essay were published under the same title in Metaphilosophy 35, nos. 1 and 2 (January 2004): 65-81, and in The Range of Pragmatism and the Limits of Philosophy, ed. Richard Shusterman (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004): 63-79.
20. Onora O'Neill, "Foreword," to Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction, ed. Nigel Dower and John Williams (New York: Routledge, 2002), xi.
21. Nigel Dower and John Williams, eds., Global Citizenship: A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2002), 5.
22. William James, Pragmatism, ed. Frederick Burkhardt and Fredson Bowers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 31-32.
23. William James, Pragmatism, 32.
24. Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press 1935), 5: 258. Whenever possible I will also cite the new-but not yet complete-edition of Peirce's writings. In the present case: Charles Sanders Peirce, The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, vol. 3, 1872-1878, ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 266.
25. William James, Pragmatism, 259.
26. Peirce, Collected Papers, 5:317.
27. James, Pragmatism, 97.
28. Stuart Sim, ed., The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 2001), 5. As Stuart Sim has noted, "There is what amounts to a commitment to finding, and dwelling on, dissimilarity, difference, and the unpredictability of analysis among poststructuralist thinkers."
29. William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, ed. Frederick Burkhardt and Fredson Bowers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), 26.
30. Thomas Dalton, Becoming John Dewey: Dilemmas of a Philosopher and Naturalist (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 65.
31. Charles Haddock Seigfried, "Socializing Democracy: Jane Addams and John Dewey," Philosophy of Social Sciences 29, no. 2 (1999): 213.
32. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Science and Civilization in Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 27.
33. Elizabeth Deeds Ermarth, "Postmodernism," in Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
34. Ian Hamilton Grant, "Postmodernism and Politics," in The Routledge Companion to Postmodernism, ed. Stuart Sim (London: Routledge, 2001), 30.
35. Emrys Westacott, "Relativism of Autonomy," The Philosophical Forum 27, no. 2 (1996): 131. Thanks to John Hartmann for calling my attention to this wonderfully concise statement of the position.
36. David Wong, "Relativism," in A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 442-50.
37. David Wong reminds us that "almost all polemics against moral relativism are directed at its most extreme versions." He advocates a position that holds that there is no single true morality, but at the same time he "does not deny that some moralities might be false and inadequate for the functions they all must perform." The position of this essay is that cognitive relativism is a form of moral relativism, since morality requires judgments. Moreover, it is an extreme form of relativism, since it provides no methodological basis for making such judgments. Wong, "Relativism," 446.
38. See Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, eds., Fundamentalisms and Society (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993) and Vine Deloria Jr., Red Earth, White Lies, Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Fact (New York: Scribner, 1995).
39. Rorty's address was published as "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism," in Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 160-75.
40. Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982): xviii.
41. James Livingston, Pragmatism and the Political Economy of Cultural Revolution, 1850-1940 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 214.
42. It could also be argued that Pragmatism is a "post-postmodernism," that is, that it has come to terms with many of the problems that continue to bedevil official postmodernism. See chapter 1, "Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism" for an extended discussion of this issue.
43. Emrys Westacott, "Relativism and Autonomy," The Philosophical Forum 27, no. 2 (1996): 131.
44. Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science (New York: Picador USA, 1998).
45. Jim Holt, "Fashionable Nonsense," New York Times Book Review, November 15, 1998, 8.
46. Rorty, Consequences, 51.
47. Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 83.
48. Ralph Sleeper, The Necessity of Pragmatism (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986), 1.
49. Larry A. Hickman, Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture: Putting Pragmatism to Work (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 98ff.
50. Konstantin Kolenda, Rorty's Humanistic Pragmatism: Philosophy Democratized (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1990), 37.
51. Richard Rorty, Rorty & Pragmatism, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995).
52. Steven Shapin, "Dear Prudence," London Review of Books, January 24, 2002, 25.
53. Hickman, Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture.
54. James Gouinlock, "What is the Legacy of Instrumentalism? Rorty's Interpretation of Dewey," in Rorty & Pragmatism, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr. (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), 72-90.
55. Richard Rorty, "Response to James Gouinlock," in Rorty & Pragmatism, ed. Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), 92.
56. This chapter first appeared as "Habermas's Unresolved Dualism: Zweckrationalität as Ideé Fixe," in Perspectives on Habermas, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago: Open Court, 2000), 501-13.
