Regret and instability in causal decision theory

Synthese

Volumn 187, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 123-145

  Joyce, James M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

Author keywords

Causal decision theory; Decision instability; Dynamics of deliberation; Expected utility; Ratifiability; Reflection principle; Regret

Indexed keywords

EID: 84863219143     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-0022-6     Document Type: Article

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