Sciences immunity to moral refutation

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 91, Issue 4, 2013, Pages 633-653

  Barber, Alex ^a  

^a OPEN UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

moral epistemology; moral immunity; moral realism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84889590246     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2013.768279     Document Type: Article

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