A practical use of imperfect recall

SARA 2009 - Proceedings, 8th Symposium on Abstraction, Reformulation and Approximation

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 175-182

  Waugh, Kevin ^a   Zinkevich, Martin ^b   Johanson, Michael ^a   Kan, Morgan ^a   Schnizlein, David ^a   Bowling, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^b YAHOO RESEARCH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

FINE GRANULARITY; IMPERFECT RECALL; LIMIT EQUILIBRIUM; PERFECT RECALLS; PRACTICAL USE; THEORETICAL GUARANTEES;

ALGORITHMS;

ABSTRACTING;

EID: 84890303245     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: None     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (15)

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