57. Jürgen Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), 91.
58. Jürgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).
59. Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964) as quoted by Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 86.
60. Habermas, Toward a Rational Society, 87.
61. Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 315.
62. Habermas, "Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences," 26.
63. Hans Joas, "The Unhappy Marriage of Hermeneutics and Functionalism," in Communicative Action, ed. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, trans. Jeremy Gaines and Doris L. Jones (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 101.
64. Alan Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1995), 357.
65. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 309.
66. Robert J. Antonio and Douglas Kellner, "Communication, Modernity, and Democracy in Habermas and Dewey," Symbolic Interaction 15 (1992): 277-97.
67. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, 309.
68. Robert J. Antonio and Douglas Kellner, "Communication, Modernity, and Democracy in Habermas and Dewey," Symbolic Interaction 15 (1992): 277-97
69. Jürgen Habermas, The Past as Future, ed. and trans. Max Pensky (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1994).
70. Antonio and Kellner, "Communication, Modernity, and Democracy in Habermas and Dewey," 280. "[Habermas's] Pragmatism is partial and contradictory, because of his nonhistorical standard of communicative rationality."
71. Hilary Putnam and Ruth Anna Putnam, "Education for Democracy," 361-76.
72. This chapter was first published in Philosophy of Technology: New Debates in the Democratization of Technology, ed. Tyler Veek (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 71-81.
73. See Joel Anderson, "The 'Third Generation' of the Frankfurt School," in Intellectual History Newsletter 22 (2000), http://www.phil.uu.nl/%7Ejoel/ research/publications/3rdGeneration.htm.
74. Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (London: Routledge, 1999), 136. Hereinafter in text and in notes as QT. Feenberg devotes about a half page to Dewey, but dismisses his view as exhibiting a "rather uncritical confidence in science and technology."
75. Anderson, "The 'Third Generation' of the Frankfurt School."
76. QT, xiii, 9. See also Andrew Feenberg, "Subversive Rationalization: Technology, Power, and Democracy," in Technology and the Politics of Knowledge, ed. Andrew Feenberg and Alastar Hannay (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 4.
77. Don Idhe's quote comes from Don Idhe, Technology and the Lifeworld (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990), 128.
78. See Melvin Kranzberg, "The Information Age," in Computers in the Human Context: Information Technology, Productivity and People," ed. Tom Forester (London: Blackwell, 1989), 30.
79. Feenberg, "Subversive Rationalization," 4.
80. Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977), 228.
81. Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), 197.
82. Larry A. Hickman, "Technology, Final Structures, and Focal Things," Review of Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, by Albert Borgmann, Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1992): 337-45.
83. Albert Borgmann, "Reply to Larry Hickman," Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1992): 346.
84. Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 9.
85. Larry A. Hickman, John Dewey's Pragmatic Technology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
86. Borgmann, "Reply to Larry Hickman," 345-47.
87. Borgmann, "Reply to Larry Hickman," 346.
88. Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, 219.
89. Earlier versions of this chapter were published as "Doing and Making in a Democracy: John Dewey's Experience of Technology," in Philosophy of Technology: Practical, Historical and Other Dimensions, Philosophy and Technology, ed. Paul T. Durbin (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 5: 97-111;
90. and in Philosophy of Technology, ed. Robert C. Scharff and Val Dusek (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003), 369-77.
91. As Hannah Arendt pointed out in her classic essay "The Vita Activa in the Modern Age," in The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 7-11, Aristotle's Metaphysics had placed the sciences of fabrication above the practical sciences but below the theoretical ones. She thought that this was so because for the Greeks the contemplation of the theoretical sciences was thought to be an inherent element in fabrication, that is, what allowed the craftsman to judge the finished product. The point of Dewey's critique of the Greeks was not that they did not give techne some of its due, but that they thought it secondary to grander technical forces, viz., supernature for Plato, and nature for Aristotle.
92. Plato, Timaeus and Critias, trans. Desmond Lee (New York: Penguin, 1983), 18.
93. Plato, Timaeus and Critias, 19.
94. Daniel Boorstin, The Discoverers (New York: Random House, 1983), 318.
95. Paolo Rossi, Philosophy, Technology and the Arts in the Early Modern Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), 35.
96. Stuart Hampshire, "Morality and Pessimism," in The Philosophy of Society, ed. R. Beehler and A. Drengson (London: Methuen, 1978), 32.
