Do Natural Resource Revenues Hinder Financial Development? The Role of Political Institutions

World Development

Volumn 57, Issue , 2014, Pages 101-113

  Bhattacharyya, Sambit ^a,b   Hodler, Roland ^b,c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LUCERNE   (Switzerland)

^d CESIFO   (Germany)

Author keywords

Financial development; Natural resources; Political institutions

Indexed keywords

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; FINANCE; INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK; NATURAL RESOURCE; POLITICAL INTEGRATION; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

EID: 84892976531     PISSN: 0305750X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2013.12.003     Document Type: Article

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