Users get routed: Traffic correlation on Tor by realistic adversaries

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 337-348

  Johnson, Aaron ^a   Wacek, Chris ^b   Jansen, Rob ^a   Sherr, Micah ^b   Syverson, Paul ^a  

^a NAVAL RESEARCH LABORATORY   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

anonymity; metrics; onion routing

Indexed keywords

ADVERSARY MODELING; ANONYMITY; AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS; INTERNET EXCHANGE POINTS; METRICS; NETWORK CONFIGURATION; ONION ROUTING; TOPOLOGICAL MODELS;

COMPUTER AIDED NETWORK ANALYSIS; INTERNET;

NETWORK SECURITY;

EID: 84889028646     PISSN: 15437221     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/2508859.2516651     Document Type: Conference Paper

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