97. L. J. Beck, The Method of Descartes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 261-262.
98. Don Ihde, Existential Technics (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 25-46.
99. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. and ed. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 12.
100. Heidegger, The Question, 13.
101. This quotation is from Bertrand Russell, Religion and Science (New York: Henry Holt, 1935), 12. Although the statement serves Dewey's purpose in this essay, there remains an underlying disagreement with Russell. There is something of the "mental mirror" in Russell's epistemology. Dewey rejects this view out of hand.
102. This is a revised version of an essay by the same name published in Environmental Pragmatism, ed. Andrew Light and Eric Katz (London: Routledge, 1996), 50-72.
103. George Santayana, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," 251.
104. John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. P. A. Schilpp and L. E. Hahn, 3rd ed. (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), 532.
105. John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value," 532-33.
106. John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value," 534. The term "emanates" was Santayana's. Dewey allowed its usage in connection with his own view, provided that the "aura that clings to the word" be eliminated. See LW 14.19.
107. This is Frederic L. Bender's reading of James Lovelock. See Frederic L. Bender, "The Gaia Hypothesis: Philosophical Implications," in Technology and Ecology, ed. Larry A. Hickman and Elizabeth F. Porter (Carbondale, Ill.: Society for Philosophy and Technology Press, 1993), 64-81.
108. See Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980), 293.
109. Paul W. Taylor, Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 75. Taylor does not base his biocentrism on the rights of individual nonhuman organisms, but rather on their status as "teleological centers of life." (Taylor, Respect for Nature, 122) He does allow that human beings have the right to destroy predatory organisms, such as the smallpox virus, on grounds of self defense. (Taylor, Respect for Nature, 264.)
110. Taylor, Respect for Nature, 99.
111. Max Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991).
112. Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness, 228.
113. Aldo Leopold, "Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest," in The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays, ed. Susan L. Flader and J. Baird Callicott (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 95.
114. Leopold withheld "Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest" from publication during his lifetime.
115. Aldo Leopold, "Game and Wild Life Conservation," in The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays, ed. Susan L. Flader and J. Baird Callicott (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 166.
116. Aldo Leopold, Game Management (New York: Scribner, 1936).
117. Oelschlaeger, The Idea of Wilderness, 227.
118. Nathaniel T. Wheelwright, "Enduring Reasons to Preserve Threatened Species," The Chronicle of Higher Education, June 1, 1994, B2.
119. Aldo Leopold, "The Conservation Ethic," in The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays, ed. Susan L. Flader and J. Baird Callicott (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 183.
120. Thomas H. Huxley, Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays (New York: D. Appleton, 1896), 81-83, et passim. Quoted in EW 5.36.
121. See, however, the argument of Bob Pepperman Taylor that Dewey's view of nature represents no advance over that of Locke. Bob Pepperman Taylor, "John Dewey and Environmental Thought," in Environmental Ethics 12, no. 2, (Summer 1990): 183. Dewey was in fact quite critical of Locke's view of nature.
122. Locke, Dewey writes, "was completely under the domination of the ruling idea of his time: namely, that Nature is the norm of truth." Further, "Nature is both beneficent and truthful in its work; it retains all the properties of the Supreme Being whose vice-regent it is" (MW 8.59). The irony here is that if Dewey's reading of Locke is correct, then his (Locke's) view of nature is much closer to that of the idealistic environmentalists such as Paul Taylor than it is to Dewey's view. This is a point that Bob Pepperman Taylor apparently misses.
123. See Frederic L. Bender, "The Gaia Hypothesis: Philosophical Implications," 68-71.
124. Eric Katz, "The Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature," Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1992): 240.
125. See William R. Jordan III, " 'Sunflower Forest': Ecological Restoration as the Basis for a New Environmental Paradigm," in Beyond Preservation: Restoring and Inventing Landscapes, ed. A. Dwight Baldwin Jr., Judith De Luce and Carl Pletsch (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994), 17-34.
126. Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 251.
127. This is a slightly revised version of an essay by the same name published in Research in Philosophy and Technology 18 (1999): 39-56.
128. "America's Philosopher Attains an Alert 90," New York Times Magazine, October 16, 1949, 17, 74-75.
129. Larry A. Hickman, John Dewey's Pragmatic Technology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).
130. Robert B. Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), 75. STL, 330 refers to MW 2.330.
131. J. Baird Callicott, "On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species," in The Preservation of Species, ed. Bryan G. Norton (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), 142.
132. Callicott, "On the Intrinsic Value of Nonhuman Species," 161.
133. J. Baird Callicott, "Intrinsic Value in Nature: A Metaethical Analysis," Electronic Journal of Analytical Philosophy 3 (Spring 1995): 59. Emphasis added.
134. J. Baird Callicott, "The Pragmatic Power and Promise of Theoretical Environmental Ethics: Forging a New Discourse," Environmental Values 11, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 17.
135. Brian G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism," Environmental Ethics 6 (Summer 1984): 134.
136. This is ironic, of course, because one of the great antagonists of the idealists of this period was G. E. Moore. "Eaton," Dewey's name for the character who presents the Pragmatist position, is also significant. It is probably a reference to the fact that we must eat to live.
137. Michael E. Zimmerman, "Quantum Theory, Intrinsic Value, and Panentheism," Environmental Ethics 10 (Spring 1988): 27.
138. Michael E. Zimmerman, "What Can Continental Philosophy Contribute to Environmentalism?" in Rethinking Nature, ed. Bruce V. Foltz and Robert Frodeman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004): 222.
139. Holmes Rolston III, "Values Gone Wild," Inquiry 26 (June 1983), 183. Emphasis on last two words added.
140. Holmes Rolston III, Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986), 44.
141. Rolston, "Values Gone Wild," 197.
142. Aldo Leopold, "Some Fundamentals of Conservation in the Southwest," in The River of the Mother of God and Other Essays, ed. Susan L. Flader and J. Baird Callicott (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991), 166.
143. This chapter was first published in Contemporary Philosophy, Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 2000), 8:221-31.
144. An earlier version of this chapter was published as "Cultivating a Common Faith: John Dewey on Religion and Education," in the Korean Journal of Religious Education 18, no. 6 (2004): 59-77 (in English); 79-95 (in Korean).
145. Michael Eldridge, Transforming Experience (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998), 141.
146. Charlene Haddock Seigfried, "Pragmatism" in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 730.
147. Eldridge, Transforming Experience, 141.
148. This chapter is a revision of "Dewey's Theory of Inquiry," in Reading Dewey: Interpretations for a Postmodern Generation, ed. Larry A. Hickman (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 166-86.
149. William James, Pragmatism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), 63-64.
150. See, for example, Alonzo Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, vol. 1 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1956), 26-27.
151. Sidney Hook, The Metaphysics of Pragmatism (Chicago: Open Court, 1927).
152. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 139.
153. Bergson, Creative Evolution, 23.
154. Max Scheler, "Mensch und Geschichte," in Philosophische Weltanschauung (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1954).
155. Max Scheler, Man's Place in Nature (New York: Noonday, 1961).
156. Scheler, "Mensch und Geschichte," 73-74.
157. Scheler, Man's Place in Nature, 35.
158. Scheler, "Mensch und Geschichte," 67.
159. Scheler, Man's Place in Nature, 36.
160. Scheler, Man's Place in Nature, 73.
161. This chapter is a revised version of "The Products of Pragmatism," in Living Doubt: Essays Concerning the Epistemology of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. G. Debrock and M. Hulswit (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 13-26.
162. Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), 304.
163. Max Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, (New York: Seabury Press, 1974 [1947]), 42ff. "The core of this philosophy [Pragmatism] is the opinion that an idea, a concept, or a theory is nothing but a scheme or plan of action, and therefore truth is nothing but the successfulness of the idea."
164. Lewis Mumford, The Golden Day (New York: Dover, 1968), 137.
165. Richard Bernstein, Praxis and Action (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), xiii.
166. Don Ihde, Technics and Praxis (Boston: D. Reidel, 1979), 117.
167. Larry A. Hickman, "Why Peirce Didn't Like Dewey's Logic," Southwest Philosophy Review 3 (1986): 178-89.
168. William James, Psychology: Briefer Course (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 132.
169. George Gentry, "Habit and the Logical Interpretant," in Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Philip P. Wiener and Frederic H. Young (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), 75-90.
170. "I need not repeat that I do not say that it is the single deeds that constitute the habit. It is the single 'ways,' which are conditional propositions, each general" (5:510).
171. Gentry, "Habit and the Logical Interpretant," 78.
172. Charles S. Peirce, The New Elements of Mathematics, ed. Carolyn Eisele (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976), 4: 142.