Trust on the brink of Armageddon: The first-strike game

European Economic Review

Volumn 67, Issue , 2014, Pages 190-196

  Abbink, Klaus ^a   de Haan, Thomas ^b  

^a MONASH UNIVERSITY   (Australia)

^b UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Deterrence; Fear; Laboratory experiment; Spite; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 84894488291     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.01.009     Document Type: Article

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