Presidents and the Political Economy: The Coalitional Foundations of Presidential Power

Presidential Studies Quarterly

Volumn 42, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 101-131

  Hacker, Jacob S ^a   Pierson, Paul ^b  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84891545927     PISSN: 03604918     EISSN: 17415705     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-5705.2012.03943.x     Document Type: Article

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