The determinants of federal and state enforcement of workplace safety regulations: OSHA inspections 1990-2010

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 1-33

  Jung, Juergen ^a   Makowsky, Michael D ^b  

^a TOWSON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE   (United States)

Author keywords

Decentralization; Enforcement; Occupational safety; Regulation

Indexed keywords

EID: 84889600502     PISSN: 0922680X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-013-9229-4     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Agency, O. S. A. H. (2011). OSHA Fact Sheet. Washington, DC. http://www. osha. gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections. pdf. Accessed 6 Jan 2013.
2. Angrist, J., Chernozhukov, V., & Fernandez-Val, I. (2006). Quantile regression under misspecification, with an application to the US wage structure. Econometrica, 74(2), 539-563.
3. Arrow, K. J., Cropper, M. L., Eads, G. C., Hahn, R. W., Lave, L. B., Noll, R., et al. (1996). Is there a role for benefit-cost analysis in environmental, health, and safety regulation? Science, 272(5259), 221-222.
4. Atlas, M. (2007). Enforcement principles and environmental agencies: Principal-agent relationships in a delegated environmental program. Law & Society Review, 41(4), 939-980.
5. Axtell, R. (2001). Zipf distribution of U. S. firm sizes. Science, 293, 1818-1820.
6. Baron, D. P. (1994). Electoral competition with informed and uniformed voters. The American Political Science Review, 88(1), 33-47.
7. Bawn, K. (1995). Political control versus expertise: Congressional choices about administrative procedures. The American Political Science Review, 89(1), 62-73.
8. Bradbury, J. C. (2006). Regulatory federalism and workplace safety: Evidence from OSHA enforcement, 1981-1995. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29(2), 211-224.
9. Croley, S. P. (1998). Theories of regulation: Incorporating the administrative process. Columbia Law Review, 98(1), 1-168.
10. Ferejohn, J., & Shipan, C. (1990). Congressional influence on bureaucracy. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 6, 1-20. (ArticleType: research-article / Issue Title: Special Issue: [Papers from the Organization of Political Institutions Conference, April 1990] / Full publication date: 1990 / Copyright 1990 Oxford University Press).
11. Gawande, K., & Bohara, A. K. (2005). Agency problems in law enforcement: Theory and application to the U. S. Coast Guard. Management Science, 51(11), 1593-1609.
12. Gray, W. B., & Jones, C. A. (1991a). Are OSHA health inspections effective? A longitudinal study in the manufacturing sector. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 73(3), 504-508.
13. Gray, W. B., & Jones, C. A. (1991b). Longitudinal patterns of compliance with occupational safety and health administration health and safety regulations in the manufacturing sector. The Journal of Human Resources, 26(4), 623-653.
14. Gray, W. B., & Mendeloff, J. M. (2005). The declining effects of OSHA inspections on manufacturing injuries, 1979-1998. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 58(4), 571-587.
15. Gray, W. B., & Scholz, J. T. (1993). Does regulatory enforcement work? A panel analysis of OSHA enforcement. Law & Society Review, 27(1), 177-213.
16. Gray, W. B., & Shimshack, J. P. (2011). The effectiveness of environmental monitoring and enforcement: A review of the empirical evidence. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 5(1), 3-24.
17. Hahn, R. W., & Tetlock, P. C. (2008). Has economic analysis improved regulatory decisions? The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(1), 67-84.
18. Helland, E. (1998). The enforcement of pollution control laws: Inspections, violations, and self-reporting. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80(1), 141-153.
19. Kim, D. R. (2008). Political control and bureaucratic autonomy revisited: A multi-institutional analysis of OSHA enforcement. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 18, 33-55.
20. Leung, S. F., & Yu, S. (1996). On the choice between sample selection and two-part models. Journal of Econometrics, 72(1-2), 197-229.
21. Machado, J. A. F., Parente, P. M. D. C., & Santos Silva, J. M. C. (2012). QREG2: Stata module to perform quantile regression with robust standard errors. Statistical Software Components.
22. Makowsky, M. D., & Stratmann, T. (2009). Political economy at any speed: What determines traffic citations. American Economic Review, 99(1), 509-527.
23. Moe, T. M. (1982). Regulatory performance and presidential administration. American Journal of Political Science, 26(2), 197-224.
24. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U. S. C. 651-678 (1976).
25. Peterson, M. A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: Comparing approaches. The Review of Financial Studies, 22(1), 435-480.
26. Puhani, P. (2000). The Heckman correction for sample selection and its critique. Journal of Economic Surveys, 14(1), 53-68.
27. Reiss, A. J, Jr. (1984). Consequences of compliance and deterrence models of law enforcement for the exercise of police discretion. Law and Contemporary Problems, 47(4), 83-122.
28. Scholz, J. T. (1986). Regulatory enforcement in a federalist system. The American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1249-1270.
29. Scholz, J. T. (1991). Cooperative regulatory enforcement and the politics of administrative effectiveness. The American Political Science Review, 85(1), 115-136.
30. Scholz, J. T., & Gray, W. B. (1997). Can government facilitate cooperation? An informational model of OSHA enforcement. American Journal of Political Science, 41(3), 693-717.
31. Scholz, J. T., & Wei, F. H. (1986). Regulatory enforcement in a federalist system. American Political Science Review, 80(4), 1249-1270.
32. Scicchitano, M. J., & Hedge, D. M. (1993). From coercion to partnership in federal partial preemption: SMCRA, RCRA, and OSH act. Publius, 23(4), 107-121.
33. Shimshack, J. P., & Ward, M. B. (2005). Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50(3), 519-540.
34. Shughart, W. F., Tollison, R. D., & Goff, B. L. (1986). Bureaucratic structure and congressional control. Southern Economic Journal, 52(4), 962-972.
35. Sunstein, C. R. (2008). Is OSHA unconstitutional? Virginia Law Review, 94(6), 1407-1449.
36. U. S. D. o. Labor (2011). OSHA Fact Sheet. U. S. D. o. Labor. Washington, DC.
37. Viscusi, W. K. (1996). Economic foundations of the current regulatory reform efforts. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(3), 119-134.
38. Viscusi, W. K., Harrington, J. E., & Vernon, J. M. (2005). Economics of regulation and antitrust (4th ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
39. Weil, D. (1992). Building safety: The role of construction unions in the enforcement of OSHA. Journal of Labor Research, 13(1), 121-132.
40. Weil, D. (1996). If OSHA is so bad, why is compliance so good? RAND Journal of Economics, 27(3), 618-640.
41. Weingast, B. R., & Moran, M. J. (1983). Bureaucratic discretion or congressional control? Regulatory policymaking by the federal trade commission. The Journal of Political Economy, 91(5), 765-800.