What is the 'Cause' in Causal Decision Theory?

Erkenntnis

Volumn 78, Issue SUPPL1, 2013, Pages 129-146

  Hitchcock, Christopher ^a  

^a CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891852784     PISSN: 01650106     EISSN: 15728420     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10670-013-9440-9     Document Type: Article

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