Must we be faithful to original meaning?

Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 57-86

  Balkin, Jack M ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84893096913     PISSN: 22197117     EISSN: 22197125     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jrls/jlt022     Document Type: Article

References (43)

1. Reem Segev, The Argument for (Living) Originalism: Comments on Jack Balkin's Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 35 (2013).
2. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 7, 17-18 (2005) (noting the remarkably democratic features - for its time - of the Constitution's ratification process).
3. For a discussion of the undemocratic features of the American Constitution, see SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED!: AMERICA'S FIFTY-ONE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012).
4. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006).
5. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).
6. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE The PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1988). Ackerman's brilliant and provocative theory, however, is not the generally accepted understanding of American constitutional history.
7. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 38, 50 (2011).
8. For one suggestion, see Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) (arguing that a nationwide referendum is sufficient to amend the Constitution).
9. See Bernadette Meyler, Towards a Common Law Originalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 551, 558 (2006).
10. Several commentators have argued that this limitation is the best reading. See, eg, Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1683, 1722-33 (2009).
11. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2040 (2012).
12. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 53, 62, 77, 233, 248, 255, 257, 348, 379, 423 (1987).
13. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 12-14, 61-72, 178-83 (2011).
14. Randy E. Barnett, Welcome to the New Originalism: A Comment on Jack Balkin's Living Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 42, 47 (2013).
15. See Balkin, supra note 8, at 352-3, n 16. Akhil Amar has offered a masterful demonstration of the multiple ways that American legal culture uses the constitutional text to generate meaning. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY (2012).
16. See Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L. J. 1 (2008).
17. John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L. J. 1385, 1390, 1396, 1435-8 (1992).
18. DAVID CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS 349 (1985).
19. Barak Medina, "Foundational" Originalism?: On Jack Balkin's Living Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (2013).
20. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010).
21. See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Workarounds, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1499 (2009).
22. For one such proposal, see National Popular Vote, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/. This solution is not perfect because the winning candidate may receive only a plurality of the popular vote, and not an absolute majority. It would take more work to organize an "instant runoff" ballot that would always produce a majority.
23. Andrei Marmor has made a similar point. Andrei Marmor, Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation, FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
24. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 11, 12-13, 88 & n. (1980). Quite the contrary, I assume that interpreters should try to understand how the different parts of a constitution work together. More interesting examples are structural principles that are not explicitly stated in the text but that are presumed by the interaction of the Constitution's different parts, like the separation of powers and federalism. Structural principles are technically constitutional constructions that we infer from the text. But some of them are so essential to the operation of the framework that we would seriously misunderstand the Constitution if we neglected them.
25. Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498, 544 (2011).
26. Jed Rubenfeld argues that the paradigmatic cases involving individual rights or national powers in which the adopters expected the text would apply are binding on later generations because they are part of our constitutional commitments. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 15 (Harvard University Press 2005).
27. Solum, Construction and Constraint: Discussion of Living Originalism, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 17, 31 (2013).
28. Gideon Sapir, Living Originalism - The Jewish Version, 7 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 49 (2013).
29. Id. at 4. See also Yaakov Elman, R. Zadok Hakohen on the History Of Halakha, 21 TRADITION 1-26 (1985) (tracing the history of the problem).
30. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
31. RAOUL BERGER: GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977).
32. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
33. Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 212-13, 220-1 (1980).
34. See, eg, Curtis A. Bradley and Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411 (2012) (canvassing current theories of historical practice and offering a new theory of when and how past precedents should affect the separation of powers).
35. LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 143, 145 (1865) ("It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases necessarily used in such a charter; more especially those which divide legislation between the general and local governments; and that it might require a regular course of practice to liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them.").
36. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 37 (5th ed. 2006).
37. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 227-33 (1957).
38. See Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 U. VA. L. REV. 1, 11-14, n. 33 (2001). Madison seems to have believed that liquidation could only allow subsequent interpreters to choose from among a set of plausible constructions; it did not allow them to repeal or alter the existing law. Id. at 13.
39. Sapir, supra note 66, at 11. See Yaakov Elman, Rabbi Moses Samuel Glasner: The Oral Torah, 25 TRADITION 63-9 (1991), available at .
40. Babylonian Talmud Temurah 14b; see also Babylonian Talmud Gittin 60b. Given the actual history of Talmudic development, one must take these prohibitions with a grain of salt. See H. L. STRACK AND GÜNTER STEMBERGER, INTRODUCTION TO THE TALMUD AND MIDRASH 31-4 (Markus Bockmuehl, trans., 2d. ed. 1996) ("the doctrine of the oral Torah in rabbinic times did not result in a prohibition of writing.").
41. As Sapir explains, this is also Glasner's view. Sapir, supra note 66, at 11, n. 28; Elman, supra note 85. In contrast, Jacques Derrida's has famously argued that many of the strengths and weaknesses commonly associated with oral communication are also true of writing, and vice versa. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (1976). Thus, Derrida might suggest that a system of continuous writing and interpretation can also provide ample opportunity for creativity.
42. Sapir, supra note 66, at 10-11. One might also point to Rabbi David Hartman's liberal Orthodox Judaism. See DAVID HARTMAN, A HEART OF MANY ROOMS: CELEBRATING THE MANY VOICES WITHIN JUDAISM 50 (1999).
43. DAVID HARTMAN, A LIVING COVENANT: The INNOVATIVE SPIRIT IN TRADITIONAL JUDAISM 36 (1